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Abstract 
 
Scholars have been working on the proliferation question since the detonation of first the 
atomic bombs in 1945. Yet despite over six decades of fears about the rapid spread of 
nuclear weapons, only ten states now posses the bomb; and of these only Israel, India, 
Pakistan, and North Korea developed their weapons after the Treaty for the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature in 1968.  
 Nevertheless, numerous states have clandestinely pursued nuclear weapons 
despite their treaty obligations and the robustness of the nonproliferation norm. What 
factors prompt some leaders to pursue nuclear weapons, while the vast majority of others 
choose to rely on the nonproliferation regime, external guarantees, or a combination of 
the two, for security? To answer this question this study compares nuclear decision-
making in one state that chose to proliferate - Iran - and a state that did not - Turkey - 
from the mid-1950s, when they first showed interest in nuclear energy, to the present. To 
maximize the total number of observations, the study analyzes every nuclear decision 
made during this period in an attempt to identify the subjective variables influencing 
decision-makers in both countries.  
 It will be further argued that nuclear decision-making is multi-causal, owing to 
different conceptions of similar external inputs. As such, nuclear decision-making is 
country specific, requiring in-depth research to determine the dynamics of proliferation in 
different countries to determine the reasons why individual states choose to proliferate, 
compared to the majority that have embraced nonproliferation.  
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Introduction: The World’s Most Powerful Weapon 
 
In August 1945, the United States’ military dropped two atomic bombs on the 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The weapons’ power changed the way 
military strategists conceived of war. Bernard Brodie, the American architect of 
deterrence theory, reasoned that in the atomic era, nations must remain forever prepared 
for war or otherwise risk tempting a nuclear-armed adversary to launch a preventative 
attack. For Brodie, the destructive power of nuclear weapons rendered traditional defense 
obsolete, and thus required the maintenance of a credible capability to strike an enemy’s 
cities.  
Brodie’s mentor, Jacob Viner, coined the term deterrence in November 1945, 
telling the audience that a well prepared and nuclear armed adversary could retain the 
capacity to respond to any first strike by enemy. As such, both sides could be deterred 
from launching a first strike, so long as the adversary retained the capability to strike 
back. This fundamental assumption has underpinned nuclear strategy ever since. The 
notion of deterrence has also influenced the study of nonproliferation and the 
assumptions made about why states seek out nuclear weapons. If an adversary acquires a 
weapon with the destructive power of an atomic bomb, then the rival state must seek out 
an effective defense. 
As Brodie articulated in his seminal work on the topic, The Absolute Weapon, 
deterrence was the only rational policy in the nuclear weapons era.1 Thus, if a rival state 
is suspected of pursuing, or has acquired a nuclear weapon, it is rational for a state to 
seek out atomic arms to ensure state survival. This pessimistic assumption about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bernard Brodie (ed.) The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1946).   
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dynamics of proliferation, in turn, has resulted in the prevalence of realist/neo-realist 
arguments about proliferation decision-making. In an anarchic world where power begets 
power, states have an interest in obtaining history’s most destructive weapon. And, if one 
state acquires this weapon, a rival state will take steps to also acquire nuclear weapons. 
Balanced against this pessimistic assumption are other explanations for nuclear 
decision-making. Like Brodie in 1945, many of the American scientists responsible for 
the development of nuclear weapons argued that the physics needed to develop nuclear 
weapons were widely known; and thus proliferation was inevitable. Thus, to prevent 
future catastrophe, the United States must disarm, in favor of a global regime responsible 
for overseeing nuclear research. This proposal was never fully implemented, although 
many of its component parts were used first in the United States’ Atoms for Peace 
initiative, and then the supranational International Atomic Energy Agency. Thus, to 
explain why states forego nuclear weapons, some scholars point to the weapon’s 
indiscriminate lethality. This lethality, in turn, has resulted in a prohibitive norm against 
the weapons’ use.  
Indeed, despite the prevalence of the security centric explanations about nuclear 
decision-making, few states have developed nuclear weapons. This slow pace of 
proliferation has prompted scholars to examine the dynamics of proliferation to 
determine: Why do certain states proliferate, whereas most choose to forego nuclear 
weapons? To date, scholars have yet to settle on a definition of these dynamics, owing to 
continued disagreement about the reasons for nuclear decision-making. To address this 
lacuna in the nonproliferation scholarship, this study examines nuclear decision-making 
in two similar states, Iran and Turkey.  
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Both countries are heirs to historic empires, sit at the periphery of the Middle 
East, were close allies of the United States for much of the Cold War, and have expressed 
a prolonged interest in nuclear energy. Furthermore, both countries had an antagonistic 
relationship with the Soviet Union and, by extension, were wary of the spread of Soviet-
allied pan-Arab nationalist states along their borders. As such, one should expect Turkey 
and Iran to have viewed nuclear weapons similarly, owing to their shared threat 
perceptions. Furthermore, when the first normative mechanisms against proliferation 
were drafted, neither Iran nor Turkey had nuclear weapons, both faced key technical 
constraints that hindered independent nuclear weapons/energy development, and were 
reliant upon foreign actors for nuclear expertise. For these reasons, one should also have 
expected a similar reaction to supranational effort to control nuclear technology.  
Further to this, after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s relationship with the 
United States changed. After this change in government, the Iranian leadership made the 
decision to proliferate. This key data-point allows for the study of a so-called “deviant 
case,” as compared to the more typical decision-making processes in Turkey (1954-
present) and pre-1979 Iran. According to Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, the 
selection of a so-called deviant case study that breaks from traditional nonproliferation 
explanations (either through restraint when exposed to so-called “triggers” or foregoing 
restraint in favor or proliferation during an era of wide acceptance of nonproliferation 
norms) “may provide significant theoretical insights” for scholars.2  
As James Walsh notes in Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas and Institutions in 
International Politics, nonproliferation scholarship has traditionally suffered from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in 
Social Sciences (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 6-7. 
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“dependent variable problem.” Most case studies, Walsh notes, focus on the behavior of 
nuclear weapons states, which has therefore resulted in case study selection bias; leading 
to flawed conclusions about the dynamics of proliferation.3 Thus, by comparing two 
states that made different nuclear decisions, this study seeks to overcome the traditional 
selection bias in nonproliferation scholarship to help answer: why some states choose to 
proliferate, whereas others do not. To do so, this study focuses on the following question: 
Do similar states respond similarly to the same external inputs?  
By selecting these two cases, this study intends to address the inherent selection 
bias Walsh outlined because these two non-nuclear weapons states have rich nuclear 
histories that lend itself to the process tracing method. As such, this study’s dependent 
variable is: Iran and Turkey’s nuclear decisions. The two countries’ similarities vis-à-vis 
security concerns and nonproliferation norms, in turn, serve as this study’s independent 
variables. For the purposes of this study, these independent variables are defined as 
“external inputs,” and include: security, norms, and the influence of key-decision makers. 
This study’s research design is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 (which also 
included this study’s literature review). Briefly, to maximize the number of observations, 
this study uses case study analysis and the process tracing method. By maximizing the 
number of nuclear decisions observed, this study intends to test dominant 
nonproliferation theories (described in this study’s literature review) to understand the 
dynamics of nuclear decision-making in Iran and Turkey. In doing so, this study adds to 
knowledge in two ways: First, it generates new hypotheses about reasons for nuclear 
decision-making in Iran and Turkey. Second, and relatedly, these observations are then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 James Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas and Institutions in International Politics,” 
(PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001), pp. 7-8.  
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used to draw conclusions about the best way to make predictive models about nuclear 
decision-making in different countries. 
To discern and then compare these two countries’ nuclear choices, this study 
compares a total of 142 nuclear related decisions (65 Turkish, compared to 77 Iranian 
nuclear decisions).4 In doing so, this study’s aim is twofold: First, to measure whether 
Iran and Turkey made similar decisions when exposed to a similar input. Second, to test 
the dominant theories for nuclear proliferation/restraint, as described in this study’s 
literature review (Chapter 2).  
The bulk of this study relies upon Western primary sources to document Iran and 
Turkey’s nuclear histories. To account for source bias, this study uses primary Turkish 
and Iranian sources wherever possible. However, neither Iran nor Turkey has historical 
documents detailing the country’s nuclear history – and nuclear decisions. As such, for 
much of the historical narrative, this study relied upon American archival records, which 
document the negotiations for civil nuclear energy cooperation and nuclear weapons 
defense planning. This method raises some obvious problems, owing to lack of officials 
Turkish and Iranian sources. To overcome this problem, this study used Turkish and 
Iranian secondary sources (newspaper articles) to supplement the western documentation. 
Furthermore, wherever possible, current and government officials were interviewed to 
provide a more complete picture of Turkish and Iranian nuclear decision-making.  
With regards to Iran’s post-1979 nuclear program, much of this study’s 
conclusions about nuclear weapons intent are based on International Atomic Energy 
Agency reports. Iran provided much of the information in these reports, but has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 These observations are recounted in two charts in the findings section under the sub-
heading aggregate data. 
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vehemently denied allegations contained in numerous different reports of a nuclear 
weapons program. The IAEA, in contrast, has deemed the allegations credible, owing to 
its own investigative work and information supplied to it by numerous different member 
states. For the purposes of this study, the IAEA data about the weapons program was 
deemed credible, and is thus used to draw conclusions about Iran’s nuclear weapons 
intent.  
To test this study’s hypothesis - similar inputs should result in similar nuclear 
decisions – this study identified a set of common inputs (described in great detail in the 
methodology section). These inputs were placed in one of three broad categories: 
security, norms, and key-Individuals. To make a determinative judgment about the 
reasons for specific nuclear decisions, this study then identified a set of common inputs 
that resulted in a nuclear decision. By measuring how these inputs affected nuclear 
decision-making, this study sought to discern the reasons for Turkish and Iranian nuclear 
decision-making – and indeed identify the dynamics of proliferation to determine if they 
were similar.  
In doing so, this study addresses a key lacuna in nonproliferation scholarship: the 
reasons for divergent nuclear decision-making. Ultimately, this study finds that dynamics 
of proliferation decision-making are different in Iran and Turkey; and thus this study’s 
hypothesis is null: Similar inputs do not result in similar nuclear decisions. As such, one 
broader conclusion is that decision-making/policy-making are unique to different 
individuals. Thus while states may adopt similar policies – adherence to the Treaty on 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for example – the reasons for the decision may be 
different. The overarching lesson, therefore, is that decision-making is highly 
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individualistic. Nonproliferation scholarship must therefore account for the role of these 
key individuals when making determinative judgments about why certain states 
proliferate. 
The introduction and chapter two describe this study’s methodology and the 
current nonproliferation scholarship about the reasons for nuclear decision-making. This 
study’s three analytical chapters are organized around the three specific categories: 
security, norms, and key-Individuals. Each chapter contains a set of common inputs; from 
which the process tracing method is used to discern: 1) How each state responded to 
similar inputs; 2) And to answer: were the responses different/similar. This direct 
comparison then allows for the identification of the dynamics underpinning each 
country’s nuclear decisions, which therefore allows for a more rigorous comparison of 
the decision-making dynamics in each country. This comparison takes place in three 
analytical chapters organized around a set of common inputs; from which Turkey and 
Iran’s subsequent nuclear decisions are documented. The chapters directly compare how 
Turkey and Iran made policy in reaction this study’s independent variables.  
Chapter 3 describes how Turkish and Iranian leaders reacted to similar security 
related inputs. These inputs include: The Soviet threat during the Cold War; Turkish and 
Iranian doubts about the American security guarantee; the threat of regional proliferation; 
and the end of the Cold War and the bipolar global order. This study found that Turkey 
and Iran had different conceptions regional security issues and thus the leadership 
differed in how they conceived of nuclear weapons. For Ankara, nuclear weapons were 
thought of as vital for defending Turkish territory against a possible Soviet invasion. Iran, 
in contrast, turned down an American offer to rely on nuclear weapons for defense from 
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the Soviet Union, and instead opted for a conventional defense policy premised on 
détente with the Soviet Union and rivalry with Arab nationalism. However, after 1979, 
the two countries reacted differently to the threat of regional proliferation. Iran, for 
example, eventually chose to proliferate to defend against the Iraqi chemical weapons 
threat, whereas Turkey has gradually decreased the role of nuclear weapons for its 
defense, in favor of conventional defense. In total, this chapter suggests that security 
related inputs are not the cause of Turkish and Iranian nuclear decision-making. 
Chapter 4 documents how Turkey and Iran have approached nuclear 
nonproliferation norms to determine how they have affected nuclear decision-making. 
This study identified a common set of nuclear restraints:  
 
Nuclear Restraints 
1- Treaties/Nonproliferation Agreements  
2- Trade/Internationalizing Political Model 
3- Humanitarian/International Acceptance 
 
The data indicates that Turkey and Iran first became interested in nuclear energy after the 
United States offered to subsidize and assist with the development of small research 
programs. However, after negotiations finished for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Turkey and Iran adopted different nonproliferation policies. 
The Iranian leadership chose to sign and ratify the NPT, whereas Ankara resisted signing 
for more than a decade. Ankara eventually changed policy, after it became necessary to 
sign the Treaty to allow for the export of a nuclear reactor in the late 1970s.  
Turkey has since relied upon the nonproliferation regime to prevent the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction. Iran, in contrast, has steadily moved away from the regime; 
concluding in 1985 that global nonproliferation norms were too easily cast aside during 
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times of crises to be counted upon for security. In both cases, the approach to 
nonproliferation norms was consistent with the two countries’ different conception of 
security. Iran’s pre-1979 focus on the Arab world, for example, was reflected in the early 
embrace of nonproliferation. Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi had an incentive to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons to the countries he viewed as a threat. Turkey’s focus on 
the Soviet Union resulted in Ankara foregoing signature, owing to concerns about the 
Treaty’s impact on Turkey’s nuclear weapons centric battle plan. The data suggests that 
these conceptions nonproliferation norms were independent of humanitarian 
considerations, thus casting doubts on the notion of a “nuclear taboo” acting as an 
overarching restraint on Turkish and Iranian decision-making.  
Chapter 5 looks beyond the state as the unit of analysis, in favor of key decision-
makers. This chapter analyzed how individual key-decision makers approached the 
United States’ Atoms for Peace offer, the 1973 decision to pursue nuclear energy, and 
then Iran’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons in 1984. In this regard, this chapter differs 
from the previous two because of the singular discussion about the Iranian leadership’s 
decision to pursue nuclear weapons in 1984. Yet, in all cases, this section focused on the 
individual’s conception of nuclear energy/weapons and how those conceptions influence 
policy-making. In doing so, the chapter identifies key decision-makers, and how they 
influenced the direction of each country’s nuclear programs.  
The data suggests that the direction of each country’s nuclear program reflected 
the preferences of the person in charge. As such, the bureaucracy took direction from the 
program’s leadership. The leadership also had a tendency to use widely held “myths” 
about nuclear energy to justify decisions once they are made. Moreover, after Iran’s illicit 
	   13	  
nuclear program was revealed, widely held nuclear beliefs were grafted on to the 
founding tenets of the Islamic Revolution to justify the hitherto secret decisions to 
develop the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Taken together, the data suggests that 
myths are used to justify decisions made ex-post facto, rather than actually drive the key-
decision maker to pursue nuclear weapons.  
Turkey’s nuclear decision-making reflected the country’s historic energy poverty 
and its lack of financing options to procure nuclear reactors. Furthermore, after the 
country switched from a statist economic model to export oriented capitalism, Turkey 
adopted a unique financing model, whereby it requires the vendor to finance, build, own, 
and operate the reactor. In this regard, Turkey’s approach to nuclear energy differed 
considerably from Iran, which has relied on oil exports to fund its nuclear endeavors. For 
Turkey’s former leader, Turgut Ozal, nuclear energy eventually became a vehicle to 
attract foreign direct investment, and was thus viewed as being ancillary to his far 
broader plans to change Turkey’s economic system from autarky to export oriented 
capitalism. The Iranian leadership, in contrast, framed its post-1979 nuclear as the pursuit 
of technical independence – a key tenet of the Islamic Revolution. 
The dissertation concludes with a recounting of the ways in which Turkey and 
Iran responded differently to similar inputs. The data suggests that similar states respond 
differently to similar inputs; underscoring how nuclear decision-making is multi-causal 
and therefore not beholden to one single theory explaining proliferation decision-making. 
Furthermore, the data indicates that key-decision makers shaped the direction of Turkey 
and Iran’s nuclear program, which suggests that traditional unit of analysis –the state–
fails to capture the nuances and complexities inherent in nuclear decision-making.  
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Further to this, this study found that key decision-makers make policy, and 
therefore the nuclear programs in Iran and Turkey reflected the policy-preferences of 
these key individuals. These individuals, in turn, have differing set of 
opinions/conceptions about the value of nuclear energy/weapons. These divergent 
dynamics suggests a critical take-away: to determine the dynamics of nuclear decision-
making, one must look inside each country, identify key decision-makers, and document 
how they conceive of security and normative issues before making a determinative 
judgment about whether a country is likely to seek out nuclear weapons, or not. This 
model is in contrast to much of the focus on general abstract research, intended to 
identify a common set of “proliferation triggers” or “nuclear restraints” to explain 
proliferation decision-making more generally.   
The data has one overarching implication for policy-making: the reasons for 
nuclear decision-making differ, even in similar states, and thus there is no one model that 
explains why countries choose to pursue nuclear weapons. Thus, before making a 
judgment about the proliferation dynamics of a region based on the abstract variable of 
security or norms, one must account for the different way in which key decision makers 
view these two concepts. To do so requires a deeper knowledge of key decision-makers, 
how they conceive of specific security issues, and whether those conceptions include a 
predilection towards nuclear weapons. In this regard, this study found that, per Alexander 
L. George and Andrew Bennett’s argument about methodology, nonproliferation 
scholarship must be mindful of “how much gradations of a particular variable affect the 
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outcome in a certain case.”5 As such, state behavior may vary, depending on how they 
perceive of a potential “trigger” to proliferate (i.e., the security centric model of 
proliferation) compared to a potential restraint (i.e., how normative prohibitions against 
nuclear weapons impact key-decision makers.)  
Based on these findings, this study has resulted in the author’s formulation of a 
new hypothesis for nuclear decision-making: (1) Similar inputs do not result in similar 
nuclear decisions; (2) The availability of the heuristic influences nuclear decision-
making. These two hypotheses raise an obvious question for future scholars: (1) Do 
individual conceptions of security concerns and nonproliferation norms drive policy-
making in different countries? To test this question, scholars could compare two similar 
states (like this study) or examine two dissimilar states. In doing so, broader conclusions 
about the dynamics of proliferation can be discerned to help deepen the current 
scholarship about dynamics of proliferation. However, in all cases, scholars must be 
mindful that the lessons learned about one state may, in fact, not be transferable to 
another; depriving the nonproliferation field of a one size fits all approach to the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in 
Social Sciences, p. 25. 
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Chapter 2: Theories of Proliferation and Methodology 
 
After the development of nuclear weapons in 1945, much of the scholarly debate has 
equated the dynamics of proliferation with great power relations, and thus a symbol of 
the state’s efforts to either acquire greater power, or balance against the power acquired 
by a rival. Beginning in the 1960s, a rival school of thought emerged, attributing the lack 
of proliferation to growing normative constraints against the use of nuclear weapons. 
Further still, more recent scholarship has focused on the role individual’s play in nuclear 
decision-making, and whether a leader’s conception of nuclear energy/weapons 
underpins a state’s approach to nuclear decision-making. This chapter reviews the 
dominant theories of proliferation, before turning to this study’s methodology from which 
these theories are tested in the following analytical chapters.  
The study of proliferation has traditionally been dominated by the realist school of 
thought; thereby based on the assumption that rational actors will seek out nuclear 
weapons as a means of self-help and to maximize state power. Realism is premised on the 
assumptions that the world is anarchic and states turn inwards to balance against threats. 
Hans Morgenthau, whose work helped to create realism, argued that rational leaders work 
to accumulate more power. Thus, while Morgenthau acknowledges that states sometime 
make decisions without power considerations in mind, these decisions are rare and 
apolitical.6 After the use of nuclear weapons in 1945, realist scholars attributed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1948).  
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proliferation of nuclear weapons to state of international politics, and the need to acquire 
the means with which to balance against external threats.7  
The United States’ development and use of nuclear weapons, therefore, prompted 
the Soviet Union to pursue a nuclear weapon. The Soviet nuclear test in 1949, in turn, put 
in place the conditions needed for the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to the 
United Kingdom (1953) and France (1960). China’s nuclear program resulted from the 
United States threat to use nuclear weapons against Chinese targets during the Korean 
War, which ultimately explains why India developed nuclear weapons. India’s program, 
in turn, fueled Pakistan’s interest in nuclear weapons. This understanding of the drivers 
of proliferation lends itself to the proliferation chain analysis wherein the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons will prompt a rival state to pursue nuclear weapons, in order to balance 
against a nuclear threat. Indeed, such a decision would be rational, owing to the 
destructive power of nuclear weapons, which could tangentially give a nuclear weapons 
state the means with which to coerce its rival. 
Similar to this, neorealist theory includes the same basic assumptions as realism, 
albeit with more attention paid to the structural differences that drive decisions related to 
war and peace.8 Based on this understanding of the drivers of proliferation, realists and 
neorealists argue that the possession of nuclear weapons allows for states to balance 
against existential threats. For this reason, John Mearsheimer, Stephen Van Evera9, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  The most important work on neorealism is by Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). 
8  Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, vol. 18, no. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars 
(Spring, 1988), pp. 619-620. 
9 Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War,” International 
Security, vol. 15, no. 3 (Winter, 1990-1991), pp. 7-57. 
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Benjamin Frankel10 argued that the spread of nuclear weapons after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was inevitable, owing to balance of power issues in Europe, Eastern 
Europe, and Asia after the end of bipolarity.  
To this end, these scholars argued that Germany, Japan, and Ukraine would 
pursue nuclear weapons, in order to account for historical rivalries and the need to 
balance potential foes in the multi-polar post-Cold War world. This builds on the 
aforementioned proliferation chain argument wherein the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
to balance against a rival will similarly prompt another regional state to initiate its own 
nuclear weapons program.11 Lewis Dunn and Herman Khan, writing in Trends in Nuclear 
Proliferation, outlined fifteen proliferation scenarios that build on the proliferation chain 
narrative. Whilst the study accounted for the influence of subjective factors like the 
notion of “prestige,” the findings are closely linked to the assumptions made in 
neorealist/realist theories in that they ascribe decision-making to balancing 
considerations. Before publishing this work, Dunn warned in a private briefing to the 
U.S. State Department about the potential for a regional proliferation chain, whereby a 
Pakistani nuclear weapons program could prompt Tehran to seek out nuclear weapons, 
which would then prompt Ankara to do the same to match its neighbor’s power.12  
This linking of state-decision making to reactive policy-making, in turn, was the 
centerpiece of Dunn’s follow-on work on the subject of reactive proliferation making in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation,” vol. 2, no. 3/4 (Winter, 1991), pp. 37-78. 
11 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security, vol. 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 54-86.  
12 Lewis A. Dunn, Hudson Institute, “Iran and Nuclear Weapons,” Briefing Notes for 
Office of Director, Near East/South Asia Region, International Security Affairs, Major 
General Gordon Sumner, Jr., The Pentagon, July 29, 1975, Freedom of Information Act 
Release, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc08.pdf.  
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1976, with co-author William Overholt. In this follow-on article to Trends in Nuclear 
Proliferation, the authors argue that reactive decision-making underpin proliferation 
decision-making; suggesting that the future drivers of proliferation will be akin to the 
proliferation chain argument, and thereby “self-reinforcing.” As William Potter and 
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova note, the aforementioned Dunn/Khan forecast “has yet to be 
borne out,” but nevertheless “chain metaphors have become the terminological 
norm…for discussions of future proliferation.”13  
Yet, despite these pessimistic scenarios, most states that have the technical 
capacity to begin nuclear weapons programs have chosen to forego weapons 
development. This lack of proliferation has prompted a reevaluation of the linkage 
between realism/neo-realism and proliferation. To account for anomalies in realist/neo-
realist assumptions versus outcomes, so-called defensive and neoclassical realists have 
sought to include state preferences, beliefs, and international institutions in realist/neo-
realist’s methodological framework.  This expansion, in turn, leaves only two core realist 
assumptions: rationalism and anarchy.   
The erosion of the basic assumptions underpinning realism has raised 
methodological questions about the theory itself, particularly as it applies to proliferation 
forecasting. According to Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, this expansion of 
key assumptions has made the notion of realism so “malleable,” that it “now 
encompasses nearly the entire universe of international relations theory (including current 
liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theories) and excludes only a few intellectual 
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in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory, Volume I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010), p. 3. 
	   20	  
scarecrows (such as outright irrationality, widespread self-abnegating altruism, slavish 
commitment to ideology, complete harmony of state interests or a world state).”14 Legro 
and Moravcsik’s critique of modern realism hinges on methodological issues tied to the 
lack of core assumptions, which thereby prevents the proper testing of realist 
hypotheses.15 
Indeed, the history of nuclear decision-making is starkly at odds with the 
pessimistic assumptions associated with neorealist/realist scholars, which has resulted in 
nonproliferation scholars studying the notion of nuclear restraint. One argument for 
restraint stems from the oversized role the two superpowers played during the Cold War. 
Thus, absent bipolarity, new power dynamics in multi-polar Europe could trigger further 
proliferation. Mearsheimer, for example, argued, “The departure of the superpowers from 
Central Europe would transform Europe from a bipolar to a multipolar system,” raising 
the specter of states seeking nuclear weapons to balance, or to achieve military 
superiority. Mearsheimer argues that the spread of nuclear weapons would indeed be the 
“least dangerous option” for post-Cold War Europe, albeit only if “the process is well-
managed by the current nuclear powers.”16  
  Contrary to the Mearsheimer argument, William Potter argues that the United 
States and Russia retained an overarching interest in preventing proliferation after the end 
of bipolarity. This shared interest, which has its roots in shared concerns about the 
Chinese nuclear test in 1963, resulted in the two countries pursuing near identical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?,” International 
Security, vol. 24, no. 2 (Fall, 1999), p. 7. 
15 Ibid, p. 8. 
16 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” 
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990), p. 8. 
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approaches to nonproliferation.17 This cooperation continued after the end of the Cold 
War; notably the two sides worked together on nonproliferation issues in the post-Soviet 
states of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine to remove Soviet era nuclear weapons from 
these newly created states. 
After the end of the Cold War, Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program seriously 
challenged the nonproliferation order. In this case, the international community 
responded with the creation of a new and more comprehensive safeguards arrangement 
dubbed the Additional Protocol. This tool, in turn, has since been counted upon (between 
2003-2005; post-2015) to verify Iran’s declaration to the IAEA after its clandestine 
nuclear program was revealed in 2002. The internalization of the nonproliferation norm 
resulted in more weight being given to neo-liberal arguments about nuclear decision-
making. Like neo-realism, neo-liberal institiutionalists assume that the international order 
is anarchic and that states pursue policies based on self-interest. To do so, states pursue 
economic advancement, and are thereby more inclined to cooperate with one another to 
mitigate shared security concerns.18  
If applied to nuclear decision-making, one could then infer that states will rely on 
global nonproliferation instruments, such as the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, for security, and international institutions like the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to cooperate on nuclear issues.  However, as Potter and Mukhatzhanova 
note, “this proposition tends to be more implied than rigorously tested, and relatively few 
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18 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: 
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studies have south to demonstrate the influence of nonproliferation institutions on nuclear 
weapons restraint.”19  
Etel Solingen, in her book Nuclear Logics, put forward a liberal argument to 
explain why most states forego nuclear weapons, whereas a select few launch dedicated 
weapons programs. Solingen links nuclear decision-making to modes of “political 
survival” wherein countries with autarkic economic policies face fewer constraints when 
considering whether to develop nuclear weapons. Moreover, in these closed systems, 
leaders often ally with elements of the national security apparatus, which may be more 
predisposed towards a nuclear weapons capability for defensive reasons. Consequently, 
outward oriented governments – i.e. those that rely on export oriented capitalism – face 
greater proliferation constraints, owing to the composition of the ruling coalition, and a 
social contract with the citizens premised on economic growth. In nine case studies, 
Solingen compares nuclear decision-making in the Middle East versus that in Asia.  
Contrary to neo-liberal institutionalism and realism, Solingen’s study 
demonstrates that key decision-makers consider a wide array of factors when making 
choices. These choices also reflect differing opinions within states about the value of 
nuclear weapons – and relatedly, the value of remaining nuclear weapons free, or 
pursuing a nuclear weapons program.20  As such, Solingen posits a causal relationship 
between internationalizing governments and denuclearization, whereas inward oriented 
regimes (predominantly represented by Middle Eastern governments) are more amenable 
to proliferation or pursuing a combative policy emphasizing nuclear latency. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (eds.), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation 
in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory, Volume I, p. 5. 
20 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the Middle East 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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Constructivist IR theorists have posited yet another explanation for the absence of 
proliferation. Constructivism accepts international anarchy, whilst arguing that 
international norms influence state behavior; thus introducing the notion that policy-
making is influenced by human behavior. According to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink, “In a wide variety of issue areas, norms researchers have made inroads precisely 
because they have been able to provide explanations substantiated by evidence for 
puzzles in international politics that other approaches had been unable to explain 
satisfactorily.”21 These nonproliferation norms, Nina Tannenwald argues, have resulted in 
the creation of a “nuclear taboo” against the use of nuclear weapons. This taboo has 
pushed states towards the nonproliferation norm as the best means with which to prevent 
the spread – and use – of nuclear weapons.22  
Building on the notion of human influence on state decision-making, so-called 
“psychological” and “sociological” constructivists attribute specific nuclear decisions to 
individual leaders and their personal conceptions of the value of nuclear weapons; 
relatedly the equation of nuclear technology with political and economic 
independence/prestige/security. Jacques Hymans, author of The Psychology of Nuclear 
Proliferation, explains why so few “political leaders decided to endow their states with 
nuclear weapons.”23 Hymans’ core argument “is that oppositional nationalist leaders push 
for the bomb, while others do not.”24 These “oppositional nationalists,” according to 
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Hymans, “see their nation as both naturally at odds with another external enemy, and as 
naturally its equal if not superior,” and therefore “should want the bomb.”25  
Hymans’ argument is built, in part, upon the work of Ole Holsti, a political 
scientist at Duke University, who noted:  
It is generally recognized that an individual’s behavior is in large part shaped by 
the manner in which he perceives, diagnoses, and evaluates his physical and 
social environment. Similarly, it is recognized that in order to experience and 
cope with the complex, confusing reality of the environment, individuals have to 
form simplified, structured beliefs about the nature of their world.26  
 
Holsti’s approach to decision-making, in turn, is based on the work of Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman, who argue humans rely subjective variables, or the availability of the 
heuristic when making non-routine decisions about things with which they have no 
experience. This refers to psychological research suggesting that “when faced with the 
difficult task of judging probability or frequency, people employ a limited number of 
heuristics [i.e., mental shortcuts taken when making non-routine choices] which reduce 
these judgments to simpler ones,” using the “strength of association as a basis for the 
judgment of frequency.”27 In other words, people tend to rely on “gut feelings” to process 
complicated decisions about things they know little about, which Hymans refers to as a 
“leap in the dark” when leaders embark on a nuclear weapons program.28  
Itty Abraham, a so-called sociological constructivist, goes one step further than 
Hymans through his work to try and understand the cultural context that shapes a 
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decision-maker’s unique worldview. 29   Abraham argues that post-colonial states 
“fetishized” nuclear technology; using the development of nuclear related technologies 
for popular political gain designed to connote political strength, independence, and state 
power.30 Abraham uses the case of India’s nuclear program to demonstrate the link 
between the “post-colonial” urge to use the symbol of mastering nuclear technology as 
the means with which to ensure their place in the club of sovereign states. This emphasis 
on nuclear technology, in turn, allowed for leaders with nuclear weapons ambitions to 
build take advantage of what may have started as a peaceful nuclear program to 
proliferate. Abraham’s work underscores the ways in which culture influences decision-
making, whilst also accounting for individual and domestic debates about nuclear 
weapons/nuclear energy.  
Peter Lavoy has sought to bridge the gap between the so-called 
psychological/sociological constructivists and realists. Lavoy argues “a government is 
likely ‘to go nuclear’ when proficient and well positioned individuals who want their 
country to build nuclear bombs, exaggerate security threats to make the ‘myth of nuclear 
security’ more compelling.” The opposite is also true: mythmakers may also believe 
nuclear weapons make the country less secure and therefore argue for restraint.31 The 
success of either myth, Lavoy asserts, depends on three factors: the compatibility of the 
nuclear myth with cultural norms; the mythmaker’s ability to convince the key decision-
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maker of the saliency of nuclear weapons; the mythmakers inter-bureaucratic success in 
diverting funds to support a nuclear weapons program.32  
In this regard, Lavoy’s argument focuses on the inter-bureaucratic political 
maneuvering needed to support a weapons program, rather than the “trigger” or restraint 
that may push a state to proliferate. As such, policymakers must account for a leader’s 
statements about the bomb, internal policy debates, and the movement of key 
“mythmakers” to better judge whether a state intends to proliferate.33 Similar to this, 
Scott Sagan, in his seminal work, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three 
Models in Search of a Bomb,” presents an analytical framework comprising three 
proliferation models: the security model, the domestic politics model, and the norms 
model. Included in this model is the argument that powerful bureaucratic actors, working 
within the state’s scientific and military bureaucracies, could put pressure on key 
decision-makers to pursue nuclear weapons.34 
This dissertation focuses on Turkish and Iranian nuclear decisions to determine 
the so-called dynamics of proliferation/nonproliferation in each country. In doing so, this 
study addresses a key lacuna in nonproliferation scholars – the use of process tracing to 
compare nuclear decision in two different states that made different nuclear decisions. In 
doing so, this dissertation explores the domestic and international contexts in which Iran 
and Turkey made nuclear decisions.  
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According to Potter and Mukhatzhanova,“A growing body of research suggests 
that one cannot properly understand nuclear weapons (non)proliferation without 
reference to the domestic context in which nuclear decisions are made…Although the 
growth of alternative models of nuclear choice is a welcome development, there remains 
a paucity of theoretically informed research on the dynamics of nuclear proliferation.”35 
Similarly, Hymans notes, “the way forward for the proliferation literature is to develop 
our theories and to rigorously test new theoretical developments using systemic process 
training…The cutting edge of the proliferation literature today tries to explicate in detail 
the political processes that generate different nuclear choices.”36  
The selection of Iran and Turkey indirectly addresses other areas of interest in 
nonproliferation and strategic Middle Eastern studies37 and helps to enrich the ongoing 
debate about why states proliferate,38 owing to Turkey’s adoption of nonproliferation as a 
key component of its national security strategy in 1991, and Iran’s decision to proliferate 
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in 1985. The comparison is particularly apt due to the two countries’ similarities: these 
neighboring states share an imperial history, a common religion (albeit with a mjaoryt of 
the population from different sects), have a common border, are both highly centralized, 
and began their nuclear programs with American assistance in the mid-1950s. Thereafter, 
they faced similar technical constraints in the 1960s, and pursued nuclear energy 
programs in the 1970s - only to make different decisions about nuclear weapons starting 
in the 1980s.  
By tracing the process of Turkish and Iranian nuclear decision making from its 
onset to date, this dissertation seeks to maximize the total number of observations that 
allow for the identification of the different causal factors informing both countries’ 
different nuclear decisions. And while this work focuses only on these two cases, the 
findings could be used to explain the variance in nuclear decision-making in other states 
that are interested in pursuing nuclear energy for either peaceful or military ends.39 
The current nonproliferation/Middle Eastern scholarship focuses heavily on 
Ankara and Tehran’s recent nuclear histories rather than the full breadth of their nuclear 
choices. In doing so, the scholarship lacks a theoretical framework, and is thereby prone 
negative and probabilistic assessments of future state behavior. For example, Turkey 
scholars Leon Feurth,40 Henri Barkey,41 and Jessica Varnum42 argue that a combination 
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of growing Turkish nationalism, the increased threat posed by Iran, the erosion of the 
U.S. security guarantee, and a withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe 
could prompt Turkish leaders to reevaluate their commitment to the nonproliferation 
regime. Yet in making these observations the three scholars narrowly focus on Turkey’s 
propensity to proliferate, rather than identify the multi-causal and historical factors that 
have contributed to Ankara’s approach to nuclear issues and how those factors have 
shaped its current nuclear policies. These studies, therefore, are probabilistic in their 
determination about future proliferation behavior, rather than based on what one expects 
Turkey to do given its place in a bevy of constraints influencing decision-making.  
This omission, in turn, prevents a more in-depth analysis of Turkish nuclear 
decisions. And in so doing, these analyses do not consider the way in which Turkish 
leaders have, since the end of the Cold War, decreased the role of nuclear weapons for 
national security in favor of conventional weapons, while also embracing the 
nonproliferation norm to defend against potential proliferators like Iran. Moreover, the 
current studies discount the role economics play in Ankara’s approach to nuclear issues 
and do not discuss how Turkey’s reactor financing model hinders the development of 
nuclear weapons. Similarly, while Mustafa Kibaroglu has extensively discussed Turkey’s 
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Potter and Mukhatzhanova (eds.), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 229-54. 
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nuclear policies,43 his research has yet to account identify how economics and project 
financing considerations have driven Turkish nuclear decision-making since 1973.44  
In fact, the more realistic reason for Turkey’s limited nuclear progress is its 
unique financial requirements and the inability of external financiers to provide funding 
for the building of a Turkish reactor. It will be argued in this dissertation that Ankara’s 
pursuit of the Build, Operate, Own financing model help explain the underlying factors 
that Turkish leaders consider when making nuclear decisions. The nuclear energy 
decision, therefore, isn’t simply about nuclear energy but includes numerous other 
variables that leaders must take into account when making nuclear policy. This analysis 
allows for the identification of key subjective variables that influence key decision-
makers, which then allows for the scholars to identify the variables underpinning 
“domestic decision-making,” or the dynamics of proliferation decision-making.  
In the case of Iran, the bulk of the scholarship focuses on the post-1985 
enrichment program, rather than on the Shah’s early nuclear decision-making, the reasons 
for the program’s expansion in 1974, and the Islamic Republic’s nuclear policies starting 
in the 1980s. Little work, for example, has been done on the Islamic Republic’s decision-
making between 1979-1984 and the reasons for cancellation of the Shah’s nuclear 
program.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  See, for example,: Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Nuclear Power,” 
Nonproliferation Review,  vol. 4, no. 3 (Spring/Summer, 1997), pp. 33-44; idem, “Turkey 
and Shared Responsibilities,” in Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A 
Global Debate (American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2010); idem, “Acceptance and 
Anxiety: A Warm Reception: Turkey (Mostly) Embraces Obama’s Nuclear Posture,” 
Nonproliferation Review, 18/1 (March 2011), pp. 201-217. 
44 Idem, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power.” 
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Ambassador Dore Gold, for example, focuses heavily on Tehran’s clandestine 
nuclear enrichment program, the Iranian leadership’s approach to the nuclear negotiations 
with the P5+1 (The United States, Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany), and the 
way in which nuclear weapons compliment the worldview of the regime’s elites. Yet he 
does not discuss the evolution of Iran’s program and the ways in which the origins of the 
program - as far back as 1957 - have influenced the leadership’s current approach to 
nuclear issues.45 
The most detailed book about Iran’s nuclear program is David Patrikarakos’ 
Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State.46  It does not, however, discuss Iran’s nuclear 
decision-making in the 1950s and 1960s nor does it mention Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who, 
beginning in 1999, has allegedly overseen nuclear weapons specific experiments. Saira 
Khan also details Tehran’s nuclear history in Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted 
Conflict and Proliferation,47 but does not compare its decision-making with a state that 
opted not to proliferate, despite the presence of external security threats and protracted 
conflicts. 
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the former head of the Foreign Relations Committee 
of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and spokesman for its nuclear negotiating 
team, does discuss Tehran’s early nuclear decision-making in his memoir The Iranian 
Nuclear Crisis. However, his historical recounting does not document a number of 
critical elements like the Shah’s relative disinterest in nuclear-related issues until the late 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West (Washington, DC: 
Regenry Publishing Inc., 2009).  
46 David Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State (London: Tauris, 
2012).  
47  Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation 
(London: Routledge, 2010). 
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1960s-early 1970s, the reasons for the Islamic Republic’s embrace of nuclear technology 
in 1982, or the factors that contributed to the 1985 decision pursue an enrichment 
program. Moreover, the bulk of the narrative is a first person recounting of Iran’s post-
2003 negotiations with the EU-3 (Britain, Germany, and France) rather than a thorough 
documentation of the nuclear decisions made before the negotiations began in 2003.48 
Similarly, the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ dossier, Iran's Nuclear, 
Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment, despite briefly documenting 
Tehran’s nuclear program before the Islamic Revolution, devotes much of the study to 
Iran’s enrichment program, the origins of the illicit procurement network to support the 
nuclear program, and the Islamic Republic’s history of undeclared experiments.49 Other 
notable works on Iran, including Nikki Keddi’s Modern Iran50 don’t discuss the nuclear 
issue at all, while others, like the chapter on Iran in Etel Solingen’s Nuclear Logics51 are 
a summary of Tehran’s recent nuclear work rather than a full recounting of factors that 
have shaped its nuclear decision-making. 
To address these gaps in the literature, this dissertation provides a complete 
recounting of Iran and Turkey’s nuclear decisions and places them within a 
methodological framework to help explain the reasons for Turkey and Iran’s different 
nuclear decisions; to use the process tracing method to determine the domestic processes 
that underpinned these different decisions; and to test different nonproliferation theories. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012).  
49  Gary Samore (ed.), Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment 
(London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011). 
50 Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006; 3rd edit.). 
51 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 164-186. 
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This study examines the decisions Turkey and Iran made in reaction to a common set of 
inputs to help determine the causal reasons underpinning the two countries different 
nuclear decisions. In turn, the data is then used to identify the most salient subjective 
variable influencing policy-making, in order to understand if/why these two countries 
responded similarly to the same inputs.   
 
Methodology: Responding to the Same Input 
 
This work proceeds to document how Iran and Turkey responded to similar 
“inputs” and whether or not they resulted in similar “outputs,” i.e. nuclear specific policy 
decisions. By doing so, the study will contribute to knowledge in three ways. First, it will 
use the process tracing method to detail the processes that resulted in different nuclear 
decisions. Second, it will determine which key subjective variables influence decision-
making and how those variables impacted nuclear decisions. Third, this approach also 
allows for the testing of widely held theories about the reasons for nuclear decision-
making. In total, these observations will be used to determine the dynamics of 
proliferation in each country and therefore account for the reasons that these two states 
made radically different nuclear decisions.  
Traditional explanations for proliferation decision-making are based on a simple 
assumption: In an anarchic environment, state X will choose to pursue/forego nuclear 
weapons for Y reason. Therefore, when exposed to Y reason, other states will implement 
similar policies. This assumption is premised on the assumption of rational choice theory 
and that state behavior varies little globally. However, as noted in the previous chapter, 
substantial differences remain about why similar inputs result in different outcomes. 
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Expressed as an equation, X (input) + Y (nuclear decision) does not always equal Z 
(policy).   
As such, there is still a debate about the mechanisms that lead states to choose 
“Y” policy; in other words, why does one state choose to embrace nonproliferation to 
address certain inputs, whereas others choose to seek out nuclear weapons? To address 
this lacuna in the nonproliferation literature, this study measures how two similar states – 
Iran and Turkey – responded to the same inputs and compares how/why their decisions 
differed.  
Research Question: Do similar states respond similarly to the same external inputs?  
Dependent variable: Iran and Turkey’s nuclear decisions.  
Independent variables: External inputs, which this study defines as: Security, Norms, 
and the influence of key-decision makers. 




To control for bias, this study selected two states from the same region that were 
exposed to similar inputs and documented their subsequent nuclear decisions (outputs). 
This study identified a set of common inputs; from which the two states’ outputs were 
then measured and compared. These common inputs are organized thematically and 
include the responses to the following inputs: security, norms, and the influence of key 
decision-makers. These general themes represent the consensus amongst the dominant 
nonproliferation theories that explain decision-making. 
Security 
To eliminate bias, this study measured Turkish and Iranian decisions a common set of 
security related inputs. This study sought to define the concept of security. To do so, this 
work expands upon the work of Stephen M. Meyer, who in his seminal work, The 
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Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, operationalizes threat as the presence or absence of 
three threat conditions.  
1 – Nuclear armed adversary  
2 – Adversary with a latent nuclear weapons capability 
3 – Overwhelming conventional military threat 
 
For the purposes of this study, threat is operationalized as follows: 
 
1- Nuclear/WMD Armed Adversary 
2- Nuclear/WMD Latent Adversary 
3- Overwhelming conventional threat by Adversary 
4- Internal Political and/or Armed Adversaries 
5 - Hostile relations with a weaker state 
 
This definition was then used to identify and score this study’s common set of security 
related inputs. These security inputs include:  
1. Soviet Union/Global Communist Movement 
2. Doubts about Security Guarantees  
3. Regional Proliferation 
4. End of bipolarity 
 
Based on the data, both Iran and Turkey faced a “HIGH” security threat during the Cold 
War. After the end of the Cold War, Turkey faced a “MEDIUM” security threat, whereas 
the Islamic Republic’s threat level was still “HIGH.” To address these threats, Iran and 
Turkey could pursue the following options: 
Alternatives to build a bomb to counter security threat: 
1- Alliances/Nonproliferation 
a- Superpower alliance  
b- Embrace Nonproliferation 
2- Developing your non-nuclear weapon capabilities 
3 – Nuclear Latency 
 
This data was then used to test this study’s central hypothesis: Similar inputs should 
result in similar nuclear decisions. 
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Nonproliferation Norms and Nuclear Restraint  
To explain the phenomena of nuclear restraint, scholars have put forward 
variations explanations that are based on one of the four dominant theoretical narratives 
in proliferation studies: realism; neoliberal institutionalism; liberalism; and 
constructivistism. This study tests these theories by measuring Iran and Turkey’s 
response to the following inputs: 
 
Nuclear Restraints: 
1- Treaties/Nonproliferation Agreements52 
a- Safeguards, the IAEA, and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
2- Trade/Internationalizing Political Model53 
b- Economic s and Models of Political Survival 
3- Humanitarian/International Acceptance54 
c- The Nuclear Taboo55 
 
This approach, in turn, allows for the findings to be used to identify the key dynamics of 
proliferation/restraint in these two countries. The data is then used to test this 
dissertation’s hypothesis, in order to determine how these two states reacted to a set of 
common inputs.  
Nuclear Mythmaking and Powerful Bureaucracies: The Role of Individuals  
The final analytical chapter examines the role of key decision-makers in Iran and 
Turkey. This chapter identified a common set of inputs and the way in which key 
decision-makers made policy decisions in reaction to the following inputs:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This subset is based on the constructivist approach to nuclear proliferation and 
restraint. See: Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies 
and Institutions,” World Politics, vol. 38, no. 1 (October, 1985), pp. 226-254  
53 This subset is derived from the work of Etel Solingen. See: Solingen, Nuclear Logics: 
Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the Middle East.  
54  See: Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” 
International Security, vol. 29, no. 4 (Spring, 2005), pp. 5-49.  
55Ibid. 
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The Role of Individuals 
1- Atoms for Peace and American Nuclear Assistance 
2- The 1973 Energy Crisis 
 
The data was then used to make determinative judgments about the reasons underpinning 
individual conceptions of nuclear energy/nuclear weapons in Iran and Turkey. This data 
is then used to explain Iran’s decision to proliferate versus Turkey’s nuclear restraint 
from the perspective of different decision-makers, rather than using the state as the means 
of measurement. In doing so, this section attempts to identify the critical subjective 
variables that different leaders/ key decision-makers in Iran and Turkey rely on when 
making nuclear decisions.  
 
Determinants of Nuclear Decision-Making 
 
Based on the data, this author then measured the processes by which decisions are 
made against that of this study’s independent variables. These variables include the 
concepts of Security, Norms, and influence of key-individuals/decision-makers. This 
data, in turn, allows for the testing of this study’s research question (Do similar states 
respond similarly to the same external inputs?) and the hypothesis (Similar inputs should 
result in similar nuclear decisions.)  
The data is then used to identify which independent variable best has the most 
affect on Iranian and Turkish decision-making, or if nuclear decisions are multi-causal. 
Furthermore, if Turkish and Iranian nuclear decision is multi-causal, then this 
methodology helps scholars to identify the most important variables influencing decision-
making. Once identified, scholars can then gain a better understanding of the different 
processes influencing Turkish and Iranian policy-making. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This study’s findings suggest that different countries react differently to similar 
inputs. The data suggests that security considerations influence state behavior. However, 
Iran and Turkey made different decisions when faced with the same inputs. These 
differences stem from different subjective interpretations of the threat faced. As such, 
these differing policies reflected the key decision-makers’ subjective understanding of the 
threat posed and thus resulted in different policy responses.  
These different decisions were also present in the cases of nuclear restraint. Both 
Iran and Turkey have different conceptions of nonproliferation norms, as well as the 
salience of the taboo against the use of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the 
data suggests that both countries have different understandings of the nonproliferation 
norm. In particular, the countries have divergent views about the fairness of the 
nonproliferation order. 
These key differences suggest that even similar countries have different subjective 
understandings of common inputs. These key differences, in turn, result in different 
approaches to policy-making. Thus, while these two countries may adopt a similar policy 
(the signing of the NPT, for example), the reasons for doing so – or the dynamics of 
proliferation/restraint – differ considerably. This study also found that leaders have a 
tendency to follow a similar policy to that of their predecessors, suggesting that the 
concept of status quo bias56 informs individual decision-making. Thus, once a policy is 
enacted, subsequent leaders adopt similar – if not identical – approaches to nuclear 
decision-making.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 William Samuelson and Richard Zackhauser, Status Quo Bias and Decision-Making, 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 9-10. 
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Based on this data, this study’s hypothesis is null: Similar inputs do not result in 
similar nuclear decisions. Instead, this study found that nuclear decision-making in Iran 
and Turkey is multi-causal, and based on differing individual conceptions of a common 
set of assumptions about nonproliferation/norms.  
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Chapter 3: Threat Perceptions and Nuclear Decision-Making 
 
After the end of the Second World War, Turkey and Iran faced a growing security 
threat from the Soviet Union. In the war’s aftermath, the Soviet Union extended its 
political and military influence in to Bulgaria, along the Black Sea littoral, and down into 
modern day Georgia and Armenia. Similarly, the new Soviet border extended through 
Kazakhstan and modern-day Turkmenistan on Iran’s northeastern border. Turkey and 
Russia have a long history of imperial rivalry and successive wars as well as contention 
over control of the Bosporus strait and the Dardanelles. Similarly, Russian forces had 
intermittently occupied large swathes of Iranian territory in the early twentieth century; 
including a full-scale invasion of the country during World War II in conjunction with 
British forces.  
The development of nuclear weapons changed the security dynamics for both Iran 
and Turkey. Between 1945 and 1949, the United States retained its nuclear monopoly. 
This meant that Turkey and Iran did not face a direct nuclear threat; instead focused their 
efforts on defending against the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority. The Soviet 
Union’s 1949 test of a nuclear device further altered the region’s security dynamics and 
raised the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons to support invading Soviet forces in 
Iran and Turkey.  
This chapter documents how Turkey and Iran reacted to the same four security related 
inputs, using the aforementioned methodology: 
• The Soviet Union and the threat of Global Communism 
• Doubts about the U.S. security guarantee 
• Regional Proliferation 
• The end of bipolarity 
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The data was used to test this study’s hypothesis: Similar inputs should result in similar 
nuclear decisions. In addition, it was also used to test neo-realist assertions about nuclear 
decision-making. As explained in the previous chapter, threat is operationalized as 
follows: 
 
1- Nuclear/WMD Armed Adversary 
2- Nuclear/WMD Latent Adversary 
3- Overwhelming conventional threat by Adversary 
4- Internal Political and/or Armed Adversaries 
5 - Hostile relations with a weaker state 
 
A state faces a HIGH security threat for the following reasons: The adversarial 
state is nuclear armed and/or has an overwhelming conventional military advantage. A 
state faces a MEDIUM security threat when it adversary is nuclear latent. A state faces a 
LOW security threat when it faces internal political/armed adversaries and/or has hostile 
relations with a weaker state.  
Based on this system, neo-realist scholars contend that a state would seek out 
nuclear weapons when faced with a HIGH security threat. In other words, a HIGH 
security threat leads to an interest in nuclear weapons and then a decision to proliferate. 
The state may not ultimately succeed in developing nuclear weapons, but the reasons for 
failure are related to other factors, including: superpower coercion, technical restraints, or 
a change in relationship with the adversary.  
This chapter’s aim is to test this conviction using this study’s methodology to 
determine how security related inputs affected nuclear decision-making. The first section 
adds a layer of methodological analysis to make a determinative judgment about the 
threat posed by the common inputs. This data is then used to compare the policy-making 
process in both countries to determine the dynamics of proliferation.  
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Measuring Nuclear Latency vs. Nuclear Armed 
 
To measure the concept of nuclear latency (wherein the state has the capability to 
rapidly build a nuclear device, but has not done so), this study sought to create a new 
model that blends technical elements – i.e. the technical processes needed to develop a 
nuclear weapon – with the leadership’s comments about the value of nuclear weapons. 
This model assumes that a new nuclear state would not necessarily make the decision to 
test a first generation nuclear device. This concept of nuclear latency has prompted 
nonproliferation scholars to define nuclear-armed states as those having one significant 
quantity (SQ) of fissile material (25 kg of highly enriched uranium, or 6 kg of separated 
plutonium).  
A state, therefore, would not necessarily have to test a weapon, but rather pursue 
the Israeli model of proliferation, which Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel have 
dubbed “the opaque model of proliferation”.57 It is widely presumed that Israel has 
developed a large and sophisticated arsenal, and managed to deploy them on multiple 
different delivery vehicles without testing. Similarly, Pakistan and South Africa also 
developed nuclear weapons without testing. However, the reliance on the SQ metric is 
also problematic. First, Japan has tons of separated plutonium, but has never made the 
political decision to construct a nuclear weapon. Second, in the case of the DPRK, even a 
determined proliferator may struggle to design a usable weapon. As such, when using the 
SQ measurement, one must also make a determination about intent – and this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” in Opaque 
Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications ed. Benjamin Frankel 
(London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1991), pp. 14-44.  
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determination could lead to biased conclusions about whether a state is, in fact, seeking a 
nuclear weapons capability, or pursuing a peaceful nuclear program.58  
For simplicity, this study dismisses the possibility that a state could simply buy a 
nuclear weapon. Indeed, there has never been a case of one state selling a nuclear weapon 
to another, despite documented instances of states inquiring about procuring nuclear 
weapons from a nuclear-armed ally.59 To develop a nuclear weapon, a proliferating state 
would have to acquire the raw materials (uranium) and manufacturing infrastructure to 
acquire an SQ. If a state were interested in highly enriched uranium (HEU) production it 
would need: mining and milling equipment; conversion facilities; enrichment equipment; 
and the technical know how to convert 80-90% enriched uranium into uranium metal 
before fashioning that metal into precise hemispheres. Thereafter, a state would have to 
fabricate a neutron initiator and, in the case of HEU, either build a multipoint system that 
uses conventional explosives to generate a uniform shock wave to compress the fissile 
core, or a “gun type” projectile to fire one “uranium bullet into another” to achieve 
criticality.  
If a country were to opt for the plutonium route, it would require much the same 
infrastructure, including: mining and milling equipment; conversion facilities; fuel rod 
fabrication facilities; a nuclear reactor; reprocessing technology; in addition to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Jacques C. Hymans, “When Does a State Become a ‘Nuclear Weapons State’,” in 
Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory, Volume I, 
eds. William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010), p. 103. 
59 In 1963, Egypt asked to purchase weapons usable fissile material and a complete 
nuclear weapon from the Soviet Union. Four years later, Nasser made the same request of 
China. Libya inquired about purchasing nuclear weapons from China in 1970, Pakistan in 
1973, and then India in 1974. See: Julian Schofield, Strategic Nuclear Sharing (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 48.  
	   44	  
aforementioned processes to fabricate the actual nuclear device (However, a state could 
not rely on the “gun method” for a plutonium device, so it would need to develop a 
multipoint initiation system).  
These weaponization processes allow for the construction of model, from which 
one can determine a state’s nuclear weapon status and if, indeed, it is nuclear latent. From 
this, one can then make a determination about the threat a state faces in order to measure 
how it constructed policies to address the nuclear latent threat.  
To discern intent, this study relies on information regarding weapons specific 
experiments. Thus, if a state pursues the full fuel cycle and pairs these efforts with 
weapons specific experiments – but does not test – it is nuclear latent. To draw a further 
determination, this study combines this data with widely used technical measures to 
determine whether or not a state has access to a SQ. Thus, in the case of enrichment, a 
state will be considered nuclear latent only when it acquires the capability to produce 
weapons usable fissile material.  
To determine the length of time a state would need to acquire an SQ of HEU, one 
can use Separative Work Units (SWUs) to estimate the time needed to produce 25kg of 
HEU. As the time needed to enrich to 90 percent decreases, a state moves closer towards 
achieving nuclear latency. To test for latency on the plutonium side, one can also 
calculate the time required to “burn” a fuel rod in a reactor to maximize the amount of 
weapons usable plutonium and combine it with well-known estimates about how long it 
would take to separate the weapons usable plutonium from a burned fuel rod. A state 
would only be truly nuclear latent, once the time period to enrich/separate one SQ drops 
below 1-2 weeks.  
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Admittedly, these measures are imprecise. After enriching to 90 percent or 
separating the required plutonium, a state would then have to fabricate a nuclear device. 
Thus, even if a state were two weeks away from having one SQ, it would nevertheless 
need, by certain estimates, at least another year or so to develop a nuclear device.60 The 
difference between a “nuclear latent” and “a nuclear weapons state” therefore is the 
length of time needed to design and fabricate a device, although, as mentioned above, the 
state may not test this first generation system. The time needed to do this – and indeed 
whether a state would have to then test this design – is the subject of incredible debate 
and beyond the scope of this study.61 Nonproliferation scholarship, however, suggests 
that states interpret the dividing line between “nuclear latent” and “nuclear armed” 
differently. This subjective understanding, in turn, helps explain why few states are 
concerned about Japan’s possession of separated plutonium, whereas many Arab states 
fear that Iran has achieved nuclear latency.  
For the purposes of this study, nuclear intent was derived from leader’s statements 
on the subject. If, for example, a member of the state’s leadership expressed an interest in 
nuclear weapons, while the state also pursued all of the technical components needed to 
build a nuclear device, one can assume that the state has some interest in nuclear 
weapons. To accurately measure threat to then make a determination about nuclear 
decision-making, this data is then combined with Iran and Turkey’s subjective 
understanding of nuclear latency/weapons. This then allows for a more precise 
comparison of Iran and Turkey’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis potential adversaries that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The weaponization process, according to Sig Hecker, former director of the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, would take 1.5-2 years after the material is enriched to 
weapons grade. Author email interview with Sig Hecker, October 25, 2011.  
61 Hymans, “When Does a State Become a ‘Nuclear Weapons State’,” pp. 102-124. 
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pursued all, or some, of the criteria mentioned below. Moreover, it also creates a set of 
criteria to measure Iran and Turkey’s nuclear intention and determine whether or not 
either country decided to pursue nuclear weapons.  
Based on this data, this study defines a nuclear latent states as having the 
following characteristics: 
Measuring Nuclear Latency 
Highly Enriched Uranium Plutonium  
Infrastructure 
Uranium mining Uranium mining 
Milling Milling 
Conversion to UF6 Fuel rod fabrication  
Enrichment  Nuclear Reactor  
Weapons Design Work (Hemisphere, 
Neutron initiator, Conventional explosives 
testing (shockwave generator, or gun type 
design) 
Separation 
 Weapons Design Work (Hemisphere, 
Neutron initiator, Conventional explosives 





A nuclear-armed state, in turn, has fabricated a nuclear weapon and either announced it 
has a nuclear weapon, conducted a nuclear test, or is believed to be nuclear armed by a 
large number of states. Based on this data, it is possible to identify which states were 
nuclear latent and nuclear armed; how Iran and Turkey viewed the threats; to compare 
reactions to the same inputs; and if either Iran or Turkey are nuclear latent.  
 
Input 1: The Soviet and Global Communist Threat 
 
During the Cold War, Turkey and Iran only faced one nuclear-armed adversary: 
the Soviet Union.  Moscow also possessed a considerable conventional advantage over 
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both Iran and Turkey. This study classified the threat during this time period as HIGH. 
To address this threat, Iran and Turkey could seek out nuclear weapons or pursue one, or 
combination of, the following options: 
Alternatives to pursuing a nuclear weapon to counter a 
security threat: 
1 – Alliances 
a- Superpower alliance  
b- Nuclear guarantees 
3 – Embrace Nonproliferation/Norms 
4 – Developing your non-nuclear weapon capabilities 
5 – Nuclear Latency (Nuclear hedging) 
6 – Détente/Appeasement 
 
Turkey: A NATO Ally 
 
From the outset of the Cold War, Turkish politicians were concerned about 
Russian territorial ambitions; and in particular, Moscow’s efforts to gain greater control 
of the Bosporus strait. During World War II, Turkey deftly managed to play the allied 
and axis powers off against one another to remain neutral up until the very end of the 
conflict. After the conflict ended, the Soviet Union managed to expand its territory. The 
Red Army and allied forces moved conventional forces along Turkey’s western border 
with Bulgaria, in the Black Sea, and along much of Turkey’s northeastern borders. In a 
1951 National Intelligence Estimate, the United States’ intelligence community 
concluded that Ankara would be able to resist a Soviet-led attack for two-to-three months 
before being overwhelmed. 62  The NIE noted that Turkey’s geography made it 
particularly exposed to Soviet expansion because it lacked a credible air force or navy 
and Turkish territory was far from Western military centers of strength and encircled by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-9, Turkey’s Position in the East-West Struggle, 
February 26, 1951, PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563: Record Copies January-April 1951 in 
United States Department of State, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United 
States, The Near East and Africa, 1951, vol. 5, pp. 1119-1126. 
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weak Western allies that would also be quickly overrun.63 To balance against the Soviet 
threat, Turkey prioritized its relationship with the United States; thus choosing a strategy 
of superpower alliance.  
Up until 1951, the United States remained skeptical of granting Ankara a formal 
security guarantee, owing to concerns about over extending its direct military guarantees 
in areas determined to be a secondary geo strategic importance. However, after 
concluding that a Soviet attack would threaten critical Western interests in the 
Mediterranean, Washington concluded that any attack on the Dardanelles would require 
an American response.64 Turkey was subsequently invited to join the Alliance in 1951; 
Ankara officially joined NATO in 1952. Turkey’s inclusion means that Ankara now has a 
collective security guarantee from the world’s most powerful collection military alliance 
and, critically, a direct security guarantee from the United States. 
Iran: A CENTO Ally  
 
During World War II, British and Soviet troops occupied Iranian territory to 
secure allied oil and supply interests in the country. The invasion forced the Shah of Iran, 
Reza Pahlavi to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Shah 
was soon forced from power, after nationalist forces led by Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mosaddegh nationalized the oil industry in 1951. After negotiations failed to come an 
agreement surrounding the status of the British administered Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid.  
64 According to an American National Security Study: [Turkey] not only controls the 
important land, sea, and air routes (including the Turkish straits, which Russia has 
coveted for nearly 200 years) from the USSR to the Cairo-Suez area and the Middle East 
oil fields, but it offers bases from which the USSR could launch operations against the 
islands of Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus and against communications in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. See: National Security Study, “The Position of the 
United States with Regards to Turkey,” ibid., pp. 1151-1162. 
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(AIOC) failed, the United Kingdom, U.S., and a smattering of pro-Shah allies inside Iran 
organized Operation TPAJAX: the plan to overthrow Mosaddegh and reinstate the Shah 
as Iran’s leader. The operation unfolded over four days in August 1953 and resulted in 
the overthrow of Mosaddegh and the Shah’s return to power. 
Thereafter, the United States sought to empower the Shah and the Iranian armed 
forces. According to a classified American National Security Council report, “over the 
long-term, the most effective instrument for maintaining Iran’s orientation towards the 
West is the monarchy, which in turn has the army as its only real source of power.”65 
Like Turkey, Iran shared a northern and eastern border with Soviet allied proxy states. In 
1953, John Foster Dulles first conceived of a “Northern Tier alliance” of Western allied 
Middle Eastern and Central Asian states, including: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan to 
defend against a Soviet invasion of the Middle East.  The efforts to build a Northern Tier 
alliance to defend Western interests in the Middle East began in the late 1940s, but only 
really began to take shape in 1954, after the signing of the Pakistani-Turkish agreement.66  
Thereafter, the nascent structure’s headquarters was moved to Baghdad in 1955, 
after Iraq agreed to join. The alliance was subsequently named the Baghdad Pact. In as 
early as 1954, the Shah expressed his support for the proposed alliance, but was 
concerned that the U.S. assistance given to Iran was inadequate, and that Iran would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, United States Policy Towards 
Iran, NSC 5042, S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, “NSC Memoranda”, 2 January 1954, in the 
United States Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor, Foreign relations of the 
United States, 1952-1954. Iran, 1952-1954, Volume X, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1952-1954, pp. 865-889. 
66  Michael J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied 
Contingency Plans, 1945-1954 (London: Frank & Cass Co. Ltd, 1997), pp. 296-323. 
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the “weak link in the chain” of Middle East defense.67 Iranian Prime Minister Hossein 
Ala originally stated that it would only join the pact if the U.S. provided Iran with greater 
assistance, recognized Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain, and guarantee that it would 
come to Iran’s defense in the event of a Soviet attack.68 After the U.S. refused, the Shah 
lessened the Iranian demands, and only asked for a U.S. security guarantee. The U.S. 
refused again, but President Eisenhower sought to reassure the Shah by telling him that 
an attack on Iran would be an attack on the “free world,” and would therefore invite an 
American military response.69 Ultimately, the Shah agreed to join the Baghdad Pact, 
telling Dulles that the decision to do so was “his policy” and that while he may be 
criticized, or the circumstances about joining might change, he “would never change 
it.”70 
The Baghdad Pact suffered its first setback in 1958, after the overthrow of the 
Western preferred King Faisal, and the subsequent empowerment of Arab nationalist Abd 
al-Karim Qasim (After Iraq’s withdrawal, the alliance was renamed the Central Treaty 
Organization, or CENTO). The transition away from Hashemite rule in Iraq towards Arab 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Possibility of Increasing Military Assistance to Iran in light of Its Possible Affiliation 
with the Baghdad Pact and CENTO, Top Secret, Letter State, June 27, 1955, Iran 
Revolution, IR00331, Digital National Security Archives, accessed on November 12, 
2013.  
68 Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, South 
Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to Under Secretary of State (Hoover), 22 Jue 1956, in 
the United States Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor, Foreign relations of the 
United States, 1952-1954. Iran, 1952-1954, Volume X, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1952-1954, pp. 954-958. 
69 Expression of Appreciation to the Shah for Committing Iran to the Baghdad Pact and 
CENTO, Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, March 9, 1956, Iran Revolution, 
IR00337, Digital National Security Archives, accessed on November 12, 2013. 
70 Harry N. Howard, “The Regional Pacts and the Eisenhower Doctrine,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 401, America and the Middle 
East (May, 1972), pp. 85-94.  
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nationalism was a source of considerable concern in Iran; privately Shah made clear that 
he feared a three-pronged attack from the Soviet Union, Baathist Iraq, and Soviet allied 
Afghanistan. 71  
 
Nuclear Weapons: Divergent Perceptions about the Zagros Line 
 
In 1953, the United States and the United Kingdom concluded that nuclear 
weapons were required to prevent Soviet forces from overrunning Iranian, Turkish, and 
Pakistani defenses along the Northern Tier. The battle plan called for a defense of the 
Zagros line against a Soviet attack, along with support from British, American forces, and 
Arab forces – backed by Western air power flying from bases in the region and in the UK 
–marching north from areas in the Levant to the front line. The battle plan envisioned the 
use of nuclear weapons, delivered both by tactical battlefield systems and aircraft. Turkey 
embraced the nuclear war plan. Iran did not. 
In 1959, the United States presented an updated battle plan to defend the Zagros 
line to the Shah. During the presentation, the United States indicated that “there [was] a 
slight possibility of tactical nuclear weapons being used in case of a limited war there, but 
in such an event U.S. forces would carry a great part of the load and would be directly 
involved.”72 The Shah, however, dismissed the U.S. war plan all together by refusing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Memorandum from the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Bowling) to the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hart), November 
21, 1960, FRUS, Near East region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, vol. 12, pp. 709-711. 
72 Memorandum from the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Bowling) to the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hart), November 
21, 1960, FRUS, Near East region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, vol. 12, pp. 709-711.  
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“consider a defense based on the Zagros.”73 Instead, the Shah proposed that the United 
States provide the Iranian armed forces with greater conventional weapons; in particular, 
a modern air force.74 The United States was skeptical, but nevertheless sought to appease 
the Shah by maintaining its level of conventional military of support for Iran, whilst also 
putting in place elements of the defense plan in other Northern Tier countries.75  
Turkey, on the other hand, embraced nuclear weapons for the defense of its 
western and eastern borders. Ankara’s nuclear war planning was contingent on two 
different factors: 1) Its NATO membership; 2) The American decision to forward deploy 
nuclear weapons in allied countries. In 1956, the United States and Turkey began formal 
discussions about basing nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Force base in Adana.76 In 1957, 
the NATO alliance agreed “to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The Shah, according to John W. Bowling, the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, 
Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, “refuse[d] to consider a defense based on the Zagros.” See: Ibid 
74 The United States, on the other hand, planned for the Iranian forces to perform stay-
behind guerilla operations because even a “400,000 man army with billions of dollars 
worth of equipment, would not do more than delay the USSR for a few days, and would 
be chewed to bits in the process.” See: Ibid 
75 The United States does not appear to have abandoned the plan to use nuclear weapons 
to defend Iran. In as late as 1980, CENTCOM was worried the Soviets might blitz into 
Tehran to take advantage of the weak revolutionary government and invade Iran and 
Afghanistan. The battle plan set aside 20 SADMs, which Green Berets would use in 
mountain passes after parachuting into Tehran, presumably without Tehran’s permission. 
See: Adam Rawnsley and David Brown, “The Little Boy,” Foreign Policy, January 30, 
2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/the-littlest-boy/; David Crist, The Twilight of 
War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty Year War with Iran (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2012).  
76 In April 1956 the U.S. military announced plans for the stationing of large numbers of 
ground forces, air forces, and “special” weapons (a euphemism for nuclear weapons) 
mainly in the Adana area. Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of 
State, April 17, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957. Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, vol. 24, 
pp. 677-678. 
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available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need.”77 In 1959, Turkey and the 
United States concluded for the “Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual 
Defense Purposes,” which allowed for the United States to forward deploy nuclear 
weapons on Turkish territory. 78 Shortly thereafter, the United States deployed the first 
nuclear warhead – the W-7 – at Incirlik Air Base in Adana.  
The archival evidence indicates that, beginning in the 1960s, Turkey sought to 
gain greater control over the nuclear weapons based on its territory. To safeguard against 
the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, the U.S. instituted a “dual-key” arrangement with 
regards to forward deployed nuclear weapons. The weapons remained under U.S. 
custody, but the host nation retained the capability to deliver them – but only after given 
the order by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR).  Turkey accepted the 
dual-key arrangement without any protests.  
Turkey also accepted the need for the use of nuclear weapons to defend the 
Zagros line. As of 1968, Ankara supported the forward deployment of nuclear weapons 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Final Communiqué, Chairman: Mr. P.H. Spaak, Secretary General of NATO, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 16-19, 1957, accessed on October 9, 2013, at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c571219a.htm; The United States first deployed 
non-nuclear components – i.e., bomb casings and assemblies – outside of the United 
States in the United Kingdom in 1950, after the Department of Defense began to worry 
about American nuclear readiness after the start of the Korean War. In October 1952, the 
United States’ Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) argued that it was “essential to operational 
readiness and military flexibility that nuclear components be deployed outside the 
Continental limits of the United States at the earliest practicable date.” See: History of the 
Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons (U): July 1945-1977, Prepared by the 
Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, February 1978, available at, 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/30
6.pdf; Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 1, 1999, vol. 55, no. 26, pp. 26-35. 
78 Transmission of the exchange of notes regarding the entry into force of Agreement for 
the Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, File no: 
611.8297/7-2959, 29 July 1959, General Records of the Department of State, National 
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Box 2553.  
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along its northeastern border to blunt a Soviet attack; however, NATO never agreed to 
deploy these weapons, choosing instead to keep them stored in Italy.79 In any case, by 
1978, Turkey hosted nuclear warheads for the Honest John surface-to-surface rocket, B61 
nuclear gravity bombs, and nuclear artillery shells.80  
While the battle plan remains classified, in the event of war Turkish aircraft were 
expected to target Soviet oil resources in Romania, Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus. The 
Turkish forces were then expected to fall back gradually to the Hatay region, where they 
would then make a final stand in the Iskenderun area in southern Turkey, near the Syrian 
border. From there, Turkish forces would attempt to block a Soviet invasion of the 
Middle East and thereby allow the Alliance to maintain access to Middle Eastern oil 
fields, before American and British forces moved north from areas in the Levant, and met 
their Turkish counterparts somewhere in southwestern Turkey.  
Based on this, it is not too far of a leap to think that Turkish aircraft, armed with 
U.S. nuclear weapons, could have been ordered to target installations in areas ranging 
from Baku to Moscow, and Hatay to Thrace. In addition, short-range nuclear artillery 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79  "NATO Nuclear Planning," NARA, US Nuclear History, NH01023, Secret, 
Memorandum, January 10, 1967, published in the Digital National Security Archive; 
Drew Middleton, “NATO Approves Rules for Defensive use of Tactical Nuclear 
Weapons,” ibid, December 4, 1969. 
80 History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons (U): July 1945-1977, 




	   55	  
shells, would likely have been used to slow down and destroy Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces 
along invasion routes on Turkey's eastern and western borders.81 
Findings  
 
When faced with a HIGH threat, Turkey and Iran adopted different nuclear 
policies. Turkey viewed nuclear weapons as vital to its national security and incorporated 
them into its war-fighting plan. Iran, on the other hand, dismissed the role of nuclear 
weapons for territorial defense and chose instead to pursue conventional armaments. The 
reasons for the difference between Iran and Turkey’s decision-making are twofold. First, 
Turkey’s participation in NATO resulted in it hosting U.S. nuclear weapons. Iran, as a 
CENTO state, never received U.S. nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, they share an 
important characteristic: they were both included in the Zagros Line defense plan. As 
such, they both were both included in U.S. nuclear war planning, and therefore queried 
on their thoughts on nuclear weapons. Second, the two countries had divergent threat 
perceptions about the Soviet Union. 
For Turkey, the threat was linked to territorial defense and, in particular, 
defending the Turkish straits and eastern/western Turkey from a Soviet invasion. Indeed, 
defense of the Zagros line was only one component of a much broader plan for the use of 
U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Turkey. Iran, on the other hand, dismissed the Zagros 
plan, choosing instead to lobby for a new war plan, predicated on the U.S. providing Iran 
with the most modern of conventional armaments.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, 
Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952,” Journal of American History vol. 71 (March, 1985), pp. 
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Iran’s decision-making was driven, in large part, by its fear about Pan-Arab 
nationalism, rather than the threat of Red Army invasion. To be sure, the Pan-Arabist 
threat was linked to the Soviet threat. The Arab nationalist states – Egypt, Iraq, and Syria 
– were all allied with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, by 1967, the Shah had grown 
disillusioned with the intense U.S. focus on the Soviet Union, arguing that Nasser posed a 
more acute threat to Iranian interests.  
This evidence suggests that the Soviet Union’s conventional and nuclear 
superiority did not drive Iranian nuclear decision-making during Shah’s reign. In 
contrast, Turkey’s nuclear decision-making was driven by the Soviet threat. Ankara’s 
approach to the role of nuclear weapons pre-dates its inclusion in NATO, but 
nevertheless the evidence suggests that once it became a member, Ankara’s nuclear 
policy reflected that of the alliance.  
 
Input 2: Doubts about Security Guarantees 
 
Neo-realists contend that states seek out nuclear weapons after the country’s 
leadership has lost faith in their super power protector. To test this hypothesis, this study 
examined whether Iranian and Turkish concerns about the U.S. security commitment 
changed their approach to nuclear weapons.  During similar periods of time during the 
Cold War, both countries’ questioned to the United States’ commitment to abide by its 
security commitment to come to their defense if the conflict risked a greater 
confrontation with the Soviet Union.  
To determine if these doubts affected Turkish and Iranian nuclear decision-
making, this study measured how the two states reacted to disagreements about U.S. 
policy during the Indo-Pakistan War (1965) and Cyprus (1964 and 1974) – and what the 
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these decisions suggest about the key drivers of Iranian and Turkish nuclear decision-
making.  The data suggests that rather than seek out more military power – either through 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons or more advanced conventional arms – both Iran and 
Turkey pursued a strategy of détente/appeasement, albeit for different reasons related to 
their specific circumstances.  
 
Iran: Embracing Détente  
 
The Shah of Iran was never content with the level of support the United States 
provided to the Iranian armed forces. In as early as 1954, the Shah asked the United 
States for an explicit security guarantee. The United States refused, but in 1955, President 
Eisenhower personally reassured the Shah that the U.S. was ready to use force to protect 
Iran. As evidence, Eisenhower pointed to the U.S. led war in Korea to prove the 
American commitment to fighter communism abroad.82  
The Shah lost faith in the United States’ informal security guarantee in 1965, after 
the U.S. refused to provide fellow CENTO member Pakistan with a greater level of 
assistance during its conflict with non-allied India. The Indo-Pakistan war began after 
Islamabad launched a probing attack in the marshy Rann of Kutch (Gujarat). After some 
initial success, Pakistan sought to foment an uprising in Kashmir and use the opportunity 
to take the province back from India. These efforts, however, proved unsuccessful 
because Pakistan had overestimated local support for its Kashmir policy. The Indian 
military subsequently escalated the conflict in other areas outside of Kashmir and began 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 “A. The Evolution of the U.S.-Iranian Relationship. B. A Survey of U.S.-Iranian 
Relations 1941-1979,” January 29, 1980, Iran Revolution, IR03556, Digital National 
Security Archives, accessed November 12, 2013; “Suggestions for Allaying Iranian 
Hesitations over Joining the Baghdad Pact,” September 17, 1955, Iran Revolution, 
IR00335, Digital National Security Archives, accessed November 12, 2013.  
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to target Pakistani defenses along the border. The Indian military eventually threatened 
Lahore, before international mediation ended the conflict, and restored the pre-conflict 
borders. 
During the conflict, the United States imposed an arms embargo on both 
countries. India, however, was reliant upon British and Soviet weapons, whereas Pakistan 
was completely dependent on U.S. provided weaponry and ammunition. The arms 
embargo was therefore seen as negatively affecting Pakistan’s ability to sustain armed 
conflict, rather than a policy that would equitably undermine both sides’ ability to wage 
war. The Shah was dismayed at the United States’ policy and chose to maintain close ties 
with Pakistan’s General General Ayub Khan, who directed the ill-fated Pakistani 
offensive.83 The Shah is reported to have provided General Ayub with weapons and 
diplomatic support during the conflict. He also argued that the United States’ failure to 
support Pakistan would result in it further tightening ties with communist China, which 
would allow for further expansion of global communism along Iran’s border. In parallel, 
the Shah was concerned that any Indian advantage over Pakistan would embolden the 
Baluchi separatist movement84 – a collection of Sunni Muslim tribes that have used 
guerilla tactics to combat the Iranian state for decades.85 
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Based on this evidence, it is possible to draw conclusion about the Shah’s 
subjective understanding of the U.S. actions vis-à-vis the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, and 
how that relates to Shah perception of Iran’s most pressing security concerns. The Shah’s 
primary concern during the Cold War was not the Soviet Union per se, but rather the 
spread of Soviet allied nationalism in its near abroad. As explained above, these concerns 
prompted the Shah to turn down a U.S. offer to use nuclear weapons to defend the Zagros 
line in 1959; and instead prod the United States to focus more intently on the threat posed 
by Nasser’s Pan-Arabism/Soviet allied nationalist movements. Similarly, with regards to 
Pakistan, the threat, according to the Shah, was that Indian military victories would allow 
for the expansion of communism, which would then exacerbate the Baluchi nationalist 
threat.  
Based on this data, this study concluded that in this specific instance (i.e., the 
tangential threat posed by 1965 Indo-Pakistan war) Iran faced a LOW security threat. It 
faced neither a nuclear armed, nor a conventionally superior threat. Instead, the Shah was 
concerned about the threat posed by a nationalist insurgency. Thus, in reaction to his 
discomfort with viability of the U.S. security guarantee, the Shah chose to follow a two-
pronged policy of pursuing a policy of greater independence from the United States, as 
well as détente with the Soviet Union.86 In 1967, for example, the Shah concluded a $110 
million arms agreement with the Soviet Union, and thereafter concluded numerous 
infrastructure related agreements, including the export of Iranian natural gas to 
Moscow.87  
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With regards to Iran’s nuclear decision-making, shortly after the Shah’s faith in 
the U.S. security commitment was tested, the government chose to forego nuclear 
weapons, and instead signed the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 
1968. The Parliament then ratified the NPT in 1970. By signing the Treaty, the Shah 
essentially disavowed the notion of nuclear proliferation, in favor of a policy of 
nonproliferation. As will be discussed in the following chapter on the role of norms in 
Iranian nuclear decision-making, the Shah was never completely comfortable with 
relying solely on the NPT, but his concerns were not about the Soviet Union’s nuclear 
arsenal, but rather linked to his fear of Soviet allied Gulf Arab states acquiring nuclear 
weapons – both of which are related to his specific threat perceptions during his time as 
Iran’s leader.  
Turkey: Reaffirming the Value of Nuclear Weapons  
 
In as early as 1947, Turkey eagerly sought out an explicit American security 
guarantee. After being rebuffed for close to four years, the United States changed its 
opinion about Turkey’s role in NATO, and formally invited Ankara to join the Alliance 
in 1951. By doing so, the United States and its Western allies had formally pledged to 
come to Turkey’s defense in the event of a Soviet attack. 
NATO’s Western European members, however, considered the Middle East to be 
“outside of the area” of the alliance’s defense commitment. According to Turkish scholar 
Mustafa Kibaroglu, “in informal gatherings, leading European members of NATO have 
made it clear, time and again, that their loyalty to the Article 5 commitment (alliance 
solidarity) … would cover only these situations where Turkey had to be defended against 
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… the Soviet Union.”88 Consequently, for “out of area” issues, Turkey was more reliant 
on the United States for security cooperation, rather than the NATO alliance.  
The first significant rupture in U.S.-Turkish security relations started in 1963, 
after the Cypriot government collapsed, and Greek nationalist forces began to threaten 
the island’s sizeable Turkish minority. In response, Turkey brought the Cyprus issue to 
both NATO and CENTO and asked that both alliances step-in to guarantee the security of 
Cyprus’ Turkish minority.89 Fearing Soviet involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
the United States and the United Kingdom supported the Greek supported position of 
enosis, which envisioned the unification of Greece and Cyprus, albeit with concessions to 
Turkey to protect the Turkish minority on the island.90  
In response to Turkey’s military build-up to support its Cyprus policy, President 
Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu chiding Turkey for 
contemplating the use of force on the island and warning that military intervention could 
lead to the direct involvement of the Soviet Union, which meant that Ankara had to 
consult with NATO before opting to use force. “I must tell you in all candor,” Johnson 
wrote, “that the United States cannot agree to the use of any U.S. supplied equipment for 
a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.”91 Ankara thus decided to 
call off the invasion, but the incident has remained a sore point to date with many Turks 
viewing the letter as proof of Ankara’s excessive dependence on Washington, on the one 	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hand, and the administration’s readiness to sacrifice vital Turkish interests for ulterior 
motives, on the other.  
In response, the Turkish leadership did express some interest in rapprochement 
with the Soviet Union. Between 1964-1967, Turkey approached the Soviet Union to gain 
support for their Cyprus policy. First, in late 1964, representatives from the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry and a group of parliamentarians visited Moscow. Shortly thereafter, 
Turkish Prime Minister Ali Suat Hayri Urguplu became the first Turkish premier in thirty 
years to visit the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union reciprocated with a visit to Turkey in 
May 1965 and then again in 1967. During this same time period, Ankara sought to punish 
the United States for the Johnson letter by banning American U-2 flights from its 
territory.92  
Turkey’s outreach to the Soviet Union did not, however, alter its perception of the 
value of nuclear weapons – and in particular, Ankara’s belief that nuclear weapons were 
needed to defend its territory from Soviet attack. For example, at a meeting of the 
Nuclear Planning Group in Ankara (in September 1967) Turkish Defense Minster Ahmet 
Topaloglu put forward a plan for the use of atomic demolition munitions (ADM) - 
otherwise known as nuclear mines - in the mountainous areas on Turkey’s eastern border, 
claiming that the Turkish military felt it necessary to have control of the weapons and to 
detonate the munitions automatically in the face of an invasion of division strength. In his 
view, under the existing arrangement, the use of nuclear weapons would come too late to 
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prevent Turkish forces from being overrun, while ADMs were purely defensive weapons 
aimed at signaling in a non-provocative way Ankara’s intent to repel a Soviet invasion.93  
The plan was finalized on January 15, 1968. It called for the forward deployment 
of seventy-two ADMs in Turkey. Ankara had hoped to pre-position twenty-nine weapons 
in the expected force area and ring its defensive position with another thirty low-yield 
ADMs. Ankara reasoned that the lower-yield weapons would help reduce the risk to 
Turkish troops operating in the area. The other thirteen weapons were to be held in 
reserve.94 Mission planners had concluded that eastern Turkey was “ideally suited for 
ADM employment,” but acknowledged the risk of fallout to civilians in the area, should 
an invasion come with little or no warning. 
While U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was reportedly amenable to 
the idea95, Washington never deployed ADMs in Turkey or Greece (which made a similar 
request in 1968) instead choosing to keep them near the Italian town of Vicenza, where 	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they had been stored since 1956. Nor did NATO’s revised political guidelines for the use 
of nuclear weapons (December 1969) include the forward deployment of ADMs in 
Turkey: only a pledge to hasten decision time on the use of nuclear weapons in 
appropriate geographical areas to prevent Soviet forces from overrunning local 
defenses.96  
The situation in Cyprus changed again in 1973, after the mainland Greek military 
junta engineered a coup on the island to overthrow President Makarios III. For Turkey, 
the coup triggered a military invasion, ostensibly to protect the Turkish minority, but in 
reality to help achieve their political ambitions on the island.  Having quickly 
overwhelmed the Greek forces, Ankara sought to use its military superiority to coerce 
Athens to make concessions.97 After a series of ceasefires, Turkey established control 
over two-fifths of the island and in 1983 formally established the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus.98 
In response to Turkey’s invasion, the United States congress – over the objections 
of the Nixon Administration – imposed an arms embargo that lasted until 1978. Ankara 
retaliated by replacing U.S. commanders in NATO bases on its territory with local 
officers and making sweeping changes to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that 
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governed American military operations on Turkish territory.99 Ankara, however, made an 
exception for the nuclear weapons deployed in NATO facilities on its territory. Though 
these facilities were placed under Turkish control, Ankara took no steps to abrogate the 
bilateral nuclear basing agreement allowing for the deployment of nuclear weapons. In 
other words, while prepared to punish the U.S. for the embargo, Ankara was unwilling to 
threaten its nuclear weapon status.  
Findings 
 
The evidence supports the neo-realist contention that when an allied state grows 
concerned about the viability of an external security guarantee, it will take steps to 
address the perceived security threat. However, in sharp contrast to the neo-realist 
arguments posited about the reasons why states proliferate, neither Iran, nor Turkey took 
any steps to develop nuclear weapons after they grew concerned about the viability of the 
U.S. security guarantee. Instead, each state pursued divergent strategies, predicated on 
their own conceptions of the threat faced, as well as the best policy to address that threat.  
The Shah, for example, embraced the notion of rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union, whereas Ankara was merely seeking to gain support for its position on the Cyprus 
issue. The Shah’s outreach to the Soviet Union, according to Roham Alvandi, the author 
of Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War, was part 
of a more comprehensive effort to gain independence from the United States. Thus, even 
while Iran faced a HIGH security threat vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, its perception of the 
Soviet threat differed considerably from Turkey’s, as evidenced by the earlier differences 
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in opinion about nuclear weapons and the defense of the Zagros line. Thus, when faced 
with American inaction in Pakistan, the Shah linked the issue to the expansion of global 
communism, which in turn would exacerbate a LOW security threat: a domestic 
insurgency. For these reasons, the Shah had little incentive to proliferate, and instead 
explore other options to address his nuanced security concerns. This approach resulted in 
Iran’s pursuit of rapprochement with the Soviet Union – a state that enjoyed both 
conventional and nuclear superiority over Iran.  
Turkey, by contrast, continued to view the Soviet Union as its primary threat. 
Thus, while it was willing to take steps to punish the United States for its approach to the 
Cyprus issue, it never took any steps that would threaten its hosting of U.S. nuclear 
weapons. Turkey’s decision-making supports the argument that presence of American 
nuclear tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil acted as a proliferation constraint: had 
Ankara sought to proliferate it likely would have risked losing its nuclear weapons status. 
This would have been a major setback given Turkey’s continued NATO nuclear 
enthusiasm, as evidenced by its 1967 plan to use atomic munitions to blunt a Soviet 
attack.  
The evidence therefore suggests that doubts about the U.S. security guarantee did 
affect Turkish and Iranian nuclear decision-making. However, it did not prompt either 
state to seek out nuclear weapons. Thus, when presented with the aforementioned options 
to address a security threat without seeking nuclear weapons, Turkey remained wedded to 
a policy of an alliance with a superpower, whereas Iran chose to blend two different 
strategies: détente with the Soviet Union and the maintenance – albeit at a distance – of 
the security relationship it had cultivated with the United States. 
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Input 3: Regional Proliferation 
 
The political situations in both Iran and Turkey changed dramatically in 1979 and 
1980. In Turkey, after a decade of political instability, General Kenan Evren toppled the 
civilian government with the purpose of re-establishing political order and re-writing the 
Turkish constitution. The change in Iran was far more dramatic. After more than three 
decades in power, widespread anti-Shah protests resulted in the Shah fleeing Tehran in 
January 1979; soon thereafter, the powerful Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who pulled 
many strings behind the revolution, returned home after decades of exile (first in Turkey, 
then Iraq, then in France) and quickly worked to sideline his Marxist and liberal 
revolutionary allies and to put in place the political infrastructure for his envisaged 
Islamic government.  
Beginning in 1980, Turkey and Iran had to contend with a new threat: regional 
proliferation. While Israel, India, and Pakistan had already made the decision to 
proliferate by this time, none of these countries had an adversarial relationship with Iran 
or Turkey. The two countries did share concerns about Iraq’s clandestine WMD 
programs. To determine how both countries responded to this input, this study first 
sought to discern whether or not Iraq was nuclear latent. Thereafter, this study 
determined the level of threat posed by the Iraqi WMD program and then charted the 
Turkish and Iranian responses to it based upon the calculated threat level. 
 
Assessing the Threat: Iran and Turkey 
 
The nonproliferation community remains divided about how close Iraq was to 
acquiring nuclear weapons. For the purposes of this study, the data about Iraq’s program 
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was used to test whether or not Iraq was truly latent and, perhaps more importantly, 
whether Iran and Turkey felt threatened by Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. During the 
1980s, Iraq had a dedicated program to enrich uranium, first by using electromagnetic 
isotope separation (EMIS), before launching a dedicated program to produce gaseous 
centrifuges in 1987. In parallel, through out the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi scientists conducted 
weapons specific tests related to the procurement of proper detonators and the 
infrastructure needed to support a weapons program. However, Iraq had not yet 
succeeded in developing an enrichment facility and it had no access to plutonium, only 
uranium (much of which France provided for a reactor).  Based on the data, this study 
came to the following conclusion: 
Measuring Nuclear Latency: The Iraqi Case  
  
Highly Enriched Uranium  
Infrastructure No  
Uranium mining Acquired "Yellowcake" uranium 
from a foreign source in the 1970s 
Milling No 
Conversion to UF6 Yes 
Enrichment  No 
Weapons Design Work (Hemisphere, Neutron initiator, Conventional 
explosives testing (shockwave generator, or gun type design) 
Yes 
  
Subjective Variables  
Leader Statements Yes 
Adversary Perception Yes 
Conclusion  
Iraq was not nuclear latent, but Iran felt threatened by Iraq's nuclear work.  
 
Despite Iraq’s non-nuclear latent status, the regime had acquired chemical weapons – 
both blister and nerve agents – in the 1960s. As such, Iraq was WMD armed, even though 
it was not nuclear-latent. For comparative purposes, this study calculated the threat posed 
by Iraq to Iran and Turkey.  
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This study judged that Iran faced a HIGH threat during the 1980s. Iran had an 
adversarial relationship with a WMD armed neighbor, with which it was fighting a 
protracted military conflict. Turkey, on the other hand, was not directly threatened by the 
Iran-Iraq war and sought to take advantage of the conflict to benefit its economy by 
adopting a neutral policy towards the two combatants. Nevertheless, by 1985, Ankara had 
grown concerned about Iraq and Iran’s acquisition and use of ballistic missiles and Iraq’s 
WMD program. Moreover, the war exacerbated Turkey’s problems with its own Kurdish 
minority, after the Iraqi army launched an offensive in the Kurdish majority areas, which 
then forced thousands of refugees to flee to Turkey. In parallel, the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) took advantage of the security vacuum to establish strongholds in areas 
along the Turkish-Iraqi border; from which the group subsequently used to launch attacks 
on Turkish targets. Based on the indirect threat posed by both the presence of Iraqi WMD 
and the threat posed by the PKK, this study concluded that Turkey faced a MEDIUM 
threat. 100 Iran, in contrast, faced a HIGH threat owing to the fact that it was engaged in a 
shooting war with a WMD armed adversary. 
Iran Responds: The Decision to Proliferate 
 
 
After the Islamic Revolution, Iraq sought to take advantage of the political and 
military chaos inside Iran. The war began in September 1980 and unfolded in three 
phases. First, between 1980 and 1981, Iraqi forces successfully overran Iran’s border 
defenses and occupied approximately 14,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory. 
Second, beginning in 1982, Iran was able to stop the Iraqi advance and eventually push 	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the Iraqi forces out of its territory. Third, by 1983, the Iranian offensive had stalled and 
bloody stalemate took hold. 
Contrary to neo-realist assumptions, the Islamic Republic cancelled the Shah’s 
nuclear program after taking power. By 1979, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 
had plans to acquire the infrastructure needed to enrich uranium and separate plutonium – 
and thus had the potential to use this infrastructure to support a weapons program. 
However, after assuming power, Ayatollah Khomeini initiated a review of all Shah era 
contracts and warned that those that “went against the interest of [the Iranian] people 
should be cancelled.”101 In June 1980, the Iranian leadership concluded that the nuclear 
program had ensued on the “basis of colonialist imposed treaties” that had increased 
Tehran’s dependence on the Western powers.”102  
The Iranian leadership did so, despite its concerns about Iraq’s nuclear program, 
and the threat it faced from a rapidly advancing Iraqi army between 1980-1982. Just eight 
days after the Iraqi invasion, for example, the Islamic Republic made an abortive attempt 
to destroy the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near Baghdad, where with French 
assistance, two nuclear reactors were under construction.103 The strike failed to destroy 
the reactor complex, but nevertheless demonstrates that Iranian officials were concerned 
about the potential for Iraq to use the facility to acquire weapons usable plutonium (the 
Israeli Air Force destroyed the complex in 1981.) 
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Though the Iranian strike indicates the Islamic Republic’s wariness of Iraq’s 
nuclear weapons ambitions, there is no evidence that Khomeini directed his subordinates 
to begin exploring a nuclear weapons option at that time. According to Ali Ashgar 
Soltaneih, a nuclear physicist who worked in various capacities for the Iranian foreign 
ministry (most recently as Tehran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in Geneva), despite its discriminatory nature, even the Islamic Republic’s 
leadership “did not decide to leave the NPT ... and this proves that there was no nuclear 
weapons policy ... Despite this policy, the more we cooperated, we noticed that we were 
deprived of minimum of support from the international community.”104  
The decision-making calculus for Iran changed in 1983, after the Iraqi forces first 
used chemical weapons (mustard gas) against Iranian troops during the Val Fajr II 
campaign near Haj Umran. The initial attacks, however, were ineffective, due to the use 
of the chemical agents in unfavorable wind conditions.105 Nevertheless, by November 
1983, Iraqi forces were regularly using chemical weapons against Iranian troops with 
increasing lethality. Later, in February 1984, the Iraqi army shelled and bombed Iranian 
forces that had occupied the Manjoon islands near Basra with chemical agents, including 
the nerve gas tabun, causing heavy casualties as Iranian troops that lacked protective gear 
and atropine injectors to defend against the strikes.106  
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The evidence suggests that rather than seek out an effective defense or deterrent, 
Iraq sought to use these early attacks to help break free from its political isolation. For 
example, shortly after the first documented use of Iraqi WMD, Iran launched an 
aggressive propaganda campaign to raise international awareness of the Iraqi use of 
chemical weapons. The efforts included the printing of flyers in European capitals and 
sending wounded soldiers to European cities for examination. The general Western 
reaction, however, was one of indifference. While some political circles in Washington, 
notably the State Department107, condemned the Iraqi use of chemical weapons, the West 
continued to support the Iraqi war effort.   
The United States began to side with the Iraqi regime in 1982, after the Iranians 
seized the momentum during the war. Similarly, western chemical companies continued 
to sell precursors needed to manufacture chemical agents to the Iraqi regime, even after it 
become known that they were being diverted for weapons use. Nevertheless, in March 
1982, Parliament Speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, lauded Iran’s restraint in the 
conflict and argued that for the time being “we are committed to not resort to chemical 
bombs” yet warned that he did not know “how long this will remain so.”108  
There are signs, however, that Iran was exploring its nuclear weapons related 
options. Reza Amrollahi, the director of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), 
wrote to the IAEA decrying Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 On March 5, 1984, Department of State spokeswoman Anita Stockman said, “In 
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organizations to put an end to the bloodshed.” Alex Efty, “Khomeini Calls for Iranian 
Victory; One Leader Questions Strategy,” Associated Press, March 21, 1984.  
108 Hashemi-Rafsanjani Discusses Chemical Weapons,” Tehran Domestic Service, Daily 
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ominously comparing these weapons with nuclear weapons saying, “if nuclear warfare 
annihilates, maims, and in general devastates large sections of the population, advanced 
chemical warfare is designed to perform exactly the same function with equal brutality.” 
Moreover, in an overt reference to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program Amrollahi prodded 
the IAEA to consider “what may have occurred if the Iraqi regime had access to a nuclear 
device, however crude, and what safeguard rules or NPT provisions could have prevented 
the deployment of such device.”109  
In either late 1984 or early 1985, Iran reversed its previous approach and began to 
work on developing centrifuges. More robust efforts to secure the front end of the nuclear 
fuel cycle began in January 1986, when a high level Iranian delegation, comprising 
President Khamenei, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and Construction Jihad 
Minister Bijan Zangenh, met with Pakistani President Zia al-Haq to inquire about 
purchasing fuel cycle equipment.110 Pakistan turned down Iran’s request for centrifuge 
technology, but one year later, in 1987, Iranian officials began to meet with 
representative from the AQ Khan network – an illicit procurement network for centrifuge 
and nuclear weapons design information run by the Pakistani scientist, Abdul Qadeer 
Khan.111  
During those meetings, Iran purchased technical schematics and centrifuge 
equipment for a centrifuge facility as well as a list of illicit suppliers in Europe, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Letter Sent to the IAEA,” IRNA, Daily Report, South Asia, FBIS-SAS-84-050, March 
13, 1984. 
110  Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of the Proliferation 
Networks (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 66; “Khamenei 
submits report to Khomeini,” Tehran Domestic Service, Daily Report, South Asia, FBIS- 
SAS-86-015, January 23, 1986.  
111 Nuclear Black Markets, p. 67. 
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Middle East, and East Asia. Iran also acquired a 15-page document “describing the 
procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the machining of enriched 
uranium metal into hemispheres, which are components of nuclear weapons”; and while 
Tehran claimed that it didn’t ask for the document or information about casting 
hemispheres, the Khan network is not known to have ever provided any documents or 
services free of charge to any of its customers.112  
Iran subsequently began work on the development of uranium enrichment and, 
beginning in 1999, is alleged to have conducted numerous weapons specific experiments. 
The Islamic Republic has subsequently been forced to document many of these 
clandestine activities to the IAEA, after its undeclared program was revealed in August 
2002. Iran has admitted to starting an undeclared enrichment program in 1985, but has 
made very clear that the assertions that it conducted weapons specific experiments – 
known collectively as the “Alleged Studies” – are based on forged documents given to 
the IAEA in 2005 by a number of unnamed member states. 
To make a determination about whether Iran made the decision to proliferate, this 
study relied on information published by the IAEA. With regards to the “Alleged 
Studies” documents, the Agency has concluded that the combination of the documents 
and the Agency’s investigative efforts suggest that information about the weaponization 
work is “credible.”113 Iran, on the other hand, maintains that they are forgeries. For the 
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iranreport- 111504.pdf.  
113 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security 
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purposes of this study, the IAEA’s assertion that the evidence is “credible” suggests that 
the information provided can also be used to make a determinative judgment about 
Iranian nuclear intent and whether it has achieved nuclear latency.  
To build a nuclear weapon, a proliferator needs thousands of parts. Los Alamos 
nuclear weapons laboratory has compiled a classified list of all of the parts needed – and 
where one can procure them – and it reportedly totals more than 500 pages.114 Based on 
the evidence, Iran was working on an implosion driven fission device for delivery by 
ballistic missile. This information allows for the compilation of a list of 
materials/processes/experiments that Iran would have to master, before it could design an 
actual nuclear device. In turn, this study assumes that if a state conducts all of the tests 
needed to design a nuclear weapon and then pairs it with a dedicated effort to acquire 
fissile material that, indeed, the state in question has an interest in acquiring nuclear 
weapons. Thus, rather than build a timeline of when Iran made what nuclear decision, the 
chart below places that information within the context of weapons specific work.  
 
Making the Bomb: The Case of Iran 
Material Purpose Nuclear Decisions Current Status 
Fissile 
Material 
Core of a nuclear 
weapon 
Iran began centrifuge work in 1985. UF6 
was first introduced into Iranian 
centrifuges 1999. Work on the heavy 
water Arak reactor also began in 1985. 
The reactor project was accelerated in 
1997 
Enrichment on-going, as is construction at 
the heavy water reactor 
Tamper Traps neutrons in the 




No evidence of work on a tamper, 
although Iran has access to the materials 
used to construct it: Uranium 238 
Weapons work was allegedly suspended in 
2003, albeit with the key players from the 
program still working from the Mojdeh site 
near Malek Ashtar University 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Report by the Director General, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011, 
http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf.  
114 David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “Iraq and the Bomb: Were they Even Close?,” 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 47, no. 2 (March, 1991), pp. 16-24; Iraqi Nuclear 
Weapons, Federation of American Scientists, updated May 2012, available at: 
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Trigger a nuclear 
explosion 
Shaped Charge and U265 shock implosion 
generator work began in 1996 
Suspended in 2003 
Fuzing 
System 
Trigger the detonation 
of the conventional 
explosives at a specific 
altitude 
Iran is alleged to have been working on a 
fuzing mechanism to detonate a warhead 
at an altitude of 600 meters 
Suspended in 2003 
Neutron 
Source 
Initiates the chain 
reaction 
Iran irradiated bismuth to create polonium-
210 (Po-210), an intensely radioactive 
alpha-emitting radioisotope used in the 
weapon design Iran procured from the AQ 
Khan network 






Design of the fissile 
core 
Iran received these instruction from AQ 









Iran is reported to have used commercially 
available software to assist with an alleged 
effort to design a compact warhead for 







arrival at the inside of 
the explosives layer 
Iran is reported to have conducted at least 
on test at either Parchin, or Marivan, a 
town close to the border of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, in 2003 
No known tests after 2003 
Nuclear Test Test to ensure that the 
device works as 
intended 
Iran has never conducted a nuclear test, 
but there are reports that it had dug a test 
shaft for an underground test 
No test has ever been conducted  
 
 
The aforementioned data suggests that in 1985, Iran made the decision to acquire 
the infrastructure needed to support a nuclear weapons program. Thereafter beginning in 
1999, Iran began to conduct with weapons specific experiments, intended to support a 
dedicated nuclear weapons program.  The delay in making the decision to proliferate – 
and actually undertaking weapons specific experiments – will be addressed in subsequent 
sections (Specifically, in the sections discussing the end of the bipolar order and in 
Chapter 5 on the role of individuals).  
This study applied the same test to determine whether Iran ever achieved nuclear 
latent status. Iran currently has the capability to enrich 1 SQ of HEU in ~12 months. The 
program is under safeguards, but for simplicity, Iran is ~12 months from becoming 
nuclear latent. 115 This policy, according to the history, was first decided upon in 
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1984/1985 and appears to have been driven – at least in part – on security concerns 
stemming from Iraq’s use of WMD. Up until this point, the Islamic Republic had 
expressed little interest in nuclear weapons, choosing instead to abandon all but a few 
elements of the Shah’s ambitious program to develop nuclear energy. Based on the 
evidence, the trigger for Iran’s decision to proliferate was based, in part, on security 
concerns stemming from Iraq’s use of WMD.  
 
Turkish Apathy and Conventional Defense 
 
Turkey’s approach to the Iraqi threat differed considerably from that of Iran’s. For 
Ankara, the threat posed by Iraq’s possession of WMD was secondary to that of Soviet 
threat. Nevertheless, beginning in 1985, Ankara grew concerned about the growing use of 
ballistic missiles in the Iran-Iraq war. Turkey’s concerns about the WMD threat grew 
more acute in 1988, after the Iraqi army used chemical weapons in the Kurdish majority 
city of Halabja. The city – which is inside Iraq – had fallen to an Iranian supported 
Kurdish guerilla force. Despite these concerns, Turkish policymakers sought to remain 
neutral during the conflict and remained an important conduit for Iranian and Iraqi energy 
exports through out the conflict.116  
Turkey’s perception of the WMD/ballistic missile threat changed in 1990. In 
response to the planned U.S. led military operation to force Iraq from Kuwait, Ankara 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) and Iran agreed to 
the Joint Plan of Action, which limits the number of Iranian centrifuges and stockpile of 
LEU. See: Joint Plan Of Action, European Union, European Union External Action, 
November 24, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf; Eli 
Lake, “Obama Kept Iran's Short Breakout Time a Secret,” Bloomberg, April 21, 2015, 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-21/obama-kept-iran-s-short-breakout-
time-a-secret.  
116 Elliot Hentov, “Asymmetry of Interest: Turkish-Iranian Relations since 1979”, PhD 
thesis, Princeton University, 2011. 
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requested that NATO forward deploy aircraft to help protect major population centers 
from Iraqi reprisal attacks. The reason for the request was straightforward: During the 
run-up the start of first Gulf War, Turkish policymakers were concerned that Saddam 
Hussein would target Turkish population centers to punish the NATO ally for its support 
of the campaign. During this time, Turkish civilians were warned of the dangers of 
chemical weapons and nightly newscasts counseled civilians about what steps to take in 
the event of a chemical attack. 
NATO, however, was initially reluctant to forward deploy aircraft at Incirlik Air 
Force base. This reluctance raised renewed concerns about the validity of the alliance 
security guarantee. The Turkish military also had difficulty dealing with the secondary 
challenges posed by the conflict; most notably, the military had difficulty moving the 
required number of troops to the border to protect against the influx of refugees.117 
Against this backdrop, the United States used an array of sophisticated weapons – most 
notably, precision guided bombs and the tomahawk cruise missiles – to devastate, and 
quickly defeat, one of the Arab world’s best-equipped militaries.  
Turkey subsequently sought to replicate U.S. military practice; this included a 
long-term plan to develop the offensive and defensive systems to target and destroy 
ballistic missiles and WMD infrastructure. Ankara’s interest in missile defense and 
precision strike further increased in 1991, after Iraq’s surrender to the U.S. led coalition 
revealed a well-hidden nuclear weapons infrastructure. Much to the surprise the 
international community, Iraq had managed to deceive IAEA inspectors and thus was 
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able to conduct numerous weapons specific experiments in facilities inspected regularly 
by the Agency. The full extent of Iraq’s nuclear program, therefore, was not fully 
revealed until the passage of an intrusive inspection regime  – UN Special Commission 
on Iraq (UNSCOM) – as a condition of its surrender to the U.S. led coalition in 1991.  
After UNSCOM revealed Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, Ankara supported 
international efforts to strengthen the IAEA’s inspection protocol. In parallel, the Turkish 
military prioritized the development of missile defense, improved intelligence collection 
mechanisms, and long-range precision strike weapons.  The goal of these plans was 
threefold. First, Turkey’s support for improved IAEA inspections was a low cost and 
politically effective mechanism to ensure that another adversarial state could not replicate 
Iraqi practice and surreptitiously develop a nuclear weapon. Second, Turkey was eager to 
deepen the country’s ability to target ballistic missiles before they are fired and to provide 
Turkish military planners with greater long-range conventional strike capabilities against 
a variety of targets. Third, Ankara is intent on producing these systems using 
coproduction arrangements with foreign suppliers, with the intended aim of bolstering 
Turkish independence, whilst also contributing to the further development of the 
economy.  
These goals are complementary and intended to provide Turkey with greater 
assurances that a future proliferator will be detected – and if need be, provide Ankara 
with the capability to target WMD delivery systems/infrastructure in neighboring 
countries with conventional weapons. There is also a substantial economic component to 
Turkey’s defense plans. Beginning in 1985, policymakers prioritized the further 
development of Turkey’s private defense industry. The strategy is tied to a larger 
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government effort to increase research and development spending and to create high-tech 
Turkish products for export. Turkey has subsequently favored the production of these 
weapons systems through a system known as offsets, or coproduction arrangements. This 
approach has slowed its acquisition of advanced conventional arms. In the case of missile 
defense, this strategy has prevented the conclusion of a contract with any of the major 
suppliers for the sale of a system since the announcement of a tender in 1996. 
Nevertheless, Turkey remains committed to this arrangement, even though it 
currently lacks the capabilities to defend itself from ballistic missile attack and instead 
has to rely on NATO. This suggests two things. First, Ankara remains committed to 
NATO, even after its faith in the alliance was tested by the slow delivery of military 
equipment in 1991. Second, Ankara has elevated economics over security concerns, even 
as it seeks to bolster its own conventional defenses against WMD attack. Turkey has 
paired its emphasis on building a conventional defense against ballistic missile attack 




With regards to Iraq’s WMD program, Iran faced a HIGH threat, whereas Turkey 
faced a MEDIUM threat. The difference in threat perception resulted in the two countries 
adopting different polices to address the same input – Iraqi proliferation. For Turkey, the 
lower level of threat appears to have allowed policymakers to elevate economic interests 
over that security interests. For Iran, the threat became intolerable in late 1983, after 
Saddam Hussein resorted to chemical weapons to stop of the Iranian advance. Up until 
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this point, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear decision-making suggested a move away from 
latency/weaponization, rather than adopting it as a state policy.  
By contrast, the threat to Turkey only fully materialized in 1990/1991, after the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the subsequent U.S. led military resulted in the revelations 
about Iraq’s WMD programs. Turkey’s experience during this conflict resulted in two 
changes to its policy. First, Ankara sought to replicate U.S. tactics to help decrease its 
reliance on NATO – which was slow to respond to Ankara’s request in the early days of 
the U.S. air war against Iraqi forces. Second, Ankara adopted nonproliferation as a key 
component of its defense against WMD proliferation. (This will be discussed in the 
following chapter on nuclear norms and decision-making in far greater detail.) 
The evidence therefore suggests that in the case of Iran, a HIGH security threat is 
not enough to trigger a decision to proliferate. Otherwise, one would have expected Iran 
to take steps to proliferate to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War, and 
immediately after the start of the Iran-Iraq war. Instead, the Islamic Republic did not 
make the decision to proliferate for close to 5 years after the Revolution, even though it 
was fighting a war with Iraq, and its decision in 1980 to bomb Tuwaitha makes clear that 
Iranian officials were wary of Iraq’s nuclear program.  
Turkey, on the other hand, responded to the Iraqi WMD threat differently than it 
did during the Cold War. Rather than rest solely on NATO and the concept of deterrence, 
Ankara began to pursue a conventional response, framed by a continued emphasis on 
economic advancement, to the WMD threat. This suggests that a HIGH security threat is 
not an automatic trigger to explore nuclear weapons, but rather the combination of a 
HIGH security threat and the use of WMD could be a potential trigger to seek out nuclear 
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weapons for defense in certain states. Furthermore, in response to a MEDIUM security 
threat, states may also seek out alternative defensive options to developing nuclear 
weapons/seeking nuclear latency; including the development of conventional precision 
strike.  
 
Input 3: The End of Bipolarity  
 
Neo-realists scholars have argued that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
value of nuclear weapons would increase. Therefore, states that had chosen not to pursue 
an independent nuclear weapons capability – either because they had received a nuclear 
guarantee or were coerced into a policy of nonproliferation by one of the two 
superpowers – would seek to develop nuclear weapons, once the historic ethnic/political 
conflicts in Europe and the Middle East reemerged.  
Both Turkey and Iran re-evaluated their approach to nuclear weapons after the 
end of the Cold War. In Iran, the leadership continued with its clandestine efforts to 
develop the front-end of the fuel cycle and, beginning in 1999, undertook a number of 
weapons specific experiments. Turkey, on the other hand, reversed its Cold War reliance 
on nuclear weapons for security; even taking the unique step to de-certify the pilots that 
Ankara had once relied upon to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons, should NATO have 
authorized the use of nuclear weapons. Turkey and Iran’s different reactions to the same 
input suggest that the end of the Cold War did not increase the salience of nuclear 
weapons for either state.  
Divergent Threats: Iran and Turkey in the Post-Soviet World 
 
The two countries faced radically different threat levels after the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1991 and the emergence of the United States and the world’s most powerful 
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state. The Islamic Republic has, since its inception, had an antagonistic relationship with 
the United States. The United States has repeatedly threatened to use military force 
against Iran for decades, and has thus far refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons in 
any potential conflict.118 Based on this data, the Islamic Republic continued to face a 
HIGH threat after the end of the Cold War.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey emerged as the region’s strongest 
and best-equipped military. Access to arms slowed for Soviet patrons like Iraq and Syria, 
while Turkey was able to benefit from the transfer of Western European and American 
military surplus. In turn, the threat to Turkey shifted from the Soviet Union to the PKK 
led Kurdish nationalist insurgency. Based on these factors, Ankara faced a LOW security 
threat after the end of the Cold War.  
 
Turkey: A Nuclear Nation without Delivery Vehicles 
 
In 1991, Ankara began to devalue the role of nuclear weapons in their defense 
planning, along the lines proposed by the NATO alliance. Turkey’s decision-making 	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nuclear threat and thus provide a potential incentive for Iran to forgo developing nuclear 
weapons. The NPR elicited strong negative reactions from the Iranian leadership, which 
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Davis, Jeffrey Martini, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, James T. Quinlivan, Paul 
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between 1991 and 1995 suggests that Ankara was supportive of NATO’s plan to de-
emphasize the role of nuclear weapons. This suggests that, like during the Cold War, 
Turkey continued to be influenced by the Alliance’s thinking about the role of nuclear 
weapons for the defense of Europe.  
The first post-Cold War reduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe took 
place in 1991, after the United States pledged to remove all tactical ground launched and 
naval nuclear weapons from naval ships and bases outside the United States.119 NATO 
followed suit by opting to decrease the total number of tactical nuclear weapons by 
another 50 percent, leaving 700 gravity bombs in Europe.120As part of these efforts, the 
U.S. removed nuclear weapons from Eskisehir air base, leaving nuclear weapons in three 
Turkish airbases: Akinci/Murted, Balikesir, and Incirlik.  
Later, after a meeting in Italy, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group reached 
agreement “on sub-strategic nuclear force posture and stockpile level” and also 
concluded the alliance had no requirement “for ground-launched short-range ballistic 
missiles and artillery.”121 As a result, the nuclear artillery shells and warheads for 
battlefield artillery units were removed from Turkey. Ankara had relied upon these 
weapons for its defensive battle plans during the Cold War. Thus, the weapons’ removal 
signaled a more profound shift in Turkey’s threat perception vis-à-vis the threat of a 
Russian invasion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Arms Control Association, “The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical 
Nuclear Weapons at a Glance,” August 2012, available at: 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pniglance#Note2. 
120 Final Communiqué, Chairman: Manfred Wörner, The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, October 17-18, 1991, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-
95/c911018a.htm. 
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In 1995, the Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC) study recommended the 
consolidation of air force operations in Europe in four air bases in Europe: RAF 
Lakenheath in Britain, Ramstein airbase in Germany, Incirlik airbase in Turkey and 
Aviano airbase in Italy. In Turkey this resulted in the withdrawal of the 39th Munitions 
Support Squadron (MUNSS) from Balikesir airbase and the 739th MUNSS from Akinci 
airbase. The two teams completely withdrew from Turkey in April 1996 and the nuclear 
weapons stored at the base were transferred to Incirlik where they were still reserved for 
delivery by Turkish F-16s.122 
Up until the weapons’ removal from Akinci and Balikesir Turkey’s fourth and 
sixth wings were responsible for delivering the weapons. After the consolidation of 
weapons in Incirlik, Ankara decreased the readiness level of its dual-capable F-16s. As of 
2001, Turkey hosted 90 B61 nuclear gravity bombs, fifty of which are for delivery by 
U.S. aircraft from the 39th fighter wing. The other forty were reserved for delivery by 
Turkish F-16s from either the 4th or the 9th air wings currently stationed at Akinci and 
Balikesir. 
Furthermore, in 2005, Turkish policymakers turned down an American offer to 
permanently station the fifty second fighter wing at Incirlik airbase. Instead, the fighter 
wing rotates in and out of Turkey, while the nuclear weapons are under the custody of the 
United States’ 39th air wing. By 2010 the number of B61 gravity bombs in Turkey had 
dropped to 60-70, fifty of which were slated for delivery via American aircraft and the 
rest by Turkish F-16s. However, General Ergin Celasin, commander of the Turkish Air 
Force until 2001, is on record saying that “Turkey’s role in NATO’s nuclear contingency 
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plans came to an end with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons in the 1990s from the Air 
Force units that were deployed in several air bases in Turkey.”123 The statement is 
puzzling. 
According to Hans Kristensen, until Turkey receives the F-35, “approximately 30 
[Turkish] F-16C/D Block 50s are scheduled to receive a ‘stop-gap’ upgrade to make them 
capable of carrying the new B61-12 bomb that will replace the B61-3/4 beginning in 
2019.”124 Thus, it is widely assumed that Turkish aircraft have the capability to deliver 
nuclear weapons but its pilots are no longer certified to do so. In any case, Turkey has 
adopted a unique nuclear posture, whereby both the fifty-second U.S. fighter wing and 
either the fourth or sixth Turkish fighter wing would have to fly to Incirlik and be loaded 
with nuclear weapons before flying to their targets.125  
Furthermore, in an indication of the political value Turkish leaders now assign to 
nuclear weapons, Ibrahim Kalin, President Erdogan’s current spokesperson, and Suat 
Kiniklioglu, a former MP from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and 
former deputy chairman of its foreign affairs committee, made clear in 2009 that “Turkey 
would not insist that NATO retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Conventional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Telephone interview with General Ergin Celasin (ret.), February 15, 2010, Ankara, as 
cited in Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey and Shared Responsibilities,” in Shared 
Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate (American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, 2010), p. 27. 
124  Hans Kristensen, “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American 
Scientists, Special Report no. 3, May 2012, available at: 
http://www.fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons-lr.pdf  
125 In 1995 “the readiness posture of dual-capable aircraft was greatly reduced, so that 
nuclear readiness was measured in weeks rather than in minutes.” In 2002 “the readiness 
requirements for these aircraft were further reduced and are now being measured in 
months.” See NATO’s Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment, Background, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, October 22, 2009, available at: 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20091022_Nuclear_Forces_in_the_
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forces are sufficient.”126 These statements stand in stark contrast to Turkey’s policy 
during the Cold War of near total reliance on nuclear weapons for security and reflective 
of the policy put in place in 1991.  
Thus, rather than turning to nuclear weapons to augment their security, Ankara’s 
decision-making suggests just the opposite. Beginning in 1991, Turkish decision makers 
took a number of steps to decrease the role of nuclear weapons for their security; even 
took the unprecedented step within the alliance to decertify the pilots that had hitherto 
been relied upon to deliver U.S. nuclear weapon on to their targets. 
 
Iran: Independence and Nuclear Weapons 
 
The Islamic Republic’s approach to nuclear weapons changed in 1984.  After 
reaching agreement with the AQ Khan network for the supply of enrichment design 
information, a list of European suppliers, and weapons specific design information, the 
Islamic Republic consolidated its weapons specific efforts. Iran’s decision-making 
differed considerably from other AQ Khan clients. Libya, for example, purchased the 
design information and centrifuge components from Khan. Iran, for its part, purchased 
and then sought to independently develop the specialized components needed to operate 
centrifuges. This decision explains the long delay between the decisions to proliferate (in 
1984); the introduction of UF6 into centrifuges (1999); and the start of weapons specific 
experiments (1999/2000).   
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The program began in an era of bipolarity, ostensibly to deter a Soviet allied 
client state (Iraq), and then continued after the Iraqi military was defeated in 1991; a time 
when relations with the United States became Iran’s most pressing security concern. The 
data therefore suggests that the end of the Cold War had little affect on Iranian nuclear 
decision-making. Instead, the pursuit of a nuclear weapon appears to have been based on 
the belief that Iran needed to acquire a deterrent for defense. In October 1988, Rafsanjani 
argued for the need to develop weapons of mass destruction to prepare for a future 
struggle against any and all enemies of the Islamic Republic. Iran, he argued, must “fully 
equip [itself] both in an offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and 
radiological weapons” because recent experience indicated to the Iranian leadership that 
“these weapons are decisive” and “that the moral teachings of the world are not very 
effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its resolutions 
and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are committed in the 
battlefield.”127  
After acquiring enrichment design information in 1987, Iran established what 
appears to be two separate centrifuge research and development programs. The first 
program supported Iran’s civil nuclear research and was overseen by the AEOI. The 
second program was managed through the Physics Research Centre (PHRC), which was 
overseen by the Defense Industries Education Research Institute (ERI), established to 
coordinate defense R&D for the Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics 
(MODAFL).128 Iran’s alleged military program initially relied upon Seyyed Abbas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 “Hashemi-Rafsanjani Speaks on Future of IRGC,” Tehran Domestic Service, Daily 
Report, Near East & South Asia, FBIS-NES-88-195, October 6, 1988.  
128 GOV/2011/65, annex, p. 5. 
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Shahmoradi-Zavareh, an academic at Sharif University, to oversee the PHRC’s 
procurement efforts. 129 Initial centrifuge research and development first began at Sharif, 
before elements of the program were moved to a compound in north Tehran in the 
Lavizan Shian neighborhood in 1989.  
According to a series of telex requests sent by entities linked to the PHRC, Iran 
began to actively seek out the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle in 1988.130 These efforts, 
however, proved unsuccessful, due to continued difficulties procuring specialized 
centrifuge components. Thus, after six years of work, Iran returned to the Khan network 
to arrange for the purchase of centrifuge components. In 1994, the Khan network began 
to send Tehran a duplicate set of drawings for the IR-1 centrifuge, along with 
components for 500 centrifuges, which Iran then used for centrifuge testing in the late-
1990s, before researchers succeeded in introducing uranium gas into a centrifuge in 
1999.131 
The decision to pursue nuclear weapons specific tests appears to have coincided 
with the AEOI’s advances in centrifuge development. For example, there is a notable 
absence of information about weapons specific experiments and procurement activities in 
1993-98, and it was at this time when a PHRC linked fabrication facility, the Defense 
Industries Organization132, was working on manufacturing specialized components.  In 
late 1999, the PHRC was consumed by a larger entity, known as the AMAD plan, and 
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130 David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Stricker, “The Physics Research Center 
and Iran’s Parallel Military Nuclear Program,” The Institute for Science and International 
Security, ISIS Report, February 23, 2012, 
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placed under the direction of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (Mahabadi). The program’s focus 
subsequently moved away from procurement towards dedicated nuclear weapons 
experiments, including the development of a shock implosion generator133, design work 
on the nosecone for a Shahab-3 missile to carry Iran’s alleged warhead design134, and the 
full scale test of the shock implosion system in 2003135 using a substitute material to 
simulate HEU.  
This weaponization work continued up until 2003, but was suspended after an 
Iranian dissident group, National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the civilian arm 
of the Mujahedin Khalq (MEK), a terrorist group that works to overthrow the Islamic 
Republic, revealed the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran, including the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 David Albright, Paul Brannan, Mark Gorwitz, and Andrea Stricker, “ISIS Analysis of 
IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Part II, Iran’s Work and Foreign Assistance on a 
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International Security, ISIS Report, November 13, 2011, 
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Natanz enrichment center, the address of the Kalaye electric company, a heavy water 
production plant under construction at Arak, and the names of various individuals and 
front companies involved with the nuclear program. In response, the Iranian leadership 
opted to halt the program, owing to concerns that Iran’s nuclear activities would result in 
its file being referred to the United Nations Security Council.136 After the issuance of the 
halt order, Iran destroyed the Lavizan-Shian site, going as far to remove layers of topsoil 




The available data suggests that Iran’s initial nuclear decision was made in 
reaction to the Iraqi use of WMD in 1984. However, by 1988, the statements indicate that 
the purpose of Iran’s nuclear program had shifted towards acquiring an independent 
nuclear deterrent. The data therefore suggests that the end of the bipolar order was not a 
causal factor for Iranian nuclear decision-making. The program, therefore, continued 
after the end of the Iran-Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s subsequent defeat during the Persian 
Gulf War. There does, however, appear to be a link to between the credibility of the use 
of force and the Iranian decision to halt the program in 2003.  
Similarly, the end of the Cold War did not result in Turkey elevating the status of 
nuclear weapons for its defense/security. Instead, Turkey’s actions suggest just the 
opposite; rather than seek out nuclear weapons, Turkey devalued the role of nuclear 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Text of speech by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rouhani to 
the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council (place and date not given): “Beyond the 
Challenges Facing Iran and the IAEA Concerning the Nuclear Dossier,” Rahbord (in 
Persian), FBIS IAP20060113336001, September 30, 2005, pp.7-38.  
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weapons for its security. Ankara’s post-Cold War policy stands in stark contrast to its 
historic approach to nuclear weapons, which had always been premised on the belief that 
nuclear weapons were required to defend the country from a Soviet invasion.  
Conclusion: Similar Inputs, Different Outputs 
 
Turkey and Iran reacted differently to similar external inputs; thus disproving this 
dissertation’s hypothesis that similar inputs should result in similar outputs. The two 
states also responded differently when faced with HIGH security threats. As such, 
beginning in 1959, the two states adopted divergent approaches to nuclear weapons. Iran 
disavowed the use of nuclear weapons for the defense of the Zagros line, whereas Turkey 
formulated a comprehensive plan to use nuclear weapons to defend its territory – 
including along the Zagros line.  
The difference in outputs suggests that subjective factors influence nuclear 
specific decision-making. Thus, when presented with a similar input, the two states 
choose policies that the leadership believes is best suited to address the issue at hand. 
With regards to security threats, the Shah of Iran showed a consistent preference for 
maintaining cordial ties with the Soviet Union, whilst also seeking out greater 
conventional armaments from the United States. There is no evidence to suggest that a 
HIGH security threat prompted Iran to seek out nuclear weapons. 
The Shah’s policy, as well as personal statements on security related matters, 
indicates that he was not particularly concerned about nuclear weapons, but rather the 
regional threat posed by Pan-Arab nationalism. This perception, in turn, appears to have 
prompted him to focus more on defending against the Arab threat, rather than the Soviet 
threat. Consequently, Iran’s handling of the HIGH security threat posed by the nuclear-
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armed Soviet Union was similar to that of the policy to address a LOW security threat 
like the Baluchi rebels. This approach resulted in a relatively consistent nuclear policy 
that culminated in the decision to sign and then ratify the NPT, which thus indicated a 
political decision to forego the development of nuclear weapons.  
The Islamic Republic, for the first five years, made similar decisions. When faced 
with a HIGH security threat, Ayatollah Khomenei made the decision to cancel the Shah’s 
nuclear program. In addition, after reviewing Iran’s treaty obligations, the Islamic 
Republic chose to abide by its NPT obligations. The trigger for Iran’s nuclear weapons 
program appears to have been based on two interrelated factors: First, Iraq’s use of 
WMD. Second, the failure of the international community to condemn and ultimately do 
something about Iraq’s flagrant violation of international norms. The use of these 
weapons against Iran prompted Iran to explore its own nuclear options and resulted in a 
dedicated nuclear weapons program. The program began before the end of the Cold War 
and continued over a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The history, 
therefore, suggests that the end of the bipolar order is a poor explanation for Iran’s 
interest in nuclear weapons. Iran’s decision-making also indicates that a HIGH security 
threat does not always lead to a state seeking out nuclear weapons – even when the state 
in question is involved in armed combat with a WMD armed adversary.  
Turkey’s approach to nuclear weapons is more reflective of neo-realist assertions 
about nuclear decision-making, albeit with important caveats. Ankara’s nuclear decision-
making was influenced by NATO’s nuclear policy. Turkish policymakers, however, did 
seek to change NATO’s nuclear wear plan in 1967, albeit with limited success. These 
efforts, however, are an indication of the way in which Turkey viewed nuclear weapons 
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during the Cold War. The weapons were not simply meant for deterrence, but Ankara 
viewed them as a vital component of its security – and if need be, wanted to use them to 
defend territory.  
There is no evidence, however, that any combination of a HIGH security threat 
and doubts about the U.S. security guarantee ever prompted Turkish leaders to seek out 
an independent nuclear weapons capability. Ankara’s decision-making during times of 
crises with the United States suggests that Turkey would stop short of threatening its 
nuclear status, even while it sought to retaliate against the United States. Turkey’s actions 
suggest that NATO’s nuclear guarantee may have acted as a proliferation constraint. 
After the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s nuclear posture reflected NATO’s de-emphasis 
on nuclear weapons. Ankara, however, is the only NATO country that hosts U.S. nuclear 
weapons that has made the decision to de-certify the pilots needed to deliver those 
weapons. Turkey is therefore unique in its approach to nuclear weapons. Turkey’s 
posture is likely a result of its decreased threat perceptions vis-à-vis a superior adversary. 
It is also reflective of its post-1991 emphasis on conventional, rather than nuclear, 
defense.  
More broadly, the data suggests that each country considered a myriad of factors 
when making nuclear decisions. This requires a more thorough explanation of other 
factors influencing policy-decisions. The following chapters discuss the role of 
proliferation restraints in nuclear decision-making to determine how the interplay 
between these factors shaped outcomes.  
 
 
	   95	  
Chapter 4: Nonproliferation Norms and Nuclear Restraint: Iran and Turkey 
 
Realist and neo-realist scholarship has struggled to explain cases of nuclear 
restraint. At the time of writing, there are some fifty nuclear weapons capable states, but 
only ten nuclear-armed states.137 The large gap has remained static for decades and has 
thus challenged the security-oriented explanations for nuclear decision-making. In other 
words, states have not historically sought out nuclear weapons to address a security 
threat, but have instead steadily adopted nonproliferation as a key component of their 
national security strategy.  
By contrast, a consensus has emerged in the field of nonproliferation that 
proliferation is historically rare and that an overwhelming number of states choose not to 
develop nuclear weapons.138 To explain this phenomena of nuclear restraint, scholars 
have put forward variations explanations that are based on one of the four dominant 
theoretical narratives in proliferation studies: realism; neoliberal institutionalism; 
liberalism; and constructivism.  
This study tests these theories, using the two cases of Iran and Turkey to explain 
the reasons for Iran and Turkey’s nuclear restraint. To do so, this study will measure Iran 
and Turkey’s reactions to a set of common inputs. These inputs include: 
 
Nuclear Restraints 
1- Treaties/Nonproliferation Agreements  
2- Trade/Internationalizing Political Model 
3- Humanitarian/International Acceptance 	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However, as the previous chapter noted, Iran – for security related reasons – 
chose to proliferate in 1984/1985. As such, this study will disaggregate the Iranian 
decision-making process, in order to discern whether or not there were other causal 
factors that influenced nuclear decision-making in Iran specifically.  
The first section will chart Iran and Turkey’s differing approach to 
nonproliferation norms and treaties; the second will document how Iran and Turkey’s 
different economic models shaped nuclear decision-making; and the third will chart 
whether Iran or Turkey have ever embraced the notion of a “nuclear taboo” against the 
use of nuclear weapons. This approach allows for further testing of the central hypothesis 
and the measuring of Iran and Turkey’s policy responses to the imposition of 
nonproliferation.  
 
Input 1: Nonproliferation Norms and Treaties 
 
When Iran and Turkey first decided to pursue nuclear energy, the decisions were 
driven by the American willingness to export nuclear technology to allied states. The 
United States’ Atoms for Peace program was intended to assist with the development of 
peaceful nuclear energy programs in allied countries. The program’s intent was threefold: 
First, during the 1950s, nuclear energy was lauded as a critical technology for the world’s 
future. The United States conceptualized of a nuclear energy powered future, wherein the 
world could benefit from a plentiful and cheap energy source for economic development. 
Second, at the time the program was announced, the United States had the world’s most 
developed nuclear sector and thus recently founded nuclear energy firms were eager to 
expand global market share. Third, the United States had enriched a significant quantity 
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of uranium for its weapons program, whereas the Soviet Union’s weapons program still 
faced HEU shortages. Thus, as part of a broader effort to make permanent the then 
weapons gap between the two countries, the United States proposed a common nuclear 
fuel bank with the intention of depleting the Soviet Union’s access to enriched uranium.  
President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced this program to the United Nations in 
1953.139 The program provided a subsidy to the recipient nation to purchase a small 
research reactor. The United States agreed to provide the fuel for this reactor, in exchange 
for an inspection regime outlined in a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. The 
inspections were left to the United States’ Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Turkey 
and Iran both took advantage of the American policy, with Ankara concluding an 
agreement in 1955 and Tehran in 1957.  
In both cases, the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement was limited to the 
exchange of information regarding the design, construction and operation of research 
reactors and their use as research, development, and engineering tools and in medical 
therapy; the health and safety problems related to the operation and use of research 
reactor; the use of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological research, medical 
therapy, agriculture, and industry. Furthermore, the agreements included a peaceful use 
clause and required that the AEC have the right “to observe from time to time the 
condition and use of any leased material and to observe the performance of the reactor in 
which the material is used.”140  
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Library, 
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace.html.  
140 Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Turkish 
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Faced with few constraints, both Iran and Turkey signed the agreements without 
making any changes to the U.S. drafted cooperation agreement text. In fact, both Iran and 
Turkey made similar decisions between 1955-1968.  Both countries worked closely with 
AEC officials; contracted with American Machine and Foundry for their first reactor; and 
worked closely with U.S. national labs whilst establishing the countries’ first nuclear 
research centers.141 Over time, however, the two countries adopted different approaches 
to nonproliferation norms.  
Turkey, for example, resisted concluding a safeguards agreement with the IAEA 
and chose not to sign and ratify the NPT until the late 1970s. Iran, by contrast, signed the 
NPT immediately, ratified it shortly thereafter, and concluded a safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA in 1974. This dynamic changed after both the Islamic Revolution and the 
end of the Cold War. Iran resisted signing new nonproliferation agreements, whereas 
Turkey changed course, and signed every new nonproliferation agreement shortly after 
they opened for signature.  
 
Safeguards, the IAEA, and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Republic, signed on June 10, 1955; The United States of America and Iran, Agreement 
Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed on March 5, 1957.  
141 Brookhaven was instrumental in helping to establish Turkey’s first nuclear research 
center, Kucukcekmece. See: “Report on the Cekmecek Nuclear Research Center, 
Airgram, Department of State, July 21, 1965, General Records of the Department of 
State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, Box 3071. Similarly, Manoucher 
Eqbal, who oversaw the establishment of the Tehran University Nuclear Research Center 
approached the Ford and Rockefeller foundation in 1956, with a “nuclear wish list of 
items” that he wanted to procure for the proposed research center. See: Incoming 
Telegram, Department of State, File no. 611.8897/6-156, June 2, 1956, General Records 
of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Box 
2558  
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Neither Turkey, nor Iran took a definitive position on the formation of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. At that time, the international community 
had yet to conclude negotiations for the NPT; thus leaving the Agency with a limited 
mandate related primarily to nuclear cooperation and the administering of safeguards 
largely limited to verifying the design information of small research reactors.142  
As was customary during the 1950s, the United States concluded separate 
bilateral safeguards arrangements with Iran and Turkey. These arrangements were 
governed by the terms included in the nuclear cooperation agreement, and therefore were 
subject to renewal every 10 years. To support the IAEA’s mandate, the United States, 
beginning the early 1960s, sought to transfer its bilateral safeguards obligations to the 
IAEA. Turkey signed its nuclear cooperation agreement came into force 1955 and was 
thus asked to accept IAEA safeguards in 1965. Iran’s nuclear cooperation agreement, 
however, only came into force in February 1959, which meant that it came up for renewal 
at the same that the NPT was opened for signature. 
Turkey 
 
Upon the expiration of the 1955 agreement, the United States presented an 
updated nuclear cooperation agreement that emphasized the need to transfer the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, “From 1965 to 1967 the IAEA 
was able to reach agreement on the first comprehensive set of safe-guards covering 
reactors of all sizes and, subsequently, reprocessing plants and fuel fabrication plants … 
The safeguards are set forth in IAEA/INFCIRC/66 (reactors of all sizes), 
INFCIRC/66/Rev. 1 (adding reprocessing plants) and INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 (adding fuel 
fabrication plants). The system did not extend to enrichment plants since none was yet in 
operation or projected in any non-nuclear-weapon State.” See: “The Evolution of 
Safeguards,” The International Atomic Energy Agency, November 1998, 
https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/iscn/iscn_old/resource/Evolution%20of%20Safeguards%2019
98.pdf.  
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responsibility for the administration of safeguards from the AEC to the IAEA.143 The 
United States presented the revised text to its Turkish counterparts in March 1965, which 
thus left Turkish policymakers with only 3.5 months to review and accept the new 
arrangement. Upon receiving the document, the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission 
(TAEC) informed the U.S. ambassador to Ankara that it would be impossible for the 
government to reach an agreement before April 30 - the date when Washington had 
hoped to receive a sign-off from Ankara so as to present the agreement to Congress 
within the mandatory 30 days before coming into effect. TAEC indicated that the 
agreement needed the sign-off from the Turkey’s Council of Ministers - a group of prime 
ministerial appointees picked from the ranks of the Grand National Assembly and the 
president’s approval. The reason for the delay, however, was that at the time all relevant 
MPs were out campaigning.  
Ankara also expressed reservations about the imposition of IAEA safeguards, 
driving the U.S. embassy to inform Secretary of State Dean Rusk that Turkey would 
likely opt to retain a bilateral safeguards arrangement with the AEC for the following 
reasons: “1) Present arrangement completely satisfactory and allows for constant liaison 
with U.S. AEC experts; 2) Fear IAEA inspectors might, on occasion, be from Commie 
countries; 3) Turks might have to pay expenses of the IAEA inspection.”144  Beyond and 
above these reasons, Ankara feared losing contact with the AEC, which, at that time, was 
involved in prospecting for uranium, providing grants for students to study at U.S. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 “Peaceful Uses Atomic Energy Agreement,” Outgoing Telegram, Department of 
State, Project number: NND 959900, March 16, 1965, General Records of the 
Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, Box 3071.  
144 “Atomic Energy Agreement,” Incoming Telegram, Department of State, March 24, 
1965, General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964- 
1966, RG 59, Box 3071. 
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laboratories, and, in the case of the Kucukcekmece nuclear facility, effectively running 
the plant with assistance provided by a lab-to-lab nuclear cooperation agreement with 
Brookhaven.145  
Washington, however, remained adamant on Turkey’s acceptance of IAEA 
safeguards. The Ankara embassy was instructed to emphasize that the issue of the 
safeguards transfer was “a non-negotiable pre-condition” for an amendment or extension 
of cooperation agreements. Yet by way of assuaging Turkish apprehensions the embassy 
was also authorized to assure the government that AEC-Turkish nuclear cooperation 
would not be affected, that Turkey could consult with the IAEA about the nationality of 
the inspectors visiting its sites, and that the IAEA would fund the cost of inspections.146 
To hasten the agreement’s implementation, the embassy approached Sukru Elekdag, 
Director General of the NATO Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who 
proposed extending the agreement for one year in order to give Ankara the necessary 
time to pass the updated agreement.147   
Washington was prepared to accept the proposal on condition that Ankara agreed 
to a clause in the agreement mandating the acceptance of IAEA safeguards within a year 
and noncompliance would result in the return of all safeguarded fissile material to the 
United States.148 Should Ankara fail to agree to the trilateral safeguards arrangement, 
Washington would not renew the nuclear cooperation agreement. On April 23 Elekdag 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 “Report on the Cekmecek Nuclear Research Center, Airgram, Department of State, 
July 21, 1965, ibid.  
146 “Atomic Energy Agreement,” Outgoing Telegram, Department of States, March 26, 
1965, General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964- 
1966, RG 59, Box 3071. 
147 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, April 2, 1965, ibid.  
148 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, April 2, 1965, ibid.  
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confirmed that the U.S. drafted language was “completely acceptable”149 and six days 
later indicated that the prime minister and the Council of Ministers accepted the revised 
version but would require another week to have it signed. The agreement eventually came 
into force on June 8, 1965 - one day before its scheduled expiry.150  
In February 1966 the Turkish embassy in Washington informed the Department 
of State of Ankara’s acquiescence in the IAEA assuming safeguards responsibilities.151 
The next month the administration sent the Turkish government an updated draft, and in 
early April W.L. Yeomans, Assistant Director of the Division of International Affairs at 
the AEC, arrived in Ankara to finalize the negotiations.152  On April 9 the Turkish 
negotiators accepted the revised text apart from the provision pertaining to IAEA 
safeguards. Elekdag warned that the inclusion of the cancellation feature would be 
misconstrued in parliament as a tool for pressuring Turkey and could adversely affect 
U.S.-Turkish relations in other, more important, spheres.  
He therefore suggested that the cancellation clause be included in a separate letter. 
The U.S. embassy, while deeming these concerns to be “overstated,” noted that Ankara 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, April 24, 1965, General Records of the 
Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, Box 3071. There 
were some minor revisions to Article I of the agreement, which read: “The Government 
of Turkey undertakes to initiate such trilateral negotiations promptly and to furnish its 
decision to the Government of the United States of America not later than January 31, 
1966 on whether the Government of Turkey finds the negotiated arrangements for 
safeguards to be acceptable.” See: Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, April 22, 
1965, ibid.  
150 “Exchange of Notes at Washington on July 8, 1965 with the Turkish Embassy 
Relating to the entry into force of the amendment to the agreement for cooperation 
concerning civil uses of atomic energy,” Office Memorandum, United States 
Government, 14 July 1965, ibid.  
151 Turkish Embassy, Washington, DC, No. 275.900/165-6, February 2, 1966, ibid. 
152 Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, April 4, 1966 and Incoming Telegram, 
Department of State, April 7, 1966, ibid.  
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had a penchant for rejecting language insinuating U.S. leverage over it affairs.153 
Yeomans thus rewrote the problematic Article along the proposed lines, and on April 12 
the Turkish government accepted the revised language.154 Yet, just like in 1965, Ankara 
failed to sign the document due to the difficulties in getting all members of the Council of 
Ministers together. This prompted President Celal Gursen to instruct his Washington 
ambassador (on May 6, 1966) to sign the agreement.155 
However, as a non-signatory to the NPT, Turkey was not treaty bound to 
conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153), as opposed to a facility 
specific arrangement (INFIRC/66) with the IAEA. Ankara’s approach to the safeguards 
issue appears to have been linked to its concerns about signing the NPT. Like with the 
IAEA, Turkey supported international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. 
However, in 1959, Ankara had concluded a specific arrangement with the United States 
to host U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Thereafter, Ankara put forward a plan to gain “pre-
delegated control” over these weapons to help defend Anatolia and Thrace from a 
Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion.  Turkey’ security concerns, in turn, dictated its early 
approach to nonproliferation.  
In 1967, the United States sought out Turkey’s opinion on the NPT draft text. 
Ankara expressed support for nonproliferation; however, Ankara was concerned about 
whether the treaty would limit nuclear security guarantees – and therefore Ankara’s 
ability to use nuclear weapons to blunt a Soviet attack. Turkey therefore maintained that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, April 9, 1966, General Records of the 
Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, Box 3071. 
154 Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, April 11, 1966 & Incoming Telegram, 
Department of State, April 12, 1966, ibid.  
155 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, May 7, 1966, ibid. 
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all NATO members needed to be in agreement regarding the interpretation of all its 
provisions before completely supporting the Treaty.156 Ankara’s concerns about pre-
delegation ultimately appear to have resulted in the leadership deciding to forego signing 
the Treaty until 1977. Turkey changed its approach only after Ankara expressed an 
interest in working with European states on the construction of a nuclear energy center, 
which was presumably linked to the 1974 decision to pursue nuclear energy.157 (Turkey’s 
civilian nuclear program will be discussed at length below.)  
Iran 
 
The Iranian leadership approached these inputs differently. First, by virtue of its 
nuclear cooperation agreement coming into force at a later date, Iran’s original 
cooperation with the United States did not expire until 1969. Upon the agreements’ 
expiration, Iran had already signed the NPT; thereafter, Iran concluded a safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA in 1974.  
The Shah succinctly summarized his approach to nonproliferation during a private 
conversation with Dr. Akbar Etemad, the director of the Atomic Energy Organization of 
Iran. In his book Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State, David Patrikarakos quotes 
Etemad, who said that after meeting with the Shah on a weekly basis for close to six 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 “Status report on the views of various countries consulted about the proposed 
nonproliferation treaty. These countries include: Belgium; Canada; Denmark; West 
Germany; France; Greece; Iceland; Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; the Netherlands; Norway; 
Portugal; Turkey; the United Kingdom,” Memorandum, Department of State, Secret, 
February 12, 1967. Date declassified: April 14, 1999, Declassified Documents Reference 
System (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2014). 
157 “National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is provided with the following 
information: Greek President Konstantinos Tsatsos’ opinion that the government of 
Turkey is not yet ready to negotiate a Cyprus peace settlement with Greece; Turkey's 
position toward the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT),” Memorandum, White House, 
Top Secret, December 9, 1977. Date declassified: February 01, 2005, Declassified 
Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2014). 
	   105	  
months, he asked the monarch whether he wanted nuclear weapons. The Shah, after 
explaining his military plans for the region, told Etemad that Iran had no need for nuclear 
weapons.158 He then repeated his frequent public assertion that he could change his mind 
if other nations in the region proliferated. Etemad, however, seemed to take this thinly 
veiled hint seriously, and by way of preparing for a potential policy shift encouraged 
research into all aspects of the fuel cycle and other areas that had weapons 
applicability.159  
The anecdote suggests that Iran would refrain from developing a nuclear weapons 
– and thereby uphold its NPT obligation – but would also develop the back end of the 
nuclear fuel cycle, whilst also keeping its option open regarding enrichment. Iran’s 
subsequent nuclear decision-making, however, suggests that the government had yet to 
settle on an actual policy of pursuing nuclear latency, and instead was investing in all 
elements of nuclear energy related infrastructure, 160 without an actual plan.161  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 In other settings, the Shah repeatedly framed his response to proliferation concerns in 
the form of a question, saying, “What do people want with nuclear weapons?” before 
adding that Iran would “never be able to achieve [nuclear] parity with the big powers.” 
Thus, for Iran, the idea of pursuing nuclear weapons was illogical. However, he then 
inserted a caveat, whereby he left the nuclear option open, should smaller countries in the 
region proliferate and thereby erode Iran’s conventional military superiority. See: “Shah 
Interview on Oil, Economic Aid, and Nuclear Arms,” Le Monde, FBIS, Daily Report, 
Middle East and Africa, June 27, 1974, p. R1 
159 David Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State (London: Tauris, 
2012), pp. 62-68. 
160 Mehdi Sarram, former director of Nuclear Safeguards and Training at the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran, offers a more sanguine interpretation of the program’s 
direction. In his view, Etemad thought that “Nuclear [technology] had no limit,” which 
meant that Tehran should engage in all aspects of nuclear research to develop expertise. 
For Sarram, the real indicator of Tehran’s nuclear weapons intent was the AEOI’s 
selection of light-water-reactors. Had Iran wanted to develop a plutonium cycle for 
weapons, he argues, it would have opted for technology that was better suited for the 
task. This means that the main thrust of the AEOI’s work was the development of nuclear 
energy through the purchase of power reactors. Nevertheless, he notes that the AEOI was 
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The concern about Iran’s nuclear intent stemmed from its emphasis on the back-
end of the fuel cycle and the AEOI’s emphasis on two interrelated issues: First, during 
negotiations with the United States for an updated nuclear cooperation agreement, Iran 
refused to accept any limits on reprocessing; Second, Iran had plans to construct a large 
hot lab facility at Isfahan Nuclear Research Center. This facility would have allowed Iran 
to separate plutonium from nuclear fuel elements.162   
Iran’s policies during this time indicate that the Shah and the AEOI leadership 
believed that its NPT status meant that it should face no restriction on its acquisition of 
nuclear fuel cycle related technology. Consequently, Iran’s concerns about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
involved in almost every area of nuclear research to help satisfy the Shah’s desire to be 
conversant in all areas of nuclear research. Source: Author phone interview with Mehdi 
Sarram, December 17, 2013.  
161 During the 1970s, the AEOI considered developing an enrichment facility, but 
abandoned the idea after deeming the project to be infeasible. Etemad and the Shah had 
concluded that their investment in Eurodif – and perhaps in a planned American 
enrichment facility in Ohio – would satisfy Iranian demand. However, the AEOI was 
watching the development of gas centrifuge and jet nozzle technology closely. Moreover, 
on 11 February 1976, Dr. Jeff Eerkens, an American expert on laser enrichment 
technology, wrote to the Shah directly with an offer to help Iran set-up a laser enrichment 
facility in Iran. Just two weeks later, Dr. Mojtaba Taherzadeh, the director of the TNRC, 
responded to the letter and expressed interest in cooperating with Eerkens. Like Eerkens, 
Taherzadeh worked in the U.S. defense industry and on the SNAP project to develop 
power sources for space satellites. Eerkens visited Tehran in 1976, where he met with 
Etemad, and Ehsanollah Ziai. During his visit, Eerkens and Ziai concluded an agreement 
for the AEOI to finance research into ISOSEP laser enrichment technology, which was 
based on Eerkens’ theoretical work and patented in the United States in December 1975. 
See: Anton Khlopkov, “How the United States Helped Iran Build a Laser Enrichment 
Facility,” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 20, no. 1 (March, 2013), pp. 39-40. 
162 “Le Monde Interviews Iranian Nuclear Energy Official,” Le Monde, in Daily Report, 
Middle East and Africa, FBIS-MEA-75-241, December 15, 1975, p. R1; U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran to State Department, “US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and US-Iran 
Energy Discussions,” May 16, 1977, Confidential, available at: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc28.pdf; U.S. Embassy in Tehran to 
State Department, “GOI/AEOI Plans for Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, ENTEC,” 
February 14, 1977, Secret, available at: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc25b.pdf.   
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nonproliferation norms were not about the NPT per se, but rather efforts undertaken after 
the 1974 Indian nuclear test to augment the control over the spread of reprocessing 
technology.  
The Indian nuclear test changed the international community’s approach to 
nonproliferation and safeguards. To further curtail the spread of nuclear weapons, the 
United States and the Soviet Union worked to strengthen the export control provisions, 
known collectively as the Zangeer Committee. These export guidelines included a trigger 
list of dual-use items, which would require an IAEA safeguards agreement, before a 
supplier would agree to export certain technologies.163  
The Indian nuclear test hastened the discussions and prompted yet another 
meeting of the world’s major exports. The original seven members (the United States, the 
Soviet Union, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and Canada) met in London, where 
they agreed to follow common guidelines on nuclear transfers that included and expanded 
upon the items listed on the Zangger Committee’s trigger list. Later, in 1977, eight other 
states (Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, 
and Switzerland) joined the group. The group of fifteen published its common guidelines 
in 1977 and was dubbed the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The member states were 
expected to adopt national legislation to enforce both the NSG and the Zangger 
committee.164  
Turkey and Iran reacted differently to these new restrictions. The Shah was 
particularly dismayed by the U.S. led effort to curtail the spread of reprocessing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Fritz Schmidt, “NPT Export Controls and the Zangger Committee,” Nonproliferation 
Review, vol. 7, no. 3 (Fall/Winter, 2000), pp. 136-137. 
164 Tadeusz Strulak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group,” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 1, no. 
1 (Fall, 1993), pp.2-4. 
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technology. In 1976, for example, the Shah requested a meeting with American officials, 
after negotiations for the conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement (initiated in 
1974) failed to reach consensus over the reprocessing issue. The United States – 
motivated in part by proliferation concerns in Egypt and Israel165 – sought to obtain a 
“virtual veto” over Iranian reprocessing decisions.  
To do so, the U.S. first sought to convince Iran to forego pursuing the technology, 
before offering to purchase “burned” Iranian fuel rods, and then eventually settling on a 
joint commercial approach to the issue. Through the establishment of a joint commercial 
venture, that included American representatives, U.S. officials believed that they could 
gain greater control over Iranian nuclear decision-making.166 The AEOI and the Shah 
refused to acquiesce to the American demands and used the promise of lucrative 
commercial contracts – the Shah indicated his desire to purchase eight nuclear reactors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to Secretary 
of Defense, “Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Iran (U) - Action Memorandum,” n.d. 
[late June 1974], enclosing Atomic Energy Commission and Department of State 
memoranda, Freedom of Information Act Release, accessed December 11, 2013, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc02.pdf.   
166 See: Memorandum of Conversation, “Proposed Cable to Tehran on Pakistani Nuclear 
Processing,” May 12, 1976, available at: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc17.pdf; U.S. Embassy Tehran to 
State Department, “Iranian Views on Non-Proliferation and US/Iran Nuclear 
Cooperation,” June 7, 1976, Secret, available at: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc19b.pdf; U.S. Embassy Tehran to 
State Department, “Iranian Counterproposals for Atomic Energy Agreement,” July 23, 
1976, Confidential Source: MR request, available at: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc21.pdf; Memorandum for the 
Secretary from Charles W. Robinson, “Nuclear Negotiations with Iran,” August 13, 1976, 
RG 59, Records of Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson, Box 6, CWR- 
Memos to the Secretary, July 1976-Sept 1976, available at: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc23a.pdf;  Tehran Embassy to State 
Department, “Nuclear Energy Discussions,” August 3, 1976, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc22.pdf.  
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from U.S. companies – to try and convince the United States to alter its approach to the 
reprocessing issue.  
The Shah and Etemad both felt that the NSG was discriminatory. In 1976, Etemad 
told U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms and U.S. science attaché Albert Chapman 
that the Shah wanted to arrange a meeting with NSG to express supliee country concerns. 
In a side note, Helms wrote that the reference to the NSG was a “non sequitur” and was 
likely a response to the Shah being “miffed at not being invited to the deliberations of the 
nuclear suppliers group.”167 Iran’s argument was simple: as a NPT signatory, it should 
face no restrictions on the import of nuclear technology. Moreover, the NSG, Iran argued 
was outside of the NPT Treaty structure, and therefore in excess of its safeguards 
arrangement with the Agency.  
Iran’s level of development required that it import all of the material and 
infrastructure needed to support its nuclear energy ambitions.168 The Shah, for example, 
envisioned the procurement of twenty-three reactors to produce 23,000 MW of electricity 
by 1992.169 Etemad further expanded upon this vision in 1975, telling Le Monde that 
Tehran “want[s] to possess an installed power capacity of 70,000 megawatts,” claiming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 U.S. Embassy Tehran to State Department, “Iranian Views on Non-Proliferation and 
US/Iran Nuclear Cooperation,” June 7, 1976, Secret, available at: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc19b.pdf.  
168 In an interview with Der Spiegel in January 1974, the Shah argued that Iran’s oil 
would be exhausted in thirty years, forcing it to extract oil from mature fields. He then 
explained the necessity of Tehran developing a petrochemical and pharmaceutical 
industry to sell products to Europe and the West in a post-oil world, saying, “I will sell 
oil in the form of petrochemical products. I will sell you aspirin. I will not sell you crude 
oil.” See: “Shah Gives View on Oil in Der Spiegel,” Teheran Domestic Service, in Daily 
Report, Middle East and Africa, FBIS-MEA-74-00, January 8, 1974, pp. K1-K9.  
169 U.S. Embassy in Tehran to State Department, “The Atomic Energy Organization of 
Iran,” April 15, 1976, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc14a.pdf/.  
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that the high figure was a result of its plans to rapidly industrialize so as to raise “the 
living standards of the Iranian people.”170  
To support this project, Iran relied on “super turn key” projects, whereby the 
supplier would provide all of the equipment for different nuclear projects, including for 
the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the planned Darkhovin nuclear reactor project, and the 
procurement of technology for the Isfahan nuclear research center.171 The rise of non-
U.S. suppliers – and in particular, Germany and France – allowed for the Shah to 
circumvent American efforts to curtail his reprocessing plans. Both France and Germany 
were members of the NSG and Zangger committee, but resisted U.S. pressure to restrict 
the export of reprocessing equipment. Germany, for example, made a “commitment” to 
export reprocessing facilities to Iran, after a pre-arranged number came online; 
presumably in the 1990s, after the construction of two units at Bushehr and four 
additional air-cooled reactors near Isfahan.172 France agreed to similar provisions during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Etemad also described the origins of the nuclear project, telling the reporter that “for a 
certain number of years his imperial majesty has proposed a new energy program 
according to which fossil fuels would no longer be used to produce energy but as a raw 
material in industry.” See: “Le Monde Interviews Iranian Nuclear Energy Official,” Le 
Monde, in Daily Report, Middle East and Africa, FBIS-MEA-75-241, December 15, 
1975, p. R1.  
171 The construction of the Bushehr power plant was initially overseen by Germany’s 
Kraftwerk Union. Darkhovin would have been overseen by Framatome. The AEOI also 
planned to establish five divisions at the French built Isfahan nuclear research center, 
with the two most important being reactor physics and metallurgy. The other three 
divisions were intended to study fuel fabrication, uranium chemistry, and desalinization. 
Iran set aside $300 billion for construction and envisioned employing 1,200 researchers 
at the site. See: “Le Monde Interviews Iranian Nuclear Energy Official.”  
172  “The Secretary's Meeting with FRG Ambassador von Staden on the FRG/Iran 
Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation,” Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, July 2, 
1976, Kissinger Transcripts, KT01982, Digital National Security Archives; “FRG, Iran 
Negotiating Nuclear Energy Agreement,” Hamburg DPA, Daily Report, Middle East and 
Africa, FBIS-MEA-76-09, May 12, 1976, p. R1; FRG Firm may sell more Nuclear Power 
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its negotiations with Iran; including an agreement to provide a large hot-lab facility, 
which would have allowed for Iranian scientists to conduct separation experiments.173 
After the Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic cancelled its nuclear contracts 
with western suppliers. Thereafter the program atrophied for close to three years, before 
the Iranian leadership sought to finish the Bushehr reactor, which included two reactors 
that before the Revolution were 80 and 50 percent complete.174 Iranian efforts to do so 
were blocked by the United States, which put pressure on Germany to limit its nuclear 
cooperation with Iran after the Revolution.  
The resumption of nuclear cooperation with Germany was further complicated by 
the Iran-Iraq war, which German officials maintained was the reason for the decision not 
to export components for the reactor.175 Furthermore, the export of Zangger committee 
controlled “trigger list” items required a new export agreement, after the Shah-era export 
license expired in 1984.176 As such, the two sides never did conclude an agreement to 
restart work at Bushehr, despite sustained German interest up until 1987, when sustained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Stations to Iran,” Hamburg DPA, Daily Report, Middle East and Africa, FBIS-MEA-77-
120, June 22, 1977, p. R2.  
173 “Nuclear Energy Cooperation Discussed,” Daily Report, Middle East and Africa, 
FBIS-MEA-75-235, December 5, 1975, p. R2; “Le Monde Interviews Iranian Nuclear 
Energy Official.”; U.S. Embassy in Tehran to State Department, “GOI/AEOI Plans for 
Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, ENTEC,” February 14, 1977, Secret, available at: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc25b.pdf.   
174 “Bonn Concern Ends Iran Nuclear Pact,” Special to The New York Times. New York 
Times (1923-Current file) [New York, N.Y] 01 Aug 1979: D3.  
175 In December 1982 the AEOI requested a team to visit Bushehr to make an assessment 
about finishing at least one of the reactors. KWU agreed to send a 40-50 person team 
some time in 1983 but made clear that actual construction work would only take place 
after the end of the Iran-Iraq war. See: Ann MacLachlan, “Iran Seeking way to Finish 
Bushehr Plant but Bonn Denies Exports,” Nucleonics Week, vol. 27. No. 44, October 30, 
1986.  
176 Ibid; Richard Kessler, “Argentines Hope for Expanded Iran Contacts from Tehran 
Talks,” Nucleonics Week, vol. 27, no. 50, December 11, 1986. 
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Iraqi air attacks resulted in the death of a German engineer and the proclamation that the 
site was unsalvageable.177 In response, AEOI director Amrollahi wrote in a personal 
cable to IAEA Director Hans Blix, that the agency’s meek response to the bombing was 
tantamount to giving “tacit approval for the Iraqi strike.”178  
In parallel, the Islamic Republic’s outreach to Argentina in 1983 for the 
procurement of conversion equipment for the Isfahan nuclear research center was also 
blocked by the United States. While the two sides did eventually conclude an agreement 
for the conversion of the Tehran Research Reactor to run on LEU fuel, the scope of the 
agreement was far more circumscribed than both sides had initially indicated; indeed Iran 
had approached Argentina about working as part of a larger consortium to finish work at 
Bushehr in 1986.179 During that same year, Iran first approached Pakistan about acquiring 
the full front end of the fuel cycle. While the offer was rebuffed, this sequence of events 
did eventually result in Iran making contact with the AQ Khan network and beginning its 
illicit nuclear enrichment program, presumably with the intention of developing nuclear 
weapons.  
The timeline suggests the following about the relationship between 
nonproliferation norms and nuclear decision-making. First, both the Shah and the Islamic 
Republic had similar points of view about the NPT and the NSG/Zangger committee 
guidelines; both thought they were discriminatory. The critical difference is that the Shah 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Gamini Seneviratne, “Iranians Charge that KWU Refuses to Start Work on the 
Reactor,” ibid, vol. 28, no. 7, February 12, 1987; Mark Hibbs, “Iraqi Attack on Bushehr 
Kills West German Nuclear Official,” ibid, vol. 28, no. 47, November 19, 1987; Idem, 
“Bushehr Construction now Remote after three Iraqi air Strikes,” ibid, vol. 28, no. 48, 
November 26, 1987. 
178 “IAEA’s Response to Bushehr called ‘Mockery’,” IRNA, in Daily Report, South Asia, 
FBIS -NES-87-228, November 26, 1987. 
179 “Consortium proposed for Bushehr completion,” Nuclear News, April 1987.  
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was able to procure nuclear technology from France and Germany, whereas the Islamic 
Republic could not. The Islamic Republic has admitted that its initial work on centrifuges 
began in 1985, whereas Germany and Argentina’s role in constructing Bushehr ended in 
1987. Furthermore, between 1979 and 1982, the Islamic Republic cancelled the Shah’s 
nuclear program. Nevertheless, during that three-year window (1982-1985), the Islamic 
Republic was labeled as a proliferation concern and the U.S. did take steps to limit 
cooperation with other countries.180 However, the American nonproliferation policy does 
not appear to have been the causal reason for the decision to proliferate.  
The Islamic Republic’s statements at this time suggest that leadership believed 
that the world ignored nonproliferation during times of conflict. Rafsanjani, for example, 
called for the development of nuclear weapons in 1988, saying, “that the moral teachings 
of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does 
not respect its resolutions and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions 
which are committed in the battlefield.”181  This statement suggests that the Islamic 
Republic’s lack of faith in the viability of nonproliferation to prevent proliferation – and 
then to ultimately be used to condemn or stop a WMD using state – contributed to the 
decision to proliferate. This conclusion indicates that the Islamic Republic’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 In the 1980s the Reagan administration, suspecting Tehran’s secret interest in the 
Bomb, began to work to prevent the export of nuclear equipment to the Islamic Republic. 
The American nonproliferation efforts were largely successful but did not prevent Tehran 
from clandestinely acquiring dual use equipment to support the enrichment program. In 
September 1982, just before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the administration 
announced the creation of a list of sixty-three countries - including Iran - that would need 
specific government approval to receive nuclear exports. See: Milton R. Benjamin, 
“Administration Will List 63 Countries Subject to Nuclear Export Restrictions,” 
Washington Post, September 9, 1982.  
181 “Hashemi-Rafsanjani Speaks on Future of IRGC,” Tehran Domestic Service, Daily 
Report, Near East & South Asia, FBIS-NES-88-195, October 6, 1988.  
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dissatisfaction with its treatment on the further development of its civil nuclear program 
(Bushehr) was, at best, further confirmation of an assumption made about the inability of 
Iran to rely on nonproliferation norms for security made before the 1984 decision to 
finish work at Bushehr. 
There is also evidence to suggest that the imposition of supplier controls affected 
Turkish nuclear decision-making, albeit in the opposite way to that of the Islamic 
Republic. Turkey changed its approach to the NPT in 1977. Its reason for doing so was 
simple: As a non-signatory to the Treaty, Ankara would not have been able to pursue a 
nuclear energy program because it would not have been able to import the needed 
infrastructure from the established suppliers; all of which were NSG members by that 
time. The reasons for the Turkish decision to develop a civil nuclear program will be 
discussed in the next section; however, for economic reasons related to the 1973 energy 
crisis, Turkish politicians prioritized the development of nuclear energy. This decision 
prompted a re-evaluation of long-dormant plans to procure a reactor from a foreign 
vendor. The Turkish government issued a license for the Akkuyu site in 1976, and 
thereafter Ankara began exclusive bilateral negotiations with the two state-owned 
Swedish firms - Asea-Atom and Stal Laval - for the construction of a 660 MW heavy 
water reactor.182  
By that time, Sweden had agreed to abide by NSG export guidelines. Turkey, 
therefore, had to have a safeguards agreement in place with the IAEA to allow for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182  Ahmet Kutukcuoglu, “Turkiye’nin Gecmisteki Nukleer Enerji Deneyimleri,” 
Uluslararasi Nukleer Teknoloji Kurultayi, October 12-15, 1993; Ankara Makine 
Muhendisleri Odasi (Chamber of Mechanical Engineers), Ankara, Publication No 168 
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export of certain Swedish technology to support the country’s nascent nuclear plans. As 
such, in 1977, the Turkish government expressed its desire for parliament to ratify the 
NPT, so as to allow for Ankara to receive assistance from the European Economic 
Community (EEC) for the construction of a nuclear technology center, as well as to 
support the reactor negotiations.183 Furthermore, this action was intended to complement 
the on-going efforts to secure an agreement with Sweden for the planned reactor project. 
Parliament agreed to take the issue of ratification on December 11, 1977, but in the 
turbulent political atmosphere it was not ratified until November 28, 1979.  
Ankara’s negotiations with Asea-Atom and Stal Laval stalled in 1979, after 
Turkey asked that Sweden finance the cost of construction. The negotiations were 
formally cancelled in 1980, after the Swedish government cited its concerns about 
providing nuclear technology to a military run government after the September coup.184 
Turkey’s civil nuclear plans moved in parallel to its continued reliance on nuclear 
weapons for collective defense from the Soviet Union. As such, during the 1980s, Ankara 
continued to indirectly support the use of nuclear weapons for its defense, before taking a 
different approach to the issue during the 1990s.  
Turkey’s policy shift was linked to three interrelated issues: First, NATO 
decreased its reliance on nuclear weapons; Second, Turkey’s greatest security threat, the 
Soviet Union, collapsed; Third, the nature of the threat to Turkey changed from that of 
conflict with a superior adversary, to that of potential conflict with less powerful states, 
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House, Top Secret, December 9, 1977, Declassified: 1 February 2005. 
184 Metin Demirsar, “The Turkish Electricity Authority (TEK) Plans to Reissue Tenders,” 
Nucleonics Week, vol. 23, no. 15, April 15, 1982.  
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like Iraq, Syria, and Iraq. And in these three cases, the leadership was suspected of 
pursuing WMD and ballistic missiles to augment their military capabilities. To address 
these threats, Turkey adopted a two-pronged policy of conventional defense, paired with 
the acceptance of a multi-lateral approach to preventing further proliferation; particularly 
after the 1991 revelations about Iraq’s nuclear program. 
This change in approach resulted in a re-evaluation of Ankara’s approach to 
nonproliferation. Hence, in stark contrast to the policy of apathy adopted in the 1970s and 
1980s, Turkish policymakers have made it a priority to rapidly adopt new 
nonproliferation instruments, shortly after they are made available for signature. For 
example, Ankara has now signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT), the IAEA’s more intrusive inspection regime, known as the Additional Protocol, 
whilst also joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group.  
Turkey’s support for these agreements is conditioned on three assumptions. First, 
Turkey’s acceptance of nonproliferation norms will not hinder its efforts to procure civil 
nuclear technology. Second, the adoption of nonproliferation instruments benefits 
Turkish soft power by signaling its commitment to deal with a share problem through 
multi-lateral forums and treaties. Third, the adoption of a universal set of norms allows 
for Ankara to address one of its more pressing security concerns: the proliferation of 
WMD in the Middle East.   
This approach differs from many of Turkey’s western allies, (including the United 
States and the United Kingdom), which have sought to make it more difficult to import 
enrichment and reprocessing technology in recent years. Turkey has objected to efforts to 
“black-box” (where design information is withheld from the end-user to prevent 
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proliferation of sensitive technologies) enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Turkey 
has instead supported the conditioning of the transfer of these items on a state being in 
compliance with its IAEA safeguards provisions and its acceptance of the Additional 
Protocol.185 This approach suggests that Ankara has adopted a very rigid interpretation of 
the NPT, albeit while acknowledging that the control of sensitive exports is beneficial for 





The evidence suggests that both Iran and Turkey had similar reasons for signing 
the NPT. For Iran, the acceptance of nonproliferation was linked to its concerns about 
regional proliferation, as well as the belief that adherence to the Treaty would allow for it 
to gain access to western nuclear technology. Turkey adopted the Treaty for similar 
reasons and has also resisted efforts to prevent the sharing of technologies with importing 
states. The Islamic Republic chose to follow a similar policy at the outset of its rule, 
albeit while making clear that it did not intend to rely on the West for nuclear technology. 
Neither the Shah, nor the Islamic Republic believed that the Treaty was fair; both 
governments believed that the Treaty was discriminatory.  	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Nevertheless, both governments had an incentive to support nonproliferation, 
owing to concerns about the Arab states’ development of nuclear weapons.  The data 
indicates that Iran changed its approach to nonproliferation for two reasons. First, for 
security related reasons, Iran began to explore WMD to deter Iraqi chemical weapons 
attack. Second, and related to this, the political leadership made the determination that it 
could no longer rely upon nonproliferation instruments to condemn and prevent WMD 
acquisition during times of conflict. During the Iran-Iraq war, and subsequently 
thereafter, the Iranian leadership has maintained that the West’s overarching policy goal 
is to overthrow the Islamic Republic. This approach appears to have justified the 
continued pursuit of nuclear weapons after the Iran-Iraq war, ostensibly because they 
could be used to deter external aggression. 
Turkey’s approach to nonproliferation norms was opposite to that of Iran’s. 
During the 1970s, Turkey adopted an approach similar to that of the Islamic Republic, 
albeit while foregoing proliferation, in favor of pushing for predelegation of U.S. tactical 
nuclear weapons to defend against a Soviet attack. Similarly, in response to the Iraqi 
threat, Ankara adopted nonproliferation as policy mechanism to defend against potential 
WMD threats. This approach resulted in Turkey signing every major nonproliferation 
Treaty and taking an active part in the formulation of nuclear export guidelines.   
This suggests that states are more likely to shun nonproliferation, when faced with 
a HIGH security threat; specifically, a WMD armed HIGH security threat. In the case of 
Turkey, however, Ankara has remained committed to nonproliferation, even after 
concerns about Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons became a focal point of the 
international community after the 2002 revelations described in the previous chapter. 
	   119	  
This suggests that security concerns affected Turkish and Iranian approached to 
nonproliferation norms. It also confirms that the nonproliferation norm is sufficiently 
robust enough to withstand shocks, like in the case of Turkey.   
 
Input 2: Economics and the “Internationalizing” Model of Political Survival 
 
Liberal theorists suggest that countries dependent on global trade are less likely to 
proliferate, while conversely economically isolated states that are less integrated with the 
world economy, are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Etel Solingen argues 
“systemic differences in nuclear behavior can be observed between states whose leaders 
or ruling coalitions advocate the integration in the global economy, political, economic, 
reputational, and opportunity costs of acquiring nuclear weapons because such costs 
impair a domestic agenda favoring internationalization.”186 To test this theory, Solingen 
relies on nine case studies comparing Asian and Middle Eastern countries’ nuclear 
decision-making. Solingen’s work, however, does not provide a comprehensive definition 
for the study’s key dependent variable, nuclearization; choosing to define it as moving 
towards nuclear weapons, without defining what that means. 187  Conversely, 
denuclearization is defined as the renunciation of nuclear weapon, without detailing what 
such a process would entail.188  
Moreover, as part of the analysis, Solingen does not differentiate between the two 
types of economic models prevalent in the Middle East: import substitution 
industrialization/autarkic and rentier economic models. With regards to the latter, 
Gregory Gause notes that in the oil exporting Gulf States, the state has co-opted tribes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the Middle East, p. 7. 
187 Ibid, p. 46. 
188 Ibid, pp. 43-44. 
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and replaced the traditional economic model, Bedouin caravan style trade, to ensure 
political stability.189 To support this method of governance, the Middle Eastern states rely 
on their oil largess, which allows for the paying of stipends to key tribal leaders, the 
religious community, and to the populations being governed. To support these patronage 
networks, rentier states rely on oil exports.  
This means that whilst these governments are inward looking, they ultimately rely 
on economic growth to sustain political power; ultimately this includes efforts to use 
energy resources to enhance foreign direct investment. Furthermore, Solingen argues that 
state efforts to encourage economic growth is a proliferation constraint, owing to the fact 
that it incentivizes regional cooperation, which then decreases the salience of arguments 
made in favor of nuclear weapons by elements of the national security apparatus.190 By 
contrast, inward looking coalitions, heavily influenced by the national security apparatus 
are more likely to proliferate.  
In much of the Middle East, the regime is upheld by the aforementioned 
oil/energy patronage, as well as a strong security state. As such, these governments are 
also dependent on similar factors that Solingen describes as proliferation constraints, 
including: the need for regional cooperation and stability, a strong reputation as a safe 
haven for foreign direct investment, and an aversion towards engaging in behavior that 
could result in sanctions.  
 
Methods of Political Survival 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 F. Gregory Gause, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab 
Gulf States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994) pp. 10-11.  
190 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the Middle East p. 43. 
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The UAE, in particular, brands itself as both a haven for FDI, while also running a 
very efficient – and brutal – security service to suppress internal dissent. The same can be 
said for Saudi Arabia, as well as Qatar. The presence of these regimes, combined with 
their hitherto policy of nonproliferation, requires are more in depth look at how states 
“internationalize” and the methods by which these states ensure a strong alliance with the 
world’s most powerful states and whether there is a link to proliferation decision-making. 
For much of the Cold War, both Iran and Turkey pursued similar strategies to 
ensure the viability of the regime. In Iran, the Shah branded himself as a potential partner, 
through which the United States could blunt the further expansion of Soviet allied 
communist/nationalist regimes in the Middle East. Turkey pursued a similar strategy: 
branding itself as NATO’s outermost bulwark against a Soviet incursion of Western 
Europe. This approach resulted in two different approaches to nuclear weapons: the 
Middle Eastern focused Shah disregarded nuclear weapons, whereas the Soviet focused 
Turkey integrated nuclear weapons into its security doctrine. 
As for the United States, its provision of arms and aid to both countries was 
intended to deepen the security relationship and ultimately tie Iran and Turkey to the U.S. 
led Western bloc. This perception of shared security concerns resulted in the both 
countries gaining international credibility, regardless of tangential issues like economics 
and democratic governance. For example, up until 1980, Turkey shunned the adoption of 
export-oriented capitalism, choosing instead to pursue a state driven model of 
development, first outlined by the country’s founder, Mustafa Kemal, after the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Indeed, enshrined in Turkey’s 
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constitution are Mustafa Kemal’s “six-arrows,”191 which together outline the founding 
principles of Kemalism, and thereby are intended to serve as the Republican ideology. 
Included in these arrows is the principle of “statism” as the idea economic model for 
Turkey.  
The Shah pursued a similar strategy of relying on shared security concerns to 
“internationalize”, albeit through a different model that emphasized Iran’s conventional 
military prowess, and its ambitions to partner with the United States to police the Persian 
Gulf. Taken together, both countries used shared security concerns to ingratiate 
themselves with their most important ally, the United States, which then in turn helped to 
further integrate both governments with the Western bloc. Internally, both countries 
relied on different means to ensure political survival. The Shah was a dynastic monarchy 
that ultimately relied on oil patronage and internal security services to ensure law and 
order.192 Turkey, by contrast, operated as a hybrid regime, wherein elections were 
regularly held, but the civilian rulers were rivaled by the country’s military, which 
viewed itself as the protector of the value of the Turkish Republic.193  
As such, the military has overthrown four elected governments in Turkey, 
ostensibly over concerns related to the erosion of Kemalist secularism, in favor of Islamic 
conservatism. For the Western bloc, the military was often trusted to “get things done” 
when it came to important security cooperation related matters. Consequently, Turkey’s 
most important ties to its Western allies were often military-to-military, rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191  The six arrows include: Republicanism (cumhuriyetçilik), Populism (halkçılık), 
Nationalism (milliyetçilik), Secularism (laiklik), Statism (Turkish: devletçilik), and 
Reformism (Turkish: devrimcilik). 
192 Abbas William Samii, The Role of SAVAK in the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).  
193 William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (New York: Routledge, 2006).  
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through a more traditional approach of frequent contact between civilian diplomats and 
bureaucrats.  
Nuclear Decision-Making in Iran and Turkey: Methods of Political Survival  
 
These different dynamics allows for the testing of Solingen’s hypothesis. Between 
1923 and 1980, Turkey was an autarkic government that shunned export oriented 
capitalism. Iran, by contrast, is a rentier state, which relies on oil largess to fund its 
government institutions. Did Turkey and Iran’s “inward looking” economic status affect 
its nuclear decision-making? Did Turkey’s adoption of an export oriented economic 
model alter its approach to nuclear weapons/nuclear energy? Do more internationalist 
Iranian leaders approach nuclear issues differently than their more nationalist and inward 
oriented looking counterparts?  
By answering these questions, this section also addresses this dissertation’s 
research question: Do similar states respond similarly to the same external inputs? In this 
section, these inputs include: the 1973 oil crisis, negotiations with western suppliers, and 
the cancellation of the program in 1979/1980. The data suggests that Iran’s rentier status 
was an asset for its early pursuit of nuclear energy, but that its civil nuclear progress was 
tied to high oil prices, and thus was affected after the 1978 decrease in oil prices. As 
such, one would expect Iranian decision-making to be affected by the slump in oil prices 
during the 1980s. However, in contrast to the decisions made after 1978 (and before that 
between 1972-1977), the Islamic republic re-launched its nuclear program at a time of 
historically low energy prices – perhaps in a further indication of weapons intent. By 
contrast, Turkey’s poor economic state hindered its development of nuclear energy and 
ultimately resulted in Ankara crafting a unique financing model to procure nuclear 
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reactors (intended to decrease the greatest source of Turkish economic vulnerability, its 
perpetually high current account deficit), which tangentially resulted in an ownership 
model that prevents proliferation.  
In effect, Iran’s rentier status enabled its nuclear ambitions, and thereby allowed 
for the country to put in place the infrastructure through which it would later proliferate, 
whereas Turkey’s financing concerns resulted in the creation of a financing model that 
has made proliferation all but impossible. These decisions resulted from a series of 
dynamics independent of the political outlook of the leadership in power. After the 
revolution, Iran relied on its oil largess to circumvent the U.S. backed sanctions regime – 
which thereby allowed for it to continue to procure nuclear technology – whereas Turkey 
sought to use its electricity sector (including its planned nuclear power program) to 
increase FDI. This data suggests that the role of nuclear financing – and not economic 
models per se – also play a role in nuclear decision-making; including a series of decision 
in Turkey that resulted in the signing and ratifying of the NPT and then the pursuit of a 
financing model that hinders proliferation.  
Oil Politics and Iran’s Challenge to the International System 
 
Iran’s early development of nuclear energy garnered little interest from the Shah. 
By contrast, Turkish President, Adnan Menderes, prioritized the procurement of nuclear 
technology, with the intention of using the Atoms for Peace program as a basis for 
domestic nuclear energy program.194 In both cases, however, the political leadership 
showed little interest in developing nuclear energy during the 1960s.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, File no: 611.8297/10-1555, October 15, 
1955, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records 
Administration, RG 59, Box 2553; The Shah put off signing the nuclear cooperation 
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The key catalyst for the two countries’ development of more extensive civil 
nuclear program was the dramatic increase in the price of energy, after the 1973 oil 
embargo. In this regard, the Shah was a key actor in challenging the Western preferred 
energy market. The price of oil reached an all-time low in 1970. The combination of the 
price decrease and a devaluation of the dollar prompted suppliers to take steps to increase 
their share of the oil revenues. At that time, most countries exported through a foreign 
consortium that operated on a 50-50 revenue sharing agreement. In 1971, at the behest of 
the Shah, the OPEC countries negotiated with the oil producers as a group and sought to 
make sweeping changes to the concession arrangements. After Libya was able to extract 
concession from Occidental Petroleum in 1970, the oil suppliers were intent on 
increasing revenues.195  
The threat of nationalization proved successful and, according to American 
economist Charles Issawi, “On the advice of the State Department, the companies agreed 
in February 1971 to a rise in price from $1.80 to $2.18 and an increase in tax from 50 to 
55 percent.” As excess supply decreased globally, the Middle East accounted for the only 
area of production growth during the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, the economies in the 
West and Japan boomed in the late 1960s, which contributed to an increase in oil prices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
agreement with the United States, over concerns that news about the agreement would be 
widely reported as it was a matter of public record leading to the loss of the anticipated 
political gains. This in turn illustrates that the Shah was far more interested in the 
political prestige attending the cooperation agreement than in its actual substance. See: 
Incoming Telegram, Department of State, September 13, 1956, General Records of the 
Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Box 2558; 
Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, File 611.8897/7-1856, September 18, 1956, 
ibid; Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, File 611.8897/9-1356, October 31, 1956, 
ibid.  
195 Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, 2nd Edition (London: Penguin Books, 
2003), pp. 283-287.  
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even before the 1973 embargo. Yet, as a result of the embargo, the global price of oil rose 
dramatically, increasing fourfold shortly after the embargo was announced.196  
The dramatic rise in oil prices had opposite effects on Turkey and Iran, but 
nevertheless ended in the same policy: the prioritization of the development of nuclear 
energy. As of 1970, oil accounted for 42.3 percent of Turkey’s energy production, and 
any increase in price contributed to its balance of payments issue. To this end, Ankara 
sought to address its reliance on imported energy, which thereby hastened the 
government’s interest in nuclear energy. The Turkish leadership revisited nuclear plans 
first drafted in 1965197 and hastened the licensing of the Akkuyu site in 1976, before 
opening negotiations with Asea-Atom and Stal Laval in 1977.  
Iran, by contrast, began its first feasibility studies into the development of nuclear 
power in 1972; thereafter in 1974, the Shah confidently declared during his annual 
Norouz (Persian New Year) speech that “a new era was ushered in during the previous 
year” representing “a new order more logically in line with the realities of the 
international community.” He then noted that “major changes” had affected the 
implementation of the previously drafted five-year economic plan and those changes 
“paved the way for the implementation of projects which were well beyond the programs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196  Charlies Issawi, “The 1973 Oil Crisis and After,” Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, vol. 1, no. 2 (Winter, 1978/79), p. 10. 
197 The first studies to develop nuclear power were initiated in 1965 by the Electrical 
Power Resources Survey Administration (Elektrik İşleri Etüd İdâres - EIEI). Since 
Ankara lacked the trained personnel to undertake the research on its own, it partnered 
with nuclear firms in the United States, Switzerland, and Spain to help expedite its 
nuclear energy plans. The EIEI concluded that Turkey should build 400 MW pressurized 
heavy water reactor with the cooperation of Canada’s AECL. See: Nejat Aybars, 
“Implementation of Nuclear Power Plant in a Developing Country: The Case of Turkey,” 
paper presented at the 17th Annual Canadian Nuclear Society Conference, June 9-12, 
1996.  
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originally envisioned;” including the utilization of “nuclear energy as soon as possible so 
that the consumption of oil this vital and exhaustible material whose notability we have 
been able to prove, is reduced to a minimum so that this precious substance can be used 
to produce chemical and petrochemical products instead of being used as ordinary 
fuel.”198  
Iran’s oil largess allowed for it to bypass American nonproliferation pressure, 
particularly with regards to its purchase of reprocessing technology. For much of the 
decade, the U.S. sought to convince Iran to forego reprocessing and put pressure on 
France and Germany to refrain from selling Iran reprocessing equipment. The Shah was 
able to take advantage of two issues to side-step American pressure. First, France and 
Germany were wary of limiting their nuclear exports, owing to industry related concerns, 
and an overarching government supported policy of gaining greater market share in the 
American dominated nuclear export market.199,200 Consequently, both countries were 
more laissez-faire about nuclear exports Second, and relatedly, the sheer size of Iran’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 “Shah Addresses Nation on New Year,” Teheran Domestic Service, in Daily Report, 
Middle East and Africa, FBIS-MEA-74-057, March 21, 1974, p. K1.  
199 Bertrand Goldschmidt, France’s director of international relations for Commissariat à 
l'énergie atomique and the French government’s representative to the IAEA between 
1958 and 1980, described the French position on nonproliferation as follows: “Nuclear 
energy is for a number of countries a competitive source of energy indispensible for 
development. France is willing to assist them in developing nuclear power, will guarantee 
the fuel supply of the power plants it exports, will furnish fuel cycle services and will 
transfer much needed technology.” See: Bertrand Goldschmidt, “A Historical Survey of 
Nonproliferation Policies,” International Security, vol. 2, no. 1 (Summer, 1977), pp. 81-
82. 
200 Harald Müller describes West Germany’s approach to nonproliferation as follows: “in 
the seventies and eighties, Germany behaved according to the letter of her NPT 
obligations. At the same time, Germany concluded nuclear trade agreements (with Iran, 
Brazil, and Argentina) that were not exactly conducive to the lofty goal of 
nonproliferation.” See: Harald Müller, “German national identity and WMD 
proliferation,” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 10, no. 2, (Summer, 2003), pp. 2-3.  
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planned nuclear program allowed for Iran to purchase an incredible amount of nuclear 
related infrastructure, without having many concerns about financing.  
By 1977, however, financing issues, linked to a global decrease in oil prices, 
began to plague Iran’s nuclear program. During a speech to the Iranian Parliament, 
indicated that Iran was having trouble abiding by the original terms it had reached with 
Framatome for the sale of two reactors in the Darkhovin, with Etemad telling the budget 
committee, “[work on the two reactors] will begin “as soon as the difficulties relating to 
our financial ability are solved.”201 Similarly, during the signing ceremony for four 
additional German built reactors that same year, Etemad was evasive about how Iran 
would finance construction, saying “all possible means of financing, such as export 
credits or payment through oil deliveries, were discussed.”202 In both cases, Iran was 
reported to have favored oil deliveries, rather than cash payments as had been previously 
agreed to. 
Compare this with Turkey, which ran out of foreign currency reserves in 1973, 
largely because the dramatic increase in energy prices after the oil crisis.203 Turkey’s turn 
to nuclear power was thus a reflection of its energy poverty and the determination to 
diversify Turkey’s sources of energy, in order to insulate the country from future energy 
shocks. Ankara’s efforts in this regard were unsuccessful and during the second oil crisis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 “Officials Discuss Petrochemical, Nuclear Projects,” Teheran Domestic Service, as 
published in Daily Report, Middle East and Africa on March 1, 1977, R1.  
202 “FRG Firm may sell more Nuclear Power Stations to Iran,” Hamburg DPA, Daily 
Report, Middle East and Africa, FBIS-MEA-77-120, June 22, 1977, p. R2.  
203 By 1979, Turkey’s energy situation was precarious the Deputy Director of Turkey’s 
Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) told an American diplomat that Ankara had only one 
day’s reserve of crude oil stored at its refineries. See: “Turkey Seeks Deferred Payment 
Terms on Oil,” Confidential Cable Ankara, IR01330, March 6, 1978; “Turkey’s 
Petroleum Supply Situation,” Confidential, Cable Ankara, IR02267, February 9, 1979, 
Digital National Security Archives.  
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in 1979, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit told his Cabinet that “there’s no oil, no 
foreign currency, no goods, no raw materials, no fertilizers, and no production ... we can’t 
even close the 351 billion Lira deficit by printing money.”204  
These economic concerns prompted Ankara, in 1977, to propose a unique 
financing model, which envisioned Sweden paying for the cost of construction for the 
Akkuyu reactor, in exchange for guaranteed electricity sales, set a fixed rate for a fixed 
period of time (usually between 15-20 years). The model was financially unpalatable for 
Sweden, owing to third party financing concerns about the need to expend such a large 
sum of money up-front, without adequate Treasury guarantees from the Turkish side that 
the loan would be paid back in full. Ankara has historically dismissed these financing 
related concerns, citing the guaranteed purchasing arrangement as proof of its intent to 
repay the vendor in full. This approach, however, remains controversial, owing to third-
party financing concerns about foregoing profit on their initial billions of dollar 
investment for at least 15 years. The negotiations collapsed in 1980, after the Swedish 
government withdrew from the negotiations, ostensibly over concerns about supplying a 
reactor to a country governed by a military junta.  
Findings 
 
The history indicates that the initial reason for Iran and Turkey’s prioritization of 
nuclear energy was the dramatic increase in energy prices after the events in 1972/1973. 
Iran’s oil wealth was the key asset that allowed for it to rapidly expand the program. 
Turkey’s energy poverty was a liability and ultimately deprived it of the most important 
resource needed to realize its nuclear energy policy: foreign currency. The relationship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey (New 
York: overlook press, 2004), p. 129. 
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between nuclear financing and nonproliferation remains understudied. In these two cases, 
however, there was a link between access to foreign currency and nuclear progress. Iran’s 
nuclear program, for example, began to slow in 1977, due to a decrease in oil prices. 
Turkey, on the other hand, created a financing vehicle to side step the foreign currency 
issue all together through its vendor-financing model. These decisions were made 
independent of each country’s economic model, as well as the methods each country used 
to internationalize, and thereby help guarantee regime security.    
With regards to Solingen’s hypothesis: Turkey chose not to pursue nuclear 
weapons during this time period. The sheer size of Iran’s nuclear ambitions have 
prompted speculation that the Shah intended to develop a nuclear weapon. This study 
tests this assumption, using the two models described in the previous chapter: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 “Shah Implies Iran may have Nuclear Weapons Soon,” Hong Kong AFP, in Daily 
Report, Middle East and Africa, FBIS-MEA-74-122, June 24, 1974, p. R1; U.S. Embassy 
in Paris to Department of State, “Interview with Shah,” June 24, 1974, 
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Measuring Nuclear Latency: Iran (1972-1979) 
Highly Enriched 
Uranium 
Research  Plutonium Research 
Uranium mining Yes Uranium mining Yes 
Milling Yes Milling Yes 
Conversion to UF6 Yes Fuel rod fabrication  Yes 








Subjective Variables  
Leader statements: The Shah did indeed make a statement suggesting an interest in nuclear weapons. In 
1974, the Shah told a journalist from France’s Les Informations that Tehran would have nuclear weapons 
“sooner than you think,” but “unlike India we have first thought of our people and then of technology.”205 
The Shah later backtracked in a follow-up interview, declaring his indirect embrace of nonproliferation. The 
Shah subsequently labeled the nuclear arms race “ridiculous,” and often times expressed his response to 
proliferation concerns in the form of a question, saying, “What do people want with nuclear weapons?” 
before adding that Iran would “never be able to achieve [nuclear] parity with the big powers.” Thus, for 
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Post-Revolution: A New Turkey and Iran’s Axis of Resistance 
 
  Solingen explores the Islamic Republic’s nuclear decision-making and ultimately 
attributes the country’s “schizoid” foreign policy to an internal battle between elements 
of the foreign policy establishment eager to “internationalize the economy,” compared to 
different elements eager to keep Iran’s economy closed. As such, Iranian moderates, 
which include President Mohammed Khatami, who served from 1997 to 2005, and 
current President Hassan Rouhani, would be expected to take steps to curtail Iran’s illicit 
weapons program. Conversely, an inward looking leader, like former President Mahmoud 
Ahmedinejad, would be more amenable to risk adverse behavior, owing to his disdain for 
the international global order, and his reliance upon the Iranian security sector for 
political support. The role of individuals will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter, but with regards to this hypothesis, the data suggests that Iranian leaders 
favoring internationalization methods of political survival held little sway over Iran’s 
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Iran, the idea of pursuing nuclear weapons was illogical. However, he then inserted a caveat, whereby he 
left the nuclear option open, should smaller countries in the region proliferate and thereby erode Iran’s 
conventional military superiority.206  
Adversary Perception: There is no independent evidence of regional concerns about Iran’s nuclear 
program; however, it is likely that there were concerns in neighboring Iraq about the Shah’s program. In a 
sign of their then alliance, Israel maintained a close relationship with the Shah at this time in history, going 
as far as to collaborate on a missile program. 
Conclusion: The Shah’s ambitions nuclear program had all of the technical components to support a nuclear 
weapons program, albeit with one key omission: weapons specific experiments. Furthermore, Iran’s 
selection of a light water reactor suggests civil intent. Proliferators have tended to rely on heavy water 
reactors because they produce weapons usable plutonium more easily.  To date, there is no open-source 
evidence indicating Iran’s pursuit of weapons specific experiments.  
 
Based on this data, this study has concluded that Iran did not have a dedicated weapons program, and chose 
instead to tepidly embrace nonproliferation. To be clear, the Shah indicated that he could have chosen to 
pursue a weapons program, should nonproliferation fail to guarantee regional nonproliferation. 
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nuclear weapons program, which suggests that the outlook of the individuals in charge of 
nuclear decision is a better method of analysis, rather than a focus on the state as a whole. 
In Turkey, the post-1980 political landscape in Turkey resulted in a determined 
effort to privatize the statist led economy. However, these efforts were not universally 
embraced by the parties in power. Instead, different political parties advocated for 
different economic systems, with some pushing for a more Islamist political model, 
whereas other sought to marry Ataturk inspired statism with import substitution 
industrialization. With regards to nuclear energy, however, all pursued a similar vendor-
financing model to the one used during the short negotiations with Sweden in the late 
1970s. This suggests that different political parties sought to use the energy sector more 
broadly to encourage FDI, but nevertheless adopted political platforms that shunned full 
internationalization with the world’s institutions. This suggests that the relationship 
between the economic model pursued, internationalization, and the method of regime 
survival are independent of Turkish nuclear decision-making. Instead, the key variable 
influencing much of Turkish decision-making is project financing; a constraint not 
present in rentier economies, and therefore worthy of a more comprehensive comparison.  
 
Iran 
As described in the previous chapter, Iran began to acquire the material to support 
an enrichment program in 1985. The program accelerated in 1987, after Iranian officials 
procured centrifuge related documents and equipment from the AQ Khan network. Just a 
few months later, Rafsanjani made his first public appeal for the development of nuclear 
weapons, purportedly to defend Iran from any future WMD related attack.  
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Rafsanjani, however, favored an economic rapprochement with the West, rather 
than maintaining Iran’s hitherto combative approach to Western dominated international 
system. Farzin Sarabi, for example, notes that after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, 
Rafsanjani emerged as the Iranian cleric most interested in economics and creating more 
entrenched mechanisms to allow for FDI, in order to help rebuild the war ravaged 
country. This faction, broadly referred to as Jameh-ye Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran 
(Association of Combatant Clerics of Tehran, or Ruhaniyat), was at odds with a more 
conservative faction, known as Majma-ye Ruhaniyoun-e Mobarez-e Tehran (Association 
of Combatant Clergy of Tehran, or Ruhaniyoun). The Ruhaniyat, according to Sarabi, 
was more amenable to economic changes that defied the basic principles of the 
Revolution to hasten economic growth, whereas the Ruhaniyoun favored the strict 
interpretation of the Khomeini’s ideology, which therefore called on an economic model 
similar to that of ISI.207  
Similarly, reformist President Mohammed Khatami, as well as his trusted ally, 
current President Hassan Rouhani, are affiliated with the Ruhaniyat political faction, 
whereas former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is affiliated with the 
Ruhaniyoun ideology. Accordingly, Iran’s nuclear decision-making during these period 
of rule should help to discern how these two different political ideologies, which rest on a 
nuanced understanding of how the Islamic Republic must internationalize to ensure 
regime survival, impacted nuclear decision-making.  
The Islamic Republic’s renewed focus on nuclear energy began in 1982, but only 
began to garner more pronounced leadership attention in 1984. In a critical difference 	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from the Shah’s nuclear program, Iran launched the program at a time of historically low 
energy prices, and while Iran was fighting a resource intensive war with Iraq.208 This 
willingness to finance a costly nuclear program during the 1980s; including the 
procurement of centrifuge components during the latter half of the decade suggest that 
economic concerns had little to do with nuclear decision-making in the Islamic Republic.  
Khomeini oversaw the initial nuclear decision-making, but delegated elements of 
the Islamic Republic’s procurement policy to trusted confidantes. In late June 1985, for 
example, Rafsanjani travelled to Beijing with a large delegation that included Foreign 
Minister Ali Akbar Velayati (currently a top aide to Ayatollah Khamenei) and Deputy 
Prime Minister Gholam Reza Aghazadeh (who would later be appointed president of the 
AEOI, where he served from 1997-2009). During this meeting, the two sides signed a 
secret nuclear cooperation agreement, which included a Chinese agreement to send to 
Iran tons of natural uranium (in violation of Iran’s safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA).209  
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One year later, in 1986, Khomeini dispatched a delegation, comprising President 
Khamenei, Foreign Minister Velayati, and Construction Jihad Minister Bijan Zangenh, to 
Pakistan for discussions about procuring the front-end of the fuel cycle.210 These initial 
negotiations - which were initially overseen by Khamenei - ended in 1987 with the 
conclusion of a formal nuclear cooperation agreement stipulating inter alia for Pakistani 
nuclear scientists to train a contingent of Iranian nuclear scientists at the Pakistan 
Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology.211Iran’s negotiations with Pakistan did not 
result in the procurement of centrifuge technology. However, they do appear to have led 
to direct negotiations with the AQ Khan network and the conclusion of a deal for 
centrifuge schematics, equipment for a centrifuge facility, the list of illicit suppliers in 
Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, as well as the aforementioned document 
detailing the construction of nuclear pits.  
According to Iran’s declaration to the IAEA, “the decision to acquire centrifuge 
technology was taken by the President of the AEOI [Reza Amrollahi] and endorsed by 
the Prime Minister of Iran [Mir-Hossein Mousavi].” The Islamic Republic provided the 
agency “with a copy of a confidential communication from the President of the AEOI to 
the Prime Minister, dated 28 February 1987, which also carried the Prime Minister’s 
endorsement, dated 5 March 1987. In his communication, the AEOI President indicated 
that the activities “should be treated fully confidentially.”212  
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Tehran’s actions in 1985-86 underscore the level of governmental support that 
was given to the development of the enrichment program. Indeed through out Rafsanjani 
and Khatami’s tenure in office (1989-1997; 1997-2005) support for the AEOI’s 
enrichment program remained strong. These dynamics suggests that Iran’s leaders 
supported the nuclear program, regardless of their understanding of how best to govern 
the country. As such, one can tentatively conclude that both the Ruhaniyat and 
Ruhaniyoun factions’ understanding of Iran’s right to pursue enrichment is similar, if not 
identical. The key difference, according to the data, is the approach to weapons related 
experiments.  
Iran’s weapons specific work began in 1988/1989, but appear to have been 
hindered by Iran’s inability to produce specialized centrifuge components.213 Therefore, 
much of Iran’s weapons specific work only began in 1999: the same year that the AEOI 
first successfully introduced UF6 into a centrifuge cascade at the Kalaye electric plant 
(and during a time when Khatami was in office).214 The bulk of the weaponization 
experiments began in 1999 and continued up until 2003, before Khamenei is reported to 
have issued a “halt order,” after the August 2002 revealing of the Islamic Republic’s 	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Science and International Security, ISIS Report, February 23, 2012, available at: 
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hitherto clandestine nuclear program. The reasons for the “halt order” help to elucidate 
the way in which the split between factions in Iran influence nuclear decision-making; 
including the likelihood that much of the Iranian bureaucracy was unaware of the 
weapons related work being conducted at Lavizan Shian, which was destroyed in line 
with the “halt order”.215  
While there is no direct evidence citing Khamenei’s direct control over the 
program, François Nicoullaud, France’s ambassador to Tehran from 2001 to 2005, 
believes that it was Rouhani who issued the 2003 order to halt Tehran’s weaponization 
work. At the time when the program was halted, Rouhani was Iran’s lead negotiator with 
members from the EU/3 (Britain, France, and Germany). The August 14 revelations 
prompted Tehran to undertake a serious review of its nuclear policies.  
According to Rouhani, Khameni appointed him to bring “all issues involving the 
nuclear case ... under one person’s authority” and his “orders be mandatory for all 
organizations related to the case.” Khatami and his allies in the foreign ministry appealed 
for prudence and lobbied for Iran to be as forthcoming as possible about its previous 
nuclear activities, so as to prevent the referral of its case from the IAEA Board of 
Governors to the United Nations Security Council. Rouhani was tapped to lead this 
effort. The Rouhani/Khatami approach was a source of consternation within Iran and was 
resisted by the AEOI and other harder line elements; including the director of the 
weaponization plan, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who during these bureaucratic discussions, 
reportedly authorized a test of Iran’s R265 shock implosion generator using a substitute 	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material for uranium to test the uniformity of the shock wave – and thereby simulated the 
detonation of Iran’s nuclear device.216  
In 2003, however, the Rouhani/Khatami favored approach appears to have gained 
the endorsement of the Supreme Leader. According to Rouhani, he resisted the 
appointment but changed his mind after Khatami and the Supreme Leader personally 
intervened in the matter. This in turn suggests that Khamenei endorsed the Khatami-led 
approach, albeit with some noteworthy caveats. Rouhani worked with a committee 
dubbed the “Council of Heads,” which included Ali Larijani, Velayati, intelligence 
minister Ali Younesi, and Aghazadeh.  
The group was empowered to make “important and strategic decisions” like 
whether to talk to Europe, and the extent of Tehran’s cooperation with the IAEA and its 
insistence on enrichment as a redline.217 After Tehran and the EU-3 (France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom) reached an interim agreement for Iran to freeze its conversion 
program in 2003, Rouhani is alleged to have “issued a general circular asking all Iranian 
departments and agencies, civilian and military, to report in detail about their past and 
ongoing nuclear activities.” However, according to Nicoullaud, “what Rouhani and his 
team were encountering was learning exactly what was happening in a system as 
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secretive as Iran’s.”218 If the assertion is true, then the “halt order” must also have been 
approved by Khamenei.  
In fact, Rouhani’s account of the “Council of Heads” decision-making process 
suggests a more complicated picture than the one Nicoullaud described. Rouhani 
indicates that before signing the final Paris Agreement with the EU-3, the draft text, 
which was negotiated by the Foreign Ministry, had to be sent to the Council of Heads for 
final approval; and, during the process of giving the final approval, the group agreed “that 
[Iran] should accept the suspension voluntarily, so that [it] would have control over its 
time.”219  
It appears as if the agreement on suspension was reached amongst the Council of 
Heads only after it was agreed that the suspension would be “voluntary” and that there 
would be a short timeline for the negotiations with the EU-3 to continue (6-12 months). 
The agreement, therefore, appears to have been a compromise that allowed for the AEOI 
(Aghazadeh) - which took a hard line approach - to continue with its research. On the 
weapons side, the decision also allowed the AMAD to reconstitute and continue its 
research albeit without direct access to an alleged second fuel cycle.220 Indeed, the 
AMAD plan has since transformed into the Organization of Defensive Innovation and 
Research (Sazeman-e Pazhuhesh va Nowavari-ye Defaie, or SPND) and reportedly 
maintains an office near Malek Ashtar University, dubbed the Mojdeh site.  
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This short history suggests the following: First, Rouhani and Khatami (who was 
serving as President) did not know about key elements of Iran’s nuclear program, 
including the weapons related work. Second, the key reason for the “halt order” was the 
threat of referral to the UNSC, rather than any normative related constraint, or the method 
of internationalization preferred by Iranian leaders. Third, Khamenei was the key 
decision-maker, but did make decisions based upon the input of key factions. These 
factions included hardline elements (the AEOI, represented by Aghazadeh and, 
presumably, Fakhrizadeh) and more outward looking leaders, perhaps best represented by 
Rouhani and Khatami. In the end, the Supreme Leader opted for compromise; choosing 
to “freeze” (but not halt) enrichment during negotiations, whilst also refusing to close the 
weapons related bureaucracy. In other words, Khamenei chose a middle ground that 
balanced one faction within the bureaucracy’s demands against another.  
Iran has maintained this approach ever since, albeit with a more hardline approach 
taken during the rule of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. The key take-away, therefore, is that 
decision-making about the program before the revelation in 2002 was largely 
independent of the Ruhaniyat vs. Ruhaniyoun debate about Iran’s orientation vis-à-vis the 
international community. This would therefore suggest that the unit of analysis when 
discerning how states make nuclear decision-making should be the individual, with 
special attention given to how key people within the bureaucracy view nuclear issues.  
For Turkey, the post-1980 government sought to use nuclear energy as a vehicle 
hasten the privatization of the country’s state-owned electricity utilities. These efforts 
were hampered by Turkey’s poor economic state, as well as a lack of project finance, 
which resulted in the institution of a new financing model, known as Build-Operate-
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Transfer (BOT). This financing provision was based on Ankara’s experience with ASEA-
Atom and Stal-Laval, but only formally codified into law in 1983. Specifically, BOT 
envisioned the nuclear vendor providing 100 percent of the financing for construction, in 
addition to agreeing to operate the reactor for up to twenty years. Ankara then proposed 
that the state-owned energy utility would purchase a guaranteed amount of electricity 
produced at a fixed-rate, over some 15-20 years, before the reactor was transferred to a 
local Turkish firm, which would take over the operation of the plant. Thereafter, the 
Turkish vendor would pay a percentage of the profits to the foreign vendor during the 
reactor’s service life (some fifty to seventy years depending on the particular reactor).221  
In 1984, Turkish President Turgut Ozal articulated his approach to nuclear 
energy, calling BOT the deal a “a sweet package” and identified Turkey’s energy sector 
“the most trustworthy area” for foreign investment in the country. 222  Similarly, a 
representative from ENKA, a large Turkish energy conglomerate involved in the nuclear 
tender at the time, described the financing model as “beautiful” because the “government 
[would] pay only if the reactor works.” Most importantly, the new financing arrangement 
would allow the Turkish government to present the $2 billion as a trade transaction rather 
than a capital outlay, thus contributing positively to the country’s current account deficit 
figures – and therefore contributing to Turkey’s overarching efforts to attract FDI. 
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Moreover, as part of the Turkish arrangement, Ankara called on vendors to cover the 
interest costs without a governmental off-take guarantee.223  
Between 1984 and 1986, Turkey was negotiating with Germany’s KWU and 
Canada’s AECL for the sale of a reactor for the Akkuyu site. As of 1986, both companies 
had agreed to provide 100 percent financing, albeit with one key demand: Turkey’s state-
owned Turkiye Elektrik Kurumu taking an equity share in the local project company. 
KWU demanded that TEK take a 49 percent stake in the project company, whereas 
AECL only demanded a 40 percent ownership stake for the Turkish utility.224 In an 
indication of the role project financing played in Turkish nuclear decision-making, an 
unnamed Turkish source told Nucleonics Week that “the one who offers the best 
financing package will get the project.”225  Ankara did eventually choose AECL, but the 
negotiations broke down in 1986, after AECL failed to convince third party lenders to 
provide project financing for the Akkuyu project.226 
Different Turkish political parties have since pursued nuclear energy. The first 
post-1980 leader to do so, was Ozal, whose Motherland Party (ANAP) envisioned 
Turkey’s transition from autarkic to export oriented capitalism. Thereafter, different 	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Turkish politicians that ascribe to different political ideologies pursued a similar strategy. 
These politicians included Suleyman Demiral and Tansu Ciller from the True Path Party 
(TPP), Mesut Yilmaz from ANAP, Necmettin Erbakan from the Islamist Refah Party 
(RP) and current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan from the conservative Justice and 
Development Party (AKP).  
These parties all share a commitment to export oriented capitalism, but differ in 
how they go about using international norms to internationalize. The True Path Party 
shares certain similarities with both the AKP and ANAP, albeit while describing 
themselves as sosyal devletci (Social statists). This self-description was intended to 
differentiate the party from ANAP’s intense focus on privatization and was meant to 
evoke a comparison to Adnan Menderes’ Democratic Party (In power from 1951-1960). 
To this end, TTP retained an interest in retaining elements import-substitution, as well as 
state owned enterprises. Refah advocated for a near break from the Western economic 
system, in favor of a rival alternative economic system with neighboring Muslim 
majority countries, dubbed the Developing-8. Domestically, this resulted in the 
promotion of an economic platform that ultimately favored the nationalization of 
industry, in order to harmonize the state’s economic proactive with Islamic principles, 
including the abolition of interest.  
Based on Solingen’s hypothesis, these different governments should have 
approached the nuclear issue differently. In fact, many of Turkey’s political parties 
remained inward looking, even after the introduction of Ozal’s market reforms during the 
1980s. Instead, all embraced a concept known as Build-Operate-Own (BOO); further 
suggesting that financing constraints have driven Turkish nuclear decision-making since 
	   144	  
the late 1970s. BOO is similar to the BOT financing scheme, but drops the demand that 
the vendor transfer the reactor to a local company. Instead, the foreign vendor is now 
required to operate the reactor in perpetuity, while also providing 100 perfect of the 
financing, in exchange for a power purchasing arrangement.   
Ciller made the changes to Turkish law, after BOT prevented Ankara from 
procuring up to ten coal, gas, and hydroelectric power plants from foreign vendors. The 
decree was later suspended by Turkey’s constitutional court, which then prompted the 
parliament to embark on a lengthy legislative process that culminated in the 1999 
constitutional amendment that opened the door to privatization in the energy markets.227 
Despite these changes, Turkey’s negotiations with vendors between 1996 and 1999 
failed, due to continued concerns about project financing. On the Turkish side, every 
political party embraced the BOO approach, underscoring how on this one specific issue, 
Turkish political parties put aside their rhetoric and sought out ways to overcome the 
nuclear financing hurdle.  
Turkey’s AKP finally procured Turkey’s first reactor in 2010. The terms of 
Ankara’s agreement with Russia’s Rosatom did not differ from Ozal’s demands of AECL 
and KWU in the early 1980s. The AKP required that Rosatom take 100 percent of the 
project company, in exchange for a power purchasing arrangement that envisions the 
Turkish state paying 12.35 US cents per kilowatt hour for 70 percent of the electricity 
produced at the first two Akkuyu units, and 30 percent for the electricity produced at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 S. Gurcan Gulen, “Electricity in Turkey: A Legal Battleground in an Ongoing 
Privatization War,” Power Economics, December 31, 1998; Ulusoy and Oguz, “The 
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third and fourth units.228 This arrangement envisions this arrangement being in place for 
15 years; thereafter Rosatom will sell electricity at market rates through a Turkish utility, 
in exchange for a percentage of the profits from the reactor’s electricity sales until it is 
decommissioned in 60-70 years.229  
The AKP also concluded a similar arrangement with a consortium comprising 
Mitsubishi, Itochu, and GDF Suez in March 2013.230 The deal differed considerably from 
the one concluded with Rosatom. To ensure the conclusion of the agreement with the 
Japanese led consortium, the AKP agreed that state utility EUAS would take a stake in 
the project company, before off-loading up to 50 percent of that stake in an initial public 
offering.231 This key AKP concession is reminiscent of the demands made of Ozal by 
AECL and KWU in 1985, which therefore indicates that the pressure came from the 
supplier, and not the AKP government. 
More broadly, in both cases, the vendor dynamics cast doubt on the viability of 
the BOO model. Rosatom, for example, is a state own entity that relies extensively on 
state subsidies to engage in risky projects abroad. For Japan, the nuclear industry was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 “Turkey: electricity price decisive factor for nuclear plant bid,” BBC Monitoring 
Service, Europe - Political, January 19, 2009; David O’Byrne, “Turkey plans its first 
nuclear plant under partnership with Russia,” Platts Global Power Report, January 28, 
2010. 
229 “Energy Ties Bind Together Turkey's and Russia’s Nuclear Power Sectors,” Business 
Monitor Online, May 13, 2010. 
230 “Itochu, Mitsubishi, GDF in Turkish nuclear plant bid,” Reuters, March 5, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/turkey-nuclear-idUSL6N0BX2PE20130305; 
“Mitsubishi Heavy, Areva have won Turkish nuclear plant deal - Nikkei,” Reuters, April 
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idUSL3N0CQ5ER20130403.  
231 “Turkey to own maximum 30 percent of nuclear power plant to be built by Japan,” 
BBC Monitoring Service, Europe - Political, May 6, 2013; “Nuclear plants to help 
Turkey save $7.2 bn. in gas imports,” Anadolu Agency, May 6, 2013, 
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eager to retain a foothold in the nuclear export market, after the Fukuishima disaster 
resulted in the shutting down of domestic nuclear power plants. Ankara has expressed an 
interest in a third nuclear tender, but financing will likely continue to be a serious 
impediment to the further development of Turkey’s nuclear power program.  
The BOO model that Ankara has implemented prevents the use of the reactor or 
ancillary systems to proliferate. Turkey has essentially outsourced the operation and 
maintenance of its nuclear reactors for project financing reasons. This means that even if 
Ankara were to change its approach to proliferation, it would then have to violate its 
agreement with the foreign vendor to use the reactor to derive fissile material. This 
scenario is entirely unlikely, and thereby introduces a hitherto never considered 
nonproliferation restraint: the combination of foreign financing and foreign operation of a 




When comparing Iran and Turkey’s post-1980 nuclear decision-making, it is clear 
that the role of financing is an under-studied aspect in (non)proliferation scholarship. As 
a rentier state, Iran relied on its oil largess to finance the massive expansion of its nuclear 
program in 1973, and again was able to rely on its foreign currency reserves to sustain its 
nuclear program after the Islamic Republic restarted elements of the program in 1984. 
Compare this with Turkey, which lacked foreign currency reserves to finance large 
infrastructure projects. Ankara therefore needed to devise a unique financing arrangement 
to support its nuclear energy project. The project was intended to address Turkey’s 
energy poverty, which exacerbated Ankara’s greatest economic weakness: its large 
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current account deficit.232 Turkey’s financing, in turn, created another proliferation 
constraint beyond norms related to Turkey’s adherence to the NPT. Beyond the 
normative constraint, Turkey’s financing decisions mean that future reactors and 
associated infrastructure will be foreign owned; in addition, to being inspected by the 
IAEA.  
Thus, when exposed to the same input, the two countries made different 
decisions, regardless of their approach to internationalization. For Turkey, the financing 
issue was the cause of its civil nuclear energy decision-making process, whereas the 
Islamic Republic compartmentalized its nuclear program. Both factions within Iran – 
those that favored an adversarial relationship with the West, compared to those that 
favored greater economic integration – have similar points of view about Iran’s right to 
pursue nuclear energy. The key difference stemmed from the support given to the 
military program. After the program was revealed, Khamenei sought to split the 
difference between the Ruhaniyoun and Ruhaniyat and pursued a policy that sought to 
ensure that Iran retained its enrichment program, albeit while freezing the military 
program.  
This divergent approach manifests itself in Iran’s recent negotiations with the 
EU3+3 (The United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) to 
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increased contingent liabilities of the public sector and advances to the Treasury from the 
Central Bank printing machines created a persistently high and volatile inflation. During 
this period, Turkey fell into a double-digit inflation trap.” See: Yüksel Görmez and 
Serkan Yiğit, “The Economic and Financial Stability in Turkey: A Historical 
Perspective,” (Paper presented at the Fourth Annual SEEMHN Conference, March 27, 
2009).  
	   148	  
resolve the decades old nuclear dispute about Iran’s clandestine nuclear program. The 
moderate internationalizing coalition has pursued a consensus driven approach with the 
West, albeit while demanding that Iran retain some notional “right to enrich.” Iranian 
hard-liners have a similar approach;233 choosing for now to focus on rebuilding the 
economy. The critical difference between these two factions stem from the after-affect of 
any nuclear arrangement with the West: On one side, the deal is viewed as a platform to 
increase FDI and gradually integrate with more Western economic structure, whereas on 
the other, the deal is seen as a platform to decrease sanctions, which thereby will allow 
Iran to become more independent from the West.234  
Taken together, the method and means of internationalization had little effect on 
Turkish and Iranian nuclear decision-making, suggesting that it is not the cause of nuclear 
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our work and our negotiators.’ See: Farzan Sabet and Aaron Stein, “Iran’s delicate 
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policy. Instead, key nuclear decisions stemmed from a combination of economic 
concerns, blended with the security element discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
Input 3: Turkey, Iran and the Nuclear Taboo 
  
There is a debate within nonproliferation scholarship about whether the 
humanitarian consequences associated with the use of nuclear weapons have resulted in a 
normative “taboo” against their use. Nina Tannenwald argues that the notion that nuclear 
weapons are usable during times of conflict has eroded considerably since the 1950s, 
when the United States proposed their use in multiple contingencies; including in Iran 
and Turkey.235 Tannenwald argues that the taboo against nuclear weapons began to take 
shape after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, before it was consolidated in the 1980s 
during the protests against the forward deployment of Pershing missiles in NATO 
states.236  
This study compares Iranian and Turkish decision-making during these periods of 
times, with the intention of answering whether Iranian and Turkish leaders have 
internalized the nuclear taboo. And if so, did the emergence of this taboo result in 
changes to Turkish and Iranian nuclear policies; and ultimately result in a disavowal of 
nuclear weapons? In both Turkey and Iran, nuclear issues were not debated domestically 
by powerful constituencies capable of influencing policy debates. As such, both countries 
were deprived of one pathway to instilling an anti-nuclear norm: bottom-up societal 
pressure typical in much of the Western world.237 In Turkey, Sinan Ulgen argues with 
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236 Ibid, p. 14.  
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regard to the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons and the creation of 
disarmament norms:  
the Turkish position on tactical nuclear weapons is also shaped by the fact that the 
question of nuclear weapons has not exactly been the subject of an internal debate 
in Turkey…the Green movement is politically weak, almost to the extent of being 
nonexistent. Remaining political parties have clearly prioritized the national 
security angle of the debate and have not developed an antinuclear platform. As a 
result there is no domestic pressure buoyed by political forces for the removal of 
these weapons from Turkish territory.238  
 
Similarly, before the revelations about Iran’s clandestine nuclear program, the approach 
to nuclear issues was framed within the Islamic Republic’s emphasis on technological 
innovation, independent of the West. In this regard, the Shah’s rhetoric surrounding 
nuclear energy differed little from that of post-Revolutionary leadership. For both, 
nuclear energy was seen as a platform to advance the country, conserve energy reserves 
with the intention of developing an upstream industry, and to gain independence from the 
West.239 Both Etemad and Rafsanjani, for example, sought out nuclear cooperation from 
India, arguing that Iran “did not want to be dependent on the Western powers.”240 Like in 
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239 In January 1974 the Shah told the West German magazine Der Spiegel that “as soon 
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will operate my own reactors.” He went on to chastise Bonn for using Iranian oil to make 
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Gives View on Oil in Der Spiegel,” Tehran Domestic Service, Daily Report, Middle East 
and Africa, FBIS-MEA-74-00, January 8, 1974,pp. K1-K9. 
240 In August 1982 Parliament Speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani led a parliamentary 
delegation (including today’s president Hassan Rouhani) to New Delhi where they 
discussed nuclear cooperation, among other things, with Rafsanjani asserting that Iran 
“did not want to be dependent on the Western powers.” In this he was effectively 
following in the footsteps of the Shah, who had signed a nuclear cooperation agreement 
with India (in February 1977), and whose “nuclear tsar” Etemad voiced Tehran’s interest 
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on this subject.” See: “Rafsanjani Leads Delegation to India,” IRNA in English, Daily 
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the case of the Ruhaniyoun and Ruhaniyat debate mentioned above, the differences 
between the two Iranian government comes down to tactics: The Shah favored “Super 
Turn Key” projects241 to hasten the development of nuclear power, whereas the Islamic 
Republic sought to develop an indigenous industry through the manufacture of foreign 
origin components.  
Thus, in both cases, the norms surrounding nuclear issues reflected that of the 
decision-makers who oversaw – with little external political interference – the 
development of Turkish and Iranian nuclear policies. For Turkey, national security 
officials, affiliated with the NATO desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, make nuclear 
policy; resulting in a NATO/national security conceptualization of nuclear weapons. In 
1970s Iran, the Shah and Etemad were responsible for nuclear policy. After the 
revolution, nuclear policy remained under the purview of regime elites, as evidenced by 
the delegation of nuclear matters to trusted Khomenei aides: Khamenei, Rafsanjani, 
Velayati, and Aghazadeh. As a result, both countries’ norms differ considerably from 
European countries, like Germany, which has a very established and politically powerful 
anti-nuclear movement that influences the direction of nuclear policy.242  
As explained in the previous chapter, Iran and Turkey’s conception of nuclear 
weapons differed considerably during the 1950s and 1960s. For Iran, nuclear weapons 
were not seen as being vital to the defense of the country, whereas Turkish leaders 
bristled under the command and control architecture put in place after the forward 
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deployment of nuclear weapon in NATO states. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, both the 
United States and the Soviet Union undertook discussion to slow the arms race. On the 
American side, the incident galvanized on-going work to change the U.S. nuclear war 
plan and the concept of deterrence.243 Up until the 1960s, the United States’ SIOP (Single 
Integrated Operational Plan), was relatively “inflexible,” in that it called for the use of 
much – if not all – of the American nuclear stockpile in a preemptive or retaliatory strike 
against a wide swathe of targets in the Soviet Union and China. As of 1962, U.S. 
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, was eager for the U.S. to retain greater 
flexibility in the SIOP.244  
This approach ultimately resulted in the reconceptualization of deterrence in the 
United States and the redrafting of the SIOP, which introduced the concept of 
counterforce. This new war plan called for the targeting of Soviet missile and bomber 
sites, while keeping a number of bombs in reserve. This would then allow for the U.S. to 
de-escalate the situation, before both sides’ total arsenals were launched. For Ankara, the 
move away from SIOP-62 to SIOP-63 was a source of tremendous concern, owing to 
Ankara’s persistent concern that the United States would “sacrifice Ankara for 
Washington” during times of tension with the Soviet Union. For NATO, the U.S. 
described its new nuclear war plan as war planners greater flexibility “to control” the 
pace and scope of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. 
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For Turkey, the problem was more nuanced. The concern in Ankara was that in 
any notional conflict over Berlin245, the United States would resist the use of nuclear 
weapons at the outset of the conflict, owing to concerns about the Soviet missile 
systems/bomber proximity to Turkish territory. This approach, in turn, meant that the 
actual “red-line” for the use of nuclear weapons remained ill-defined; raising the 
possibility that the defense of Turkey could be sacrificed in the event of a Soviet 
invasion, in order to save Washington from nuclear attack.  
To resolve this issue, Ankara pursued two interrelated policies: First, Turkey 
resisted signing the NPT; Second, and relatedly, Turkey pushed for greater authority to 
use nuclear weapons, independent of the order being given by NATO leadership in 
Brussels. With regards to the former, Ankara maintained this posture up until the late 
1970s; as for the latter, Turkey supported the controversial forward deployment of 
Pershing missiles in Europe in as early as 1978. Much of Europe, by contrast, resisted the 
Pershing deployment; resulting in massive street protests and the further empowerment of 
a strong anti-nuclear movement on the continent. Turkey, during the 1980s, did not have 
a similar protest movement, which meant that politicians never did have to address 
Ankara’s nuclear status. (To be clear, Turkey never hosted the Pershing missile.) 
Ankara’s approach to nuclear weapons only began to change in 1991, after the 
end of the Cold War. In response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey, beginning 
in 1995, reevaluated its own nuclear posture. Ankara, however, has yet to completely rule 
out the use of nuclear weapons and continues to support the forward deployment of 
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nuclear weapons. Ankara argues that nuclear weapons are an important component of the 
NATO alliance’s emphasis on burden sharing; pointing to the fact that 16 of the 28 
members participate in the nuclear mission. Turkey has, however, downgraded to the 
lowest level of readiness, which means that it would take a “few months” to re-train 
pilots to carryout the nuclear mission.246 As of 2015, Turkey remains committed to the 
nuclear mission and played an active role in drafting NATO’s most recent Deterrence and 
Defense Posture Review (DDPR), which regards nuclear weapons as “a core component 
of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defense alongside conventional and 
missile defense forces.”247  
Turkey’s approach to nuclear weapons echoes that of the NATO alliance’s 
assumption that “circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be 
contemplated are extremely remote.” Nevertheless, this statement implies that there are 
contingencies to use nuclear weapons, further suggesting that Ankara has yet to fully 
internalize the conception of a nuclear taboo, and indeed has plans for the weapons’ use 
(no matter how remote).248 Added to this is Ankara’s support this posture, which again 
differs from that of Germany; underscoring the divergence in norms and conceptions of 
the bomb, even amongst NATO allies that host U.S. tactical nuclear weapons.249 
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Compare this to Iran’s nuclear policies both before and after the Islamic 
Revolution. As Sepehr Zabih, writing in 1970 notes, the Shah was “de facto non-
aligned,” rather than a staunch Western ally in the mold of Turkey.250 As for the nuclear 
weapons issue, the Shah dismissed the notion of nuclear weapons use to defend the 
Zagros line in 1959. This approach to nuclear weapons was reflective of Iran’s unique 
conception of security. As Zabih notes, Iran’s most pressing security concerns related to 
Arab nationalism spreading in the Middle East. Thus, while the Soviet Union did 
represent a security threat, it was tangential to that of the spread of Arab nationalism, and 
therefore a problem that could be managed through deft diplomacy and playing the two 
super-powers off against each other.251  
The Islamic Republic broke with Iran’s hitherto strong military and industrial 
relationship with the West, in favor of an anti-western policy, premised on a combative 
relationship with the United States. As part of this new foreign policy outlook, Ayatollah 
Khomeini cancelled significant aspects of the Shah’s nuclear program and placed 
Fereydun Sahabi, a geologist with no nuclear related expertise, in charge of the AEOI. 
Sahabi’s father, Yadollah, was serving as the minister of revolutionary affairs in the new 
cabinet; suggesting nepotism and ideological loyalty were the principles reasons for 
Ferydun’s appointment.252 Between 1979 and 1982, Iran’s nuclear program atrophied; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Modernisation,” RUSI Analysis, Royal United Services Institute, September 7, 2012, 
https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C5049CC5E5A166/#.VPhAVULvZUQ  
250 Sepehr Zabih, “Iran's International Posture: De Facto Nonalignment within a Pro-
Western Alliance,” Middle East Journal, vol. 24, no. 3 (Summer, 1970), pp. 302-318.  
251 Ibid, pp. 314-1316. 
252 “Bazargan’s Comments on Division of Authority in Country,” Le Monde, in Daily 
Report, Middle East and Africa, FBIS-MEA-79-042, February 28, 1979, pp. R9-R14.  
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owing to the mass exodus of trained personnel,253 and a limited focus on maintain a small 
uranium conversion program at Isfahan.254  
As noted in the previous chapter, the Islamic Republic reviewed Iran’s previous 
Treaty obligations, and ultimately chose to remain an NPT member, despite the 
widespread feeling that the Treaty was discriminatory.255 Moreover, after the first Iraqi 
chemical weapons attack began in 1983, the Islamic Republic’s first policies emphasized 
collective action, either through the IAEA, or via bilateral talks with European countries. 
Ultimately, the nonproliferation community’s failure to stem the attacks, combined with 
the security considerations mentioned in the previous chapter, pushed Iran to 
proliferate.256 Thus, rather than embrace any set of normative prohibition against the use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 After the 1979 revolution, thousands of Western trained academics left Iran. After 
assuming power, Khomeini oversaw a so-called Cultural Revolution whereby universities 
were closed for three years (1980-83) while their curriculum was being purged of content 
deemed to be antithetical to the tenets of the revolution. The mass exodus had a 
noticeable impact on Iran’s scholarly output. In 1975, for example, Iranian scientists 
published 305 ISI-recognized publications in scholarly journals. In 1978 the number of 
scholarly publications grew to 450, before dropping to 384 1980 and to 111 in 1985, 
when the residual after effects of the academic exodus had all but diminished. See: 
Farhad Khosrokhavar & M. Amin Ghaneirad, “Iran’s New Scientific Community,” 
Iranian Studies, vol. 39, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 253-267; Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Iran’s 
New Scientific Community,” in Ali Gheissari (ed.), Contemporary Iran: Economy, 
Society, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 211-218. 
254 As early as 1981 the AEOI began to experiment with uranium conversion and 
reduction. Conversion refers to the further purification of uranium yellowcake for 
enrichment or fuel fabrication. See: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net 
Assessment, pp. 56-58.  
255 Author interview with Ali Ashgar Soltaneih, Istanbul, November 3, 2013.  
256 With regards to Bushehr, Iran sponsored an IAEA resolution to condemn Iraqi attacks 
on the reactor site. See: “’Victory' Over Iraq at IAEA Meeting Lauded,” Tehran IRNA, as 
published in Daily Report, Near East & South Asia, FBIS-SAS-85-190, October 10, 
1985, p. I5.  
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of nuclear weapons, Iran had settled on a policy of proliferation, arguably because the 
government had concluded that there was no taboo against the use of WMD.257   
This resulted in the tasking of top-level officials to procure the front-end of the 
fuel cycle. Outside of the Islamic Republic’s public emphasis on the construction at 
Bushehr, the efforts to mine for uranium, and low-level conversion experiments at 
Isfahan, the issue of nuclear enrichment was not debated by the public at large. The 
debate about the Islamic Republic’s civil nuclear program only truly began after the 
program was revealed. The issue, however, was framed within a heavily controlled media 
environment and ultimately framed within the unfolding debate between the two broad 
sections of Iranian politics: Ruhaniyat vs. Ruhaniyoun.  
This has resulted in a general consensus about Iran retaining its right to enrich, 
with the policy disagreements stemming from how best to resolve Iran’s conflict with the 
West. With regards to the nuclear taboo, Ayatollah Khamenei is reported to have issued a 
Fatwa banning the development or use of WMD. The Fatwa is a source of considerable 
controversy and its origins are beyond the scope of this dissertation.258 In any case, the 
supposed issuance of the Fatwa is tangential to the evidence that Iran conducted nuclear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 The best statement inferring a lack of faith in the nonproliferation regime came during 
Rafsanjani’s speech in 1988, where he said: “It was also made clear that the moral 
teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the 
world does not respect its resolutions and closes its eyes to the violations and all the 
aggressions which are committed in the battlefield. We should fully equip ourselves both 
in an offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. 
From now own you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task.” See: 
“Hashemi-Rafsanjani Speaks on Future of IRGC,” Tehran Domestic Service, Daily 
Report, Near East & South Asia, FBIS-NES-88-195, October 6, 1988.  
258 For a comprehensive analysis of the Fatwa debate, see: Ariane Tabatabai, “Don’t 
Misunderstand Khamenei’s nuclear Fatwa,” Arms Control for Regional Security for the 
Middle East, February 28, 2013, http://middleeast-armscontrol.com/2013/02/28/dont-
misunderstand-khameneis-nuclear-fatwa/.  
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weapons specific experiments between 1999 and 2003, in addition to its dedicated 
procurement network to support this program starting in 1987. In both cases, norm 
formation stems from Iran’s top-leaders, rather than the bottom-up.  
Findings 
 
Both Turkey and Iran have centralized policy-making structures that prevent the 
creation of norms from the bottom up. Instead, norms reflect those of the bureaucracies 
and leaders overseeing nuclear issues. As such, Turkey’s approach to nuclear issues 
reflects that of NATO, whereas Iran’s are a corollary of the leader’s worldview. In turn, 
neither Turkey nor Iran has embraced the nuclear taboo; with Ankara retaining the 
capability to deliver nuclear weapons and Iran having sought to develop a nuclear 
capability between 1987 and 2003.   
This lack of a nuclear taboo, in turn, raises new avenues for academic inquiry: 
How do centralized states, free from a strong anti-nuclear constituency, create nuclear 
norms? To what extent is a states’ understanding of nuclear norms a corollary to 
individual perceptions about the value, or meaning of, certain the nonproliferation 
norms? Similarly, do individual perceptions of nuclear weapons shape state behavior in 
centralized states, with top down decision-making mechanisms? These questions, in turn, 
touch on the role of individuals in nuclear policy-making and how their specific 
conceptions of security, or standing in the world affect perception of nuclear weapons. 
Indeed, the evidence thus far suggests that perceptions of nuclear weapons/security 
threats/treaties/nonproliferation are indeed subjective, biased, and influenced by 
individual perceptions – and that these individual understandings of these issues drive 
policymaking in different countries.  
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To address these questions, this dissertation’s final analytical chapter will explore 
this study’s dependent variable (Iran and Turkey’s nuclear decisions) on an individual 
level, to determine how specific individuals shaped Turkish and Iranian nuclear policy to 
address two questions: 1) Do similar states respond similarly to the same external 
inputs?; 2) What explains variations in nuclear decision-making? 
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Chapter 5: Nuclear Mythmaking and Powerful Leaders: The Role of Individuals  
 
Turkey and Iran’s nuclear programs began in the mid-1950s, after the U.S. 
announced its Atoms for Peace policy in 1953. At the outset of each country’s 
negotiations with the United States, the two countries placed different priorities on the 
procurement of nuclear technology. For Turkey, the procurement of nuclear energy was a 
political priority, favored by the then Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes. The Iranian case, 
however, differs in that the Shah was disinterested in the negotiations, leaving them to a 
trusted advisor, Manouchehr Eqbal. As a result, Turkey was the first to sign a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with the United States, whereas the lack of political support for 
the agreement in Iran resulted in the slow ratification of the U.S.-Iranian nuclear 
cooperation agreement. 
After the 1973 energy crisis, the Shah changed course, and prioritized the rapid 
development of nuclear energy. Tehran’s rapid accumulation of foreign capital after the 
rise in energy prices, allowed for Iran to acquire a significant amount of nuclear 
equipment from a slew of western suppliers. Ankara pursued a similar strategy, but its 
dire financial situation, as well as political unrest, prevented the government from 
pursuing a program as ambitious as Iran’s.  
The key catalyst for Iran’s policy change emanated from the upper echelons of 
leadership. During the 1970s, it was the Shah’s prioritization of the program that resulted 
in its expansion. Similarly, after the Islamic Revolution, the Supreme Leader dictated the 
direction of the nuclear program; including the decision to proliferate in 1984. On the 
Turkish side, the direction of the program changed considerably in 1983, after the market 
reforms instituted by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal.  
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This chapter explores the role of individuals in nuclear decision-making to help 
determine how key decision-makers understood nuclear issues, and subsequently made 
policy. This chapter is seeking to determine whether individuals in similar states respond 
similarly to the same external inputs. The previous two chapters suggest that states – and 
therefore, individuals making policy – respond differently to similar inputs, raising the 
rather obvious question: Why is this case? To address this question, this chapter looks at 
the role of individuals to determine whether the differences in Turkish and Iranian 
decision-making stem from different individual conceptions about nuclear energy/nuclear 
weapons.  
In doing so, this section tests the constructivist/psychological constructivist 
approaches to nuclear decision-making put forward by Jacques Hymans, Peter Lavoy, 
and Itty Abraham. Hymans, for example, has compared the decision to proliferate to a 
“leap of faith,” stemming from the key decision-maker’s “national identity conception.” 
In other words, if a leader is an “oppositional nationalist,” and thereby views his/her 
country as “being both naturally at odds with and naturally equal (if not superior) to a 
rival country (key comparison other)”, he/she is more likely to proliferate.259 Yet, 
Hyman’s attempt to prove his hypothesis is problematic. To calculate a leader’s national 
identity conception (NIC), Hyman’s attempts to quantify deeply held beliefs by analyzing 
speeches to measure the leader’s ratings on status and solidarity scales. Status quantifies 
and evaluates the leader’s perception about the country’s place and standing in the 
international community in relation to his key comparison other. Solidarity quantifies the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Jacques C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and 
Foreign Policy, p. 229.  
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leader’s perception of similarities and differences between his/her country and the rest of 
the world.260  
The leader’s score on the status and solidarity scales can be thought of as a 
numerical representation of his/her personal beliefs about his/her perception of the 
country’s international standing in comparison to other countries, and whether or not he 
sees the world in black and white terms like “us” vs “them.” A rating on the high end of 
the status scale suggests that the leader is more likely to proliferate. Conversely, a lower 
score suggests that the leader will seek out other ways to defend the country from a 
foreign threat. According to Hymans, “The best texts for understanding a leader’s NIC 
are likely to be major regular scheduled speeches such as the ‘the state of the union’ 
address which are explicitly concerned with the overall nature and direction of the nation 
. . .”261 
Data indicates that Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei is an oppositional nationalist and 
therefore will “want the bomb,” i.e. he has a NIC that favors the development of nuclear 
weapons. Yet, when one code’s former President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s speeches at 
the United Nations, the combative former Iranian leader has an NIC score that indicates 
that he is “unlikely to go for the bomb, unlikely to resist the nonproliferation regime, and 
likely to seek out superpower guarantees.”262 The history, as well as associated archival 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Ibid, p. 48. 
261 Ibid, pp. 50-52. 
262 The author used Hymans’ methodology to code Ayatollah Khamenei’s and former 
President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s speeches. For this study, Khamenei’s NIC was 
derived from a collection of speeches he gave throughout the country to “academics and 
elites” from 2006 to 2008. The format for these speeches are akin to town hall forums in 
American politics. Khamenei specifically lays out his vision for Iran, the country’s 
international status, and the government’s foreign and domestic policies. Based on this 
author’s coding of Khamenei’s speech acts, Iran’s Supreme Leader is an oppositional 
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documents, suggests otherwise. This suggests two things: First, that a leader’s NIC is 
dependent on a subjective interpretation of the statements made. The coding of speeches, 
for example, relies on the context and audience of the speech, as well as certain 
assumptions about what a leader means, when he/she refers to a key comparison other – 
the foreign actor referred to most in the speeches – in non-specific terms.  
For example when Khamenei says, “The problem besetting our great nation 
before the victory of the Islamic Revolution did not lie only in the fact that the country's 
political officials were installed and dismissed by the aliens without the Iranian people's 
knowledge,” “aliens” is coded as a generic foreign other, while “our great nation” was 
recorded as a wider self reference. The external actor references are based solely on 
Khamenei’s explicit language and coded independently and only counted once in each 
paragraph. The Iranian leadership’s tendency to use interchangeable terms like “global 
arrogance, arrogant powers, aliens, the colonialists, and the super powers” necessitates 
the making of assumptions about who it is that they are referring to, which could in turn 
alter the leader’s NIC score – and therefore whether the final score will result in an NIC 
that suggests a preference for nuclear weapons or nonproliferation. 
Second, the language used may, in fact, be dependent upon the setting in which 
the speech is given. As such, leader speeches at the United Nations compared to those 
given to the military will differ in tone. The speech may actually be the dependent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nationalist and will “want the bomb.” However, when the same process was used to code 
Ahmedinejad’s speeches, this author determined that he had an NIC that results in the 
leader foregoing the development of nuclear weapons or technical autonomy, in favor of 
an alliance themselves with a nuclear power. This description is at odds with 
Ahmedinejad’s actions and policies whilst in office.  
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variable, whereas the venue is the independent variable. This raises a potential 
methodological problem for scholars trying to replicate Hyman’s work; leaving open the 
possibility that a leader’s NIC scores may be dependent on an unrelated independent 
variable that has little to do with nuclear decisions. Indeed, when this author coded 
speeches from Ahmedinejad, the NIC differed when UN speeches were used, compared 
to speeches given to domestic audiences. 
Similar to Hymans, Peter Lavoy argues that “a government is likely ‘to go 
nuclear’ when proficient and well positioned individuals who want their country to build 
nuclear bombs, exaggerate security threats to make the ‘myth of nuclear security’ more 
compelling.”263 According to this hypothesis, a country will pursue nuclear weapons only 
after a well-positioned person in the bureaucracy convinces the leader that they are 
critical for security. In this regard, Lavoy’s argument is similar to that of Scott Sagan, 
who argued that one potential explanation for a state’s nuclear decision stems from a 
powerful bureaucracy, pushing for either a civil nuclear program, or a nuclear weapons 
effort.264 
This nuclear decision, according to Itty Abraham, was incorporated into the 
developing world’s “fetishization” of nuclear science. As newly independent states, 
Abraham argues, developing countries (many of which were under colonial rule) were 
eager to use science to rapidly advance, in order to hasten their acceptance as an equal 
member in the world community. For these ideational reasons, Abraham argues India 
sought to use nuclear energy to signal technological and economic progress. State interest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security 
Studies, vol. 2, no. 3/4, (Winter, 1993), p. 192. 
264 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of 
a Bomb,” International Security, vol. 21, no. 3 (Winter, 1996-97), pp. 54-86. 
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in nuclear weapons is therefore an outgrowth of an unconscious urge to technologically 
develop – and thereby very much linked to how a state views its own place in the world 
vis-à-vis the more advanced/former colonialist powers in the West.  
These three different theories hinge on individual perceptions of nuclear 
energy/nuclear weapons. These studies, however, do not address one of the factors that 
shaped Turkish and Iranian perceptions of nuclear energy: Western influence on the 
development of individual conceptions of nuclear energy/weapons. In the Turkish and 
Iranian cases, early perceptions of nuclear energy reflected those of the American experts 
that consulted with and helped to establish each country’s nuclear energy program. 
Moreover, the cases of Iran and Turkey suggest that in highly centralized states, 
bureaucracies act at the behest of the leader, and thereby don’t have much affect on state 
decision-making.  
As such, Iran’s nuclear program was beholden to the Shah and the support he 
gave to the program. The nuclear program was therefore relegated to a university level 
research program during the 1960s, before the Shah’s interest in the program grew, 
resulting in the dedication of tremendous resources to develop an industrial nuclear 
program. In Turkey, by contrast, the centralization of nuclear decision-making tied the 
country’s nuclear program to that of the Prime Ministry – and thereby to the person who 
held that office. Thus, when a Prime Minister who supported nuclear energy was in 
power, the program advanced. However, during times of domestic unrest, the program 
suffered. Thus, while Turkey’s nuclear bureaucracy put forward its first plan to develop 
nuclear energy in 1965, the program was not authorized until the 1973 energy crisis. 
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These differences suggest that in centralized bureaucracies, the direction of the 
nuclear program reflects the preference of the leader, or the person put in charge of the 
day-to-day operation of the bureaucracy.  
This chapter identifies key actors in Turkey and Iran’s nuclear programs and 
compares their decisions to discern how different individuals responded to the same set 
of inputs. This allows for a direct comparison of the factors that shape inter-bureaucratic 
debates about nuclear issues; shedding more light on the reasons why different decisions 
are made in response to the same input. Furthermore, this approach helps to test the 
simple assumption underpinning much of nonproliferation scholarship: State X chose to 
pursue/forego nuclear weapons for Y reason.  Therefore, when exposed to Y reason, 
other states will implement similar policies. However, substantial differences remain 
about why similar inputs result in different outcomes. Expressed as an equation, X (input) 
leads to Y (nuclear decision) resulting in Z (policy).  
 
Input 1: Atoms for Peace: Early Conceptions of Nuclear Energy and Individual 
Decision-Making in Iran and Turkey 
 
At the outset of the nuclear age, the Turkish and Iranian leadership adopted two 
different approaches to nuclear energy. The differences were linked to bureaucratic 
politics and the way in which the leadership exerted considerable influence on nuclear 
policy. As a result, the countries’ early approach reflected the approach adopted by the 
leadership, rather than interested parties within the bureaucracy. This dynamic has 
continued up until the present, underscoring the line between individual perceptions of 
nuclear energy/nuclear weapons and policy making in Iran and Turkey.  
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Turkey first approached the United States in 1954 about concluding a nuclear 
cooperation agreement. At that time, Turkey was ruled by Adnan Menderes from the 
recently formed Democratic Party (DP). The DP’s election (in 1951) ended the twenty-
seven-year uninterrupted rule by the Republican People’s Party (RPP), formed by 
Turkey’s founding father Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (d. 1938). The winning party’s political 
platform focused heavily on growing the economy and continuing Turkey’s 
modernization efforts, though it had advocated the abolition of some secularist laws 
antagonizing the country’s conservative districts.265  
For the first four years of Menderes’ rule the economy boomed, buoyed by the 
Korean War spending stimulus and an uptick in food exports. This, however, began to tax 
Turkish energy resources and by the mid-1950s the import of foreign energy sources 
accounted for 57 percent of Turkey’s visible current-account-deficit triggering a severe 
economic crisis. With agricultural production flagging, inflation spiraling to new heights, 
and foreign currency reserves dwindling, Ankara faced problems paying for oil imports 
and food staples like wheat.266 One option to ease this predicament was to decrease 
reliance on imported energy hence the government began building hydroelectric plants, in 
addition to a haphazardly articulated plan to benefit from nuclear energy. Another was to 
seek alternative energy sources and, indeed, Ankara and Washington began negotiations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 108-
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266 William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey (London: 
Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 90-91; “Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C., Subject: Interdepartmental Study on Turkish Economic Problems, 
882.00/5-1855, 18 May 1955,” in the United States Department of State, Foreign 
relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1955-57), vol. 24, pp. 632-637.   
	   168	  
for the supply of a small research reactor in 1954 - just a few months after Eisenhower’s 
Atoms for Peace speech.  
From the outset of negotiations, Turkish officials emphasized two key issues: 
Provisions for the training of Turkish students and speed. Ankara was eager to conclude 
the deal as quickly as possible, rather than being bogged down in details about the 
language included in the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement. In this regard, 
Turkey’s negotiators were acting at the behest of Prime Minister Menderes, who 
maintained close control over the negotiations.  
Ankara and Washington agreed to the draft text in April 1955 and the two sides 
officially signed the first Atoms for Peace nuclear cooperation agreement on June 10, 
1955. While Turkey was the first to sign such an agreement with the United States, the 
archival evidence indicates that this was only due to the “Turkish government act[ing] 
promptly.”267 Turkey’s nuclear authority, Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEC) 
was created after the agreement was signed. The organization was established under the 
auspices of the Prime Ministry, with its funding coming from the Prime Ministry’s 
budget, rather than directly allocated by parliament.  As such, TAEC was not independent 
from the Prime Ministry, which thereby meant that the Prime Minister exerted 
considerably authority over the direction of the program.  
With regards to the negotiations with the United States, this arrangement proved 
beneficial. Menderes believed in the value of nuclear energy; directing his government to 
prioritize the conclusion of the agreement as soon as possible. The United States helped 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, File no. 611.8297/5-255, May 2, 1955, 
General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records 
Administration, RG 59, Box 2553. 
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ease the negotiations, after offering to provide $350,000 to assist with the purchase of the 
first reactor; in exchange for Ankara providing some $250,000 for site construction and 
associated laboratory equipment.268 TAEC’s first duty after its creation in 1956 was to 
work with U.S. representatives from the Atomic Energy Commission to establish 
Turkey’s nuclear program. However, Ankara suffered from a shortage of trained nuclear 
experts. This meant that there was not a trained cadre of influences from within the 
bureaucracy influencing the direction of nuclear policy, but rather a few key individuals 
who shaped the direction of Turkey’s initial nuclear policy. 
According to the United States’ Department of State, “in general, Turkish 
educational, scientific, and technical [expertise] was quite limited.” For example, only 
Ankara and Istanbul universities had nuclear-related doctoral programs. Istanbul 
Technical University had an MSC program and Bogazici had a BS program. At the 
University of Ankara, one professor, Dr. Besin Tanyal, would later select the reactor that 
Turkey eventually purchased. In order to come to terms on Ankara’s nuclear needs, 
Washington began discussions with their Turkish counterparts to send an American 
scientist to review the reactor plans and to establish an atomic trainee program.269  
Tanyal worked closely with Dr. Clifford Beck, a former scientist at Oak Ridge, 
who later established the first research reactor at North Carolina State University 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, File no. 611.8297/7-2855, July 28, 1955, 
General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records 
Administration, RG 59, Box 2553. Furthermore, in an indication of the role financing 
played in early decision-making, a July 1955 Department of State telegram notes, “The 
Turkish Foreign Office, as well as participating agencies, including Robert College 
University [Bogazici University], are anxious to hear the details about the United States’ 
plan to fund half of the construction costs of small research reactors.” See: Ibid. 
269 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, File no: 611.8297/10-1555, October 15, 
1955, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records 
Administration, RG 59, Box 2553.  
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(NCSU). In 1955, Tanyal met with Beck, before selecting which reactor Turkey would 
purchase from the United States’ American Machine and Foundry (AMF). After the April 
meeting, Tanyal told his American interlocutors that Turkey preferred a 1 MW boiling 
water reactor similar to the one in use of at NCSU and therefore signaled his intent to use 
the U.S. university program as a model for Turkey’s first nuclear research center.270 
In 1956, Tanyal approached Dr. Cavit Erginsoy – Turkey’s TAEC representative 
– to further discussions with the AEC about Ankara’s nuclear plans. TAEC and the AEC 
then went back and forth about the plans for the construction of Turkey’s first reactor, 
with the Turks asking their American interlocutors to send a representative to Ankara for 
consultations. The Turkish government was particularly fond of Dr. Alvin Weinberg - 
director of Oak Ridge laboratory - and asked the AEC, on a number of occasions, to send 
him for consultations. This resulted in the United States dispatching Dr. Louis Roddis 
from the AEC in September 1956 and then Leonard E. Link from Argonne national 
laboratory in November 1957 to liaise about the reactor’s construction.  
Turkey then chose the firm American Machine Foundry (AMF) to construct a 
one-MW pool type research reactor at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training 
Center (CNAEM) outside of Istanbul. Reactor construction began in 1959, with it going 
critical for the first time on May 27, 1962. Thereafter, the United States’ Brookhaven 
national laboratory assisted with the running of the Cekmece nuclear center, through a 
special lab-to-lab agreement. Brookhaven provided funding for Turkish nuclear research 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270  Confidential: Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, File no: 
611.8297/4-2655, April 26, 1955, ibid. 
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projects at the facility, whilst also participating in a training program for Turkish nuclear 
students in the United States.271  
Turkey also received considerable nuclear training from British sponsored 
Baghdad-Pact nuclear research center; first based in Baghdad, and then Tehran after the 
1957 coup in Iraq.272 In a similar program to the U.S. supported Cekmece research center, 
the British Atomic Energy Authority “provided the Director and five other scientists out 
of the Institute’s total complement of twelve staff members,” to train scientists from the 
Baghdad Pact’s member states in radioisotope production, as well as agricultural uses of 
nuclear technology.273  
Western influence helped shape early Turkish nuclear decisions. Ankara was 
ultimately reliant on Western cooperation to supplement its technical expertise. As such, 
Turkey’s early perceptions of nuclear energy were similar to that of their American 
counterparts. Turkey’s particular fondness for Dr. Alvin Weinberg is noteworthy in this 
regard. Weinberg was an ardent supporter of nuclear energy, writing in 1954 that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 “Report on the Cekmecek Nuclear Research Center, Airgram, Department of State, 
July 21, 1965, ibid.  
272 “Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training Center,” Science, New Series, vol. 127, no. 3302 
(April 11, 1958), pp. 806-807.  
273 The core curriculum focused on basic fields of nuclear physics including electronics, 
radiochemistry, and health physics. The regional staff were largely culled from biological 
sciences and cooperated closely with the British staff on the medical and agricultural 
applications of nuclear science. As of 1960, for example, the projects in progress were: 
Water-flow studies by radioactive labeling and tritium counting; testing of cement and of 
archeological specimens by beta-ray back scattering; solvent extraction and ion exchange 
work in solution chemistry; synthesis of labeled carbon-14 compounds; observation of 
cytological changes in plant grown under the influence of phosphate labeled with 
phosphorus-32; and a study of the food reserves of certain insects. See: H.A.C. McKay, 
“CENTO Institute of Nuclear Science in Tehran,” Nature, vol. 186, no. 4724, (May 
1960), p. 514.  
	   172	  
progress on the development of a small reactor for submarines signaled the feasibility of 
the use of small reactors for power generation in remote places.  
In addition, he proposed the idea of using a reactor based on the swimming pool 
type reactor that AMF would build in Turkey to produce power in remote localities. 
Weinberg believed “that a vigorously competitive business for supplying such power 
packages will develop... [and] doubtless we shall shortly see such devices being built for 
a lump sum on a competitive bid basis.”274 This enthusiasm for nuclear energy is 
reflected in Menderes’ own statements; in particular, his government’s early expectation 
that the reactor procured would serve as a platform to eventually produce nuclear power 
in remote areas that were economically underdeveloped.275  
This approach resulted in Turkey’s nuclear research program being to TAEC, 
which operated under the Prime Ministry. By contrast, Iran’s early nuclear program was 
university based, and operated outside of government bureaucracy. The difference is 
related to the influence of key decision-makers. For Turkey, the program had the support 
of the Prime Minister, whereas in Iran, the early decisions were made by two men with 
links to the University of Tehran: Manoucher Eqbal and Mahmoud Hessabi.  
Eqbal was one of the Shah’s closest advisors; Hessabi has been dubbed the 
“father of Iranian physics,” after he founded Tehran University in 1934. He also helped 
draft Iran’s first nuclear wish list. In anticipation of Iranian interest in the Atoms for 
Peace program, the U.S. embassy in Tehran reached out to Hessabi to draft a statement of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 See: Alvin M. Weinberg, “Oak Ridge National Laboratory,” Science, New Series, vol. 
109, no. 2828 (March, 1949), pp. 245-248; Idem, “The Outlook for Industrial Nuclear 
Power - 1954,” American Scientist, vol. 42, no. 3 (July, 1954), pp. 461-470. 
275 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, File no: 611.8297/10-1555, October 15, 
1955, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records 
Administration, RG 59, Box 2553.   
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hopes, plans, and facilities for the [planned] nuclear research center at the University of 
Tehran.”276 Eqbal first contacted the AEC to open discussions about nuclear cooperation 
in November 1955, but the Iranian government failed to prioritize the negotiations, which 
resulted in the delay of the beginning of substantive discussions for close to two years. 
Eqbal, however, appeared unaware of the legal provision governing the export of U.S. 
nuclear technology and, in 1956, began to proactively approach American foundations to 
provide support for a university nuclear research program.277  
After a working visit to the United States, the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, Seldin 
Chapin, met with Eqbal and then with Prime Minister Hossein Ala to reemphasize that 
nuclear science cooperation required the conclusion of a cooperation agreement. Eqbal 
and Ala expressed an extreme interest in such an arrangement and inquired whether it 
would allow Iranians to be trained abroad in the nuclear field. With Chapin replying in 
the affirmative, Eqbal indicated that he “would inform the Shah today of [their] 
conversation.”278 As he explained on another occasion about the Iranian political process, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, File no. 611.8897/11-1455, November 14, 
1955, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records 
Administration, RG 59, Box 2558.  
277 After a working visit to the United States in June 1956, Eqbal told Ambassador to 
Iran, Seldin Chapin, that he had been “promised a nuclear reactor for Tehran University” 
during the visit. The statement took the ambassador by complete surprise as he was 
unfamiliar with his interlocutor’s negotiations with American foundations (Eqbal had 
actually prepared - likely in conjunction with Hessabi - a nuclear wish list that he took 
with him to the United States). Having cabled Washington for instructions, Chapin 
learned that Eqbal had not been promised a reactor but had only liaised with American 
officials about “the possibility of some foundation, such as Ford or Rockefeller, 
providing financing for specialized personnel for laboratory and nuclear studies at the 
University of Tehran.” See: Incoming Telegram, Department of State, File no. 
611.8897/6-156, June 2, 1956, Ibid; Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, June 6, 
1956, ibid. 
278 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, June 23, 1956, ibid.; Memorandum of 
Conversation, June 23, 1956, ibid.  
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“the person who gets to the Shah last, receives his support.”279 Thus, while the Shah may 
have been absent from the early talks, no government funds for the nuclear purchases 
could be obtained without his authorization.  
It was indeed this aloofness that accounted for the delay between the initial U.S.-
Iranian discussions and the conclusion of an agreement. It was only in late July 1956 that 
the Iranian ambassador to Washington, Ali Amini, was authorized to send a formal letter 
to Secretary of State Dulles indicating a desire to begin negotiations on a nuclear 
cooperation agreement. The ambassador was informed that a draft agreement was being 
prepared and was presented with the actual text in September,280 whereby he was 
peremptorily instructed by the Shah to have it signed. It is unlikely that Iran made any 
changes to the text of the agreement.  
For “the best effect” Washington and Tehran agreed to delay the announcement 
until next winter (1957), when Tehran would host an exhibit for the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy under the auspices of the atoms for peace proram. The Shah agreed to 
make an opening statement where he would announce the conclusion of the agreement. 
Before the holding of the conference, the administration agreed to begin implementing 
the agreement as soon as it came into force. This, however, required the agreement to be 
mutually ratified before the March conference, and because of Congressional scheduling 
issues, the most likely date for the signing of the agreement was February 1957.281  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Foreign Service Dispatch, Department of State, July 12, 1956, ibid.  
280 Embassy of Iran, Department of State, File 611.8897/7-1856, July 18, 1956 ibid; 
Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, File 611.8897/9-1356, July 27, 1956, ibid.  
281 Incoming Telegram, Department of State, September 13, 1956, ibid.; Outgoing 
Telegram, Department of State, File 611.8897/7-1856, September 18, 1956, ibid; 
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The United States sent Iran the draft agreement in November 1956. Having 
received the document, Tehran agreed to a tentative signing date of November 23 and to 
simultaneous announcements by the Shah and the President Eisenhower. Yet it indicated 
its desire to make the announcement at the Atoms for Peace exhibition so as to achieve 
“maximum impact.” In order to placate the Shah, the administration agreed that the 
announcement be postponed until December and that at the time of signing neither the 
Shah nor the President would make any public statements so as to ensure that the Shah 
would be able to announce the agreement in March. The agreement would then come into 
force at the same time as the atoms for peace exhibition.  
Nevertheless, the Shah worried that news about the agreement would be widely 
reported as it was a matter of public record leading to the loss of the anticipated political 
gains. He therefore opted to delay the signing until March 1957 to ensure the maximum 
political capital from the signing ceremony,282 though this meant that Iran would be 
unable to take advantage of the agreement until the agreement was ratified. In a further 
signal of the priority given to the ratification of the agreement, Tehran failed to take the 
final step to bring the agreement into force, which ultimately prompted representatives 
from American Machine and Foundry to prod their Iranian counterparts to exchange the 
necessary diplomatic notes with the United States to allow for cooperation to take 
place.283  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 Ibid.  
283 Iranian Embassy, Washington, DC, File 611.8897/2-459, September 12, 1959, ibid; 
Incoming Airgram, Department of State, File 611.8897/2-559, September 12, 1959, ibid; 
Office of Memorandum, United States Government, File no. 611.8897/3-2959, April 29, 
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The different approaches taken by Iran and Turkey demonstrate the value and 
problems of centralized nuclear decision-making. In the Turkish case, the support given 
to the program resulted in the prioritization in talks with the United States, and ultimately 
the rapid conclusion of the nuclear cooperation. For Iran, however, the Shah’s interest in 
using nuclear technology for political gain delayed the signing of the agreement. Yet, 
rather than continue to use nuclear technology for political gain, the Shah’s interest in the 
program waned during the 1960s. The program, therefore, remained limited to university 
level research, rather than the focus of a top-down political directive to hasten the 
development of nuclear energy. These early decisions also affected how each program 
was initially constructed. The government centric approach in Turkey resulted in TAEC 
overseeing much of Turkey’s nuclear research. Iran’s nuclear program, by contrast, was 




Individuals in Turkey and Iran were both interested in concluding a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with the United States after the Atoms for Peace policy was first 
announced. The subsequent trajectory of each program was dictated by the support given 
by the leadership to the bureaucracy placed in charge of nuclear related issues. In Turkey, 
Menderes’ support for the program hastened the conclusion of the nuclear agreement. 
Thereafter, the program relied on Turkey’s few nuclear physicists, who turned to 
American experts to aid in the development of a government centric research center. As 
such, Turkey’s nuclear research center is modeled on the program at North Carolina State 
University, which was under the direction of Dr. Beck. More broadly, Menderes’ 
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enthusiasm set the tone for the pace of negotiation and ultimately created the foundation 
for the formulation of Ankara’s initial approach to nuclear energy: a key technology to be 
mastered with the intent of using it to produce power.  
One consequence of this approach, however, was that TAEC was placed under the 
auspices of the Prime Ministry. Thus, during times of political turmoil and Prime 
Ministerial upheaval, the program lost its main sponsor, and therefore its main advocate 
within the Turkish bureaucracy for the allocation of funds for potential nuclear projects. 
This is most evident during the 1960s, when TAEC concluded a study to procure a 
nuclear reactor (in line with Menderes’ policy direction), but failed to find political 
support from the new administration, headed by the Justice Party’s Suleyman Demirel. 
The Shah differed from Menderes in that he paid little attention to the 
development of nuclear energy between 1955 and 1972, once he derived the political 
benefits of announcing the atoms for peace program in 1957 (and then lost interest in its 
direction for much of the 1960s). The lack of a top-down government directive resulted 
in Iran’s early program being largely confined to university level research. This early 
emphasis on university level research is reflective of the person placed in charge of the 
nuclear program, Manoucher Eqbal. However, due to the lack of top-level support the 
construction of the reactor at Tehran University suffered during the 1960s, due to 
disagreements about payment for both the construction of the reactor and to the local 
Iranian contractor in charge of building the actual buildings.  
The data suggests that neither Turkey nor Iran fetishized nuclear technology in the 
1960s/1960s, as a means with which to demonstrate technological advancement. 
Moreover, contrary Sagan’s hypothesis, the bureaucracies in Iran and Turkey remained 
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beholden to directives from the top leadership – and not the other way around. This 
dynamic of the bureaucracy taking its cues from the top is clearly reflected in the case of 
Iran after the 1973 oil crisis, and then the 1984 decision to proliferate. The Shah was 
disinterested and even acted as an impediment to the development of nuclear energy, 
owing to his desire to time the signing of the nuclear cooperation agreement to maximize 
his personal popularity.  
In Turkey, the nuclear bureaucracy has never been independent of the Prime 
Minister, which thereby limits its autonomy, and its ability to impact policy to other 
potential interested parties, like the Parliament or even the military, should Turkey have 
considered developing a nuclear weapon. The evolution of each bureaucracy suggests an 
inability, in the words of Lavoy, to create a “nuclear mythmaker” from within the nuclear 
establishment. The role of nuclear mythmaking, particularly in Iran during the 1970s, 
stemmed from the Shah, rather than a person within the bureaucracy. Indeed, during the 
1960s, the two men in charge of the program were eager for university type research, 
rather than a large-scale civilian program, or a nuclear weapons program.  
In the case of Turkey, the “mythmakers” came from the United States’ AEC, with 
Weinberg and Roddis serving as key advisors for early Turkish nuclear 
bureaucrats/scientists. Yet, even while Menderes did express similar arguments to those 
made by Weinberg and Roddis about the value of nuclear energy, the implementation of 
this vision remained beholden the leader, which as indicated remained apathetic to the 
development of nuclear energy up until 1972. The catalyst for change, in the case of Iran, 
stemmed from the Shah’s intense interest in the program beginning in the early 1970s. 
Similarly, one of Turkey’s greatest weaknesses during the 1970s was political turmoil, 
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which subsequently hindered the procurement of reactors from Sweden. Together, the 
data suggests that in highly centralized political systems, the bureaucracy’s freedom of 
action is limited; beholden to the leaders political directives; and hamstrung during times 
of political/economic crises.  
The leader’s personal feelings about nuclear energy, therefore, are of paramount 
importance to understanding a state’s nuclear policy. This suggests that political 
outcomes depend on a leader’s conception of the “input” in centralized political systems; 
resulting in different outcomes when similar states are faced with the same input. This 
suggests that similar leaders make similar nuclear decisions, particularly as it pertains to 
nuclear weapons. More broadly, most leaders choose not to proliferate, further suggesting 
that most world leaders, regardless of cultural and political differences, ultimately make 
the same decision: not to pursue nuclear weapons. This fact, in turn, makes the Iranian 
leadership’s post-1979 decision-making all the more valuable, owing to its historic rarity; 
particularly as it is compared to the more standard approach taken by Turkey’s leaders. 
Input 2: The Energy Crisis: Individual Perceptions of Nuclear Energy 
 
The Shah’s approach to nuclear energy began to change in the early 1970s, after 
the dramatic rise in oil revenues beginning in 1972. In Turkey, the government also 
prioritized the development of nuclear energy during this same time period; empowering 
TAEC to undertake site licensing studies at Akkuyu and then to begin negotiations with 
Sweden’s ASEA-Atom and Stal-Laval. It was during this period of time that the Shah 
centralized nuclear decision-making, after he created by royal decree the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran (AEOI), and placed it under the direction of Dr. Akbar Etemad (a 
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physicist trained in reactor physics in the Swiss university of Lausanne).284 By contrast, 
Turkey’s nuclear negotiations remained rather limited and ultimately driven by its dire 
need to diversify its energy resources.  
As explained in the previous chapter, Iran’s economic prosperity during this time 
period helped to solidify relationships with foreign suppliers, whereas Turkey’s financing 
problems hindered its nuclear plans. Iran also benefitted from the centralization of 
nuclear decision-making and strong support from the Shah (albeit only after 1972). The 
allocation of incredible resources and the empowerment of the AEOI resulted in the 
dramatic expansion of nuclear energy.  
Iran 
 
Hymans argues that nuclear weapons decisions are non-routine and require a 
leader take a leap in the dark. With regards to nuclear energy, the consequences are 
relatively easy to discern: the major risks are cost overruns and, once the reactor goes 
critical, the potential for a nuclear accident resulting in the release of radioactivity. In 
most new nuclear states, the decision-makers rely on outside contractors to supplement 
indigenous nuclear expertise. The Shah was no different, and initially commissioned 
directed the Ministry of Water and Power285 to develop a feasibility study for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 To help expedite the nuclear project, in 1974 the Shah created the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran by a special decree. The decree stated that “in view of the 
importance that we attach to the utilization of nuclear power ... the government is duty 
bound to set up organizations which will establish coordination and supervision over all 
matter pertaining to the use of nuclear energy.” See: “Shah Issues Decree on Nuclear 
Power Organization,” Teheran Domestic Service, Daily Report, Middle East and Africa, 
FBIS-MEA-74-054, March 19, 1974, p. K1.  
285 In the 1960s, Iran’s small nuclear research program was overseen by the Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education, the Ministry of Water and Power, and in the Plan and 
Budget Organization. See: U.S. Embassy Tehran to State Department, “The Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran,” May 11, 1977, Confidential, Freedom of Information Act 
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development of a nuclear energy program. Yet as of 1972, the relevant ministries lacked 
the trained personnel to conduct such a study. The Iranian government then turned to the 
scientists at the nuclear research center at the University of Tehran but the center lacked 
the capacity to undertake such a study. Tehran’s nuclear efforts then stalled for close to 
two years.286  
Absent indigenous expertise, the Shah commissioned the Montreal Engineering 
Company (known at the time as Monenco Inc.) to put together a feasibility study for the 
development of a nuclear energy program in Iran.287 Up to 1964, Monenco had focused 
heavily on electric projects in Canada. Yet beginning that year the company began to 
expand and diversify into new fields, including nuclear energy. In 1967, Monenco 
created Canatom Ltd. in a three-way partnership with two other engineering companies. 
The company later became the largest private sector nuclear engineering firm in Canada. 
Canatom provided a “complete range of services ... [including] supply and construction 
management, design engineering, operating plant support and the management and 
decommissioning of radioactive materials.”288 Later, in 1973, Monenco established an 
Iranian subsidiary, known as Monenco of Iran to consult on energy issues.289 Monenco 
was then tapped to write an assessment of Iran’s nuclear plans.  
Monenco of Iran’s report concluded, in 1974, that nuclear power was economical 
and affordable. According to nuclear energy expert Judith Perera, the report indicated that 	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“nuclear [energy] was the most economic source of power for based-load operations and 
middle-range operations down to 4,800 hours a year or an annual factor of about 58 
percent.”290 The report was overly optimistic in its price assessments and was certainly 
not independent given the interests that Monenco had in securing lucrative nuclear 
contracts in Iran.  To complement this study, Iran also relied on a multi-volume study 
conducted by the Stanford Research Institute, which concluded Iran would require 20,000 
MW of electrical capacity by 1990 to support its growing economy. Thereafter, the Shah 
declared his intent to produce this power using some twenty 1,000 MW nuclear reactors, 
procured from foreign nuclear firms. 
The Shah’s “leap of faith” therefore was based on research conducted by one 
industry related source, as well as a more comprehensive assessment of Iran’s future 
energy needs. This suggests that the Shah’s decisions were based on data culled to justify 
a decision made based on his own subjective understanding of nuclear energy. The 
report’s conclusions were a foregone conclusion: the development of nuclear energy. As 
such, it served to reinforce the Shah’s recent prioritization of nuclear energy. This 
suggests that the decision was ultimately based on the availability of the heuristic. This 
refers to psychological research suggesting that “when faced with the difficult task of 
judging probability or frequency, people employ a limited number of heuristics [i.e., 
mental shortcuts taken when making non-routine choices] which reduce these judgments 
to simpler ones,” using the “strength of association as a basis for the judgment of 
frequency.”291  
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The Shah based his assessments on a flawed industry report and the deeply 
ingrained belief that nuclear energy presented Iran with a unique opportunity to conserve 
energy resources, whilst also creating a more profitable petro-chemical sector. For 
example, in a 1974 interview with Der Spiegel, the Shah argued that Iran’s oil would be 
exhausted in thirty years, forcing it to extract oil from mature fields. He then explained 
the necessity of Tehran developing a petrochemical and pharmaceutical industry to sell 
products to Europe and the West in a post-oil world, saying, “I will sell oil in the form of 
petrochemical products. I will sell you aspirin. I will not sell you crude oil.”292  
The Shah was also influenced by AEOI chief Etemad, who met on a weekly basis 
with the monarch to explain nuclear physics after the AEOI’s founding in 1974. Etemad, 
according to former colleague Mehdi Sarram (the former director for safeguards and 
security at AEOI), thought that “Nuclear [technology] had no limit,” which meant that 
Tehran should engage in all aspects of nuclear research to develop expertise.293 In 1975 
Etemad told Le Monde that Tehran “want[s] to possess an installed power capacity of 
70,000 megawatts [with nuclear power comprising 20,000 MW of this total figure],” 
claiming that the high figure was a result of its plans to rapidly industrialize so as to raise 
“the living standards of the Iranian people.” Etemad then described the origins of the 
nuclear project, telling the reporter that “for a certain number of years his imperial 
majesty has proposed a new energy program according to which fossil fuels would no 
longer be used to produce energy but as a raw material in industry.”294  
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The centerpiece of Iran’s nuclear research efforts were the AEOI’s plans to 
develop a large research center near Isfahan, dubbed the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center 
(ENTEC). The plan for ENTEC, according to Etemad, was to use the facilities to train 
power plant engineers for research on power reactors, “particularly breeder reactors,” and 
for experiments to “familiarize [Iran] with the fuel cycles.” Tehran was particularly 
interested in being “able to manufacture the fuel elements of the light water power 
stations and to learn how to handle uranium and plutonium.”295 
The emphasis on developing a full-fledged nuclear research program, backed by 
seemingly unlimited funds, resulted in the creation of a large nuclear bureaucracy 
beholden to directives and funding from the Shah. By 1976, for example, the AEOI had 
more than 1,000 employees, earning a wage in excess of that of the typical Iranian 
governmental workers.296 Nevertheless, Iran continued to struggle with a manpower 
shortages up until the collapse of the regime. This forced the AEOI to hire foreign 
experts, as well as to invest considerable amounts of money into the training of the next 
generation of scientists at western universities.297  
The Shah’s priority, however, was to procure reactors as quickly as possible, 
rather than focus on building up an indigenous industry. This approach, combined with 
Iran’s limited technical expertise, explains why the AEOI opted to conclude a “super 
turn-key” arrangement with Germany for the Bushehr reactor, despite internal AEOI 
concerns that the “super turnkey” project would preclude Iranian industry from gaining 	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much needed experience during construction. Similarly, Iran’s agreement with 
Framatome for the construction of the Isfahan nuclear research center was also based on a 
“super turn-key” arrangement. Moreover, in a further indication of how centralized 
Iranian decision-making was, Etemad had to fly to Shah’s chateau in Switzerland to 
receive the monarch’s personal permission to sign the agreement, after the AEOI had 
reached an agreement with Framatome on the facility.298  
Findings  
 
The data indicates that the Shah retained day-to-day control over the direction of 
the Iranian nuclear program during the 1970s. As such, the program resembled his public 
pronouncements about the necessity of developing a nuclear energy program. Moreover, 
Etemad’s deference to the Shah’s decision-making indicates that the bureaucracy 
remained beholden to the monarch’s directives, rather than acting as an internal lobby to 
pressure the Shah to adopt specific nuclear policies. To be clear, Etemad and other AEOI 
officials did have a degree of autonomy.  
Moreover, in the case of Etemad, he did have close contact with Shah; giving him 
the opportunity to influence the monarch’s understanding of nuclear issue. Etemad’s 
influence on the direction of policy appears limited,as evidenced by his inquiry about 
developing nuclear weapons. In his book Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State, 
David Patrikarakos quotes Etemad, who said that after meeting with the Shah on a 
weekly basis for close to six months, he asked the monarch whether he wanted nuclear 
weapons. The Shah, after explaining his military plans for the region, told Etemad that 
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Iran had no need for nuclear weapons. He then repeated his frequent public assertion that 
he could change his mind if other nations in the region proliferated.299 
According to Mehdi Sarram, Iran’s selection of light-water reactors suggested an 
interest in nuclear power, rather than weapons. Had Iran wanted to develop a plutonium 
cycle for weapons, he argues, it would have opted for technology that was better suited 
for the task, i.e. the purchase of heavy water reactors. This means that the main thrust of 
the AEOI’s work was the development of nuclear energy through the purchase of power 
reactors. Nevertheless, he notes that the AEOI was involved in almost every area of 
nuclear research to help satisfy the Shah’s desire to be conversant in all areas of nuclear 
research.300 
The data suggests that the Shah made most – if not all – of the country’s 
important nuclear decisions. The AEOI, in turn, was structured in such a way that 
guaranteed the Shah’s close control over the direction of the organization. Thus, while 
powerful when compared to other bureaucratic agencies at that time (including the all-
important oil ministry), the ultimate decision remained in the hands of the Iranian 
monarch. The Shah, therefore, would have had to make the decision to proliferate. His 
policy, while at times muddled, was to abstain from developing nuclear weapons, so long 
as the smaller Arab states in the region did not acquire nuclear weapons. This skeptical 
embrace of nonproliferation prevailed up until the monarch’s overthrow in 1979; 
resulting in a new leadership and different actors that made a series of different nuclear 
decisions. 
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More broadly, these dynamics suggest that leaders rely on subjective pieces of 
data, when ostensibly working to make a rational decision. The Shah’s framing of nuclear 
energy related issues stemmed from an industry report he commissioned. This report, in 
turn, provided the basis for his public talking points. The data was a reflection of his own 
personal ambitions, rather than a stereotypical rational decision-making process. Based 
on this, one can assume that a leader’s personal conception of nuclear energy is the key 
data-point for understanding the direction of a state’s nuclear policy in centralized states, 
where the sovereign exerts considerable influence on the bureaucracy.  
Turkey     
 
Turkey’s nuclear program during the 1970s lacked a strong leader with similar 
authority to the Shah. The data suggests that Turkey’s nuclear negotiations with Sweden 
were beset with problems, owing to financing difficulties and Ankara’s hitherto 
resistance to the NPT. A better comparison stems from Turkish nuclear decision-making 
after the 1980 military coup. After the coup, two different Turkish leaders, General 
Kenan Evran and Turgut Ozal, made a series of nuclear decisions. The differences 
suggest that, like in the case of the Shah, non-nuclear related subjective variables 
influenced decision-making. 
Evran, for example, pursued a traditional “turn-key” model, after Turkey 
launched a new nuclear tender. In April 1982 the Turkish Electrical Authority (TEK) 
announced its intent to reissue an international tender for the construction of a 900 MW 
reactor at the Akkuyu site. In a departure from the negotiations with Asea-Atom, where 
Ankara insisted on full Swedish funding of the project, TEK announced that the 
government would “meet about 60 percent of costs for all of its projects, including the 
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nuclear plant at Akkuyu, with its own resources.” Ayhan Erkan, TEK’s deputy general 
manager, indicated that Ankara had approached KWU about the sale of two 400 MW 
reactors for the Akkuyu site but the talks had gone nowhere; and, unlike the negotiations 
with Asea-Atom, it also received some interest from KWU and Westinghouse for the 
construction of a larger nuclear power plant.301  
Just days before the November election, TEK sent letters of intent to General 
Electric, Kraftwerk Union, and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. KWU was thought to have 
had the upper hand owing to its low bid (about $1,100 per installed kilowatt for a 970- 
MW pressurized water reactor) that included a generous financing package backed by the 
central government and Siemens - KWU’s parent company.302 General Evren indicated 
that his government had decided to send out three letters of intent because “of the 
favorable financing being offered by the suppliers.”303  
After Ozal’s election, Ankara voided these letters of intent, owing to internal 
disagreements about financing. After some back-and-forth with AECL, KWU, and 
General Electric304, Ozal changed the financing requirement for the Akkuyu project in 
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1984. Up until that point, Ankara had been asking that the vendor provide 85 percent of 
the funding, but changed this requirement to 100 percent, after the government passed 
market oriented reforms; including the Build-Operate-Own/Transfer law. These changes, 
according to Izak Atiyas, were controversial, and thus resulted in Ozal trying to side-step 
political resistance by centralizing power within the Prime Ministry. According to Atiyas, 
“there was a significant degree of centralization of policy making authority, and an 
increased appeal to discretionary instruments. Hence, while on the one hand the scope of 
state intervention was reduced through liberalization, decision making within the 
government became more centralized.” 305  Thus, from the outset of the post-1980 
decision-making process, Turkey’s leadership moved to further centralize power; 
resulting in greater control over nuclear issues in the hands of the Prime Minister. 
With regards to the procurement of nuclear reactors, the process was beset by 
problems stemming from the passage of decrees outside of the parliament to advance 
Ozal’s preference for privatization. Thus, in a key difference from the Shah’s nuclear 
decision-making, Ozal viewed the pursuit of nuclear energy through the prism of Turkish 
economic privatization; tying the 1980s era negotiations to an overarching plan to 
privatize Turkey’s state owned electricity utilities. As Atiyas notes, “With regards to the 
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energy sector, governments tried to attract private capital through various contractual 
schemes entailing monopoly rights and government take or pay guarantees.”306  
These changes resulted in Ozal having the power to make nuclear specific 
decisions. Thus, after both KWU and AECL altered their bids to account for the 100 
percent vendor financing requirement, Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural 
Resources, Cemal Buyukbas, noted that the final decision over which reactor to choose 
was now in the hand’s of the Prime Minister.307 Ozal had close ties with ENKA, the 
Turkish private company working in partnership with AECL: his minister of customs and 
monopolies, Vural Arikan, was a former board member of ENKA and his former son-in-
law worked for the firm as did the son of his foreign minister, the brother of his press 
aide, and the brother of one of his closest advisors.308 At the time, ENKA was reportedly 
experiencing financial difficulties and needed the Akkuyu project to help become more 
competitive in Turkey’s private electricity market.309  
In these circumstances, Ozal had many competing interests when considering the 
country’s nuclear future. For one, he was quite corrupt310, which adds an element to 
nuclear decision-making that is rarely accounted for in nonproliferation scholarship. 
Thus, from the outset of the tender, AECL had the upper hand for two distinct reasons: 
they had the lowest bid; and ENKA had close ties to a corrupt Ozal. However, throughout 
the process the only constant in Turkey’s early decision-making was the insistence on 
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private vendor financing. Thus, for example, in a private meeting with the West German 
leadership in September, Ozal proposed new tender terms, asking that the vendor operate 
the plant for fifteen years before transferring it to the Turkish private firm that partnered 
with it.311 The change in terms forced the vendors to once again alter the terms of their 
bid to account for the construction costs and another $1 billion in interest payments on 
the loans needed to cover the gaps in funding.  
Ultimately, Ozal opted to begin exclusive negotiation with AECL (ENKA’s 
foreign partner), after agreeing to take a 60 percent ownership stake in a local project 
company that would oversee the construction of the power plant (KWU, by contrast only 
offered to take a 51 percent stake in the company).312 AECL conducted the negotiations 
without having first received guaranteed financing from the Royal Canadian Bank. To 
diminish risk, it reached an agreement with British turbine maker N.E.I. Parsons PLC, 
which also received the exclusive right to build a conventional power plant at a 
neighboring site. Nevertheless, the financing remained “cloudy,” according to a 
representative from White & Case, the law firm representing the Turkish government in 
the negotiations.313 
The two sides signed a preliminary agreement on August 22, 1985, which 
committed the AECL consortium to a 60 percent ownership stake in the project. AECL, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 Ann Taboroff and Ann MacLachlan, “Turkey wants a Nuclear Plant Constructor to 
Operate the Plant,” Nucleonics Week, vol. 25, no. 40, October 4, 1984.  
312 Ann Taboroff and Ray Silver, “Kraftwerk Union has Offered to Provide DM 710- 
Million,” ibid, vol. 25, no. 46, November 15, 1984; Ann Taboroff and Ann MacLachlan, 
“AECL Ready to Consider Turkish Government’s Terms for Akkuyu Project,” ibid, vol. 
25, no. 47, November 22, 1984; Ann Taboroff, “The Turkish Government Extends 
Akkuyu Negotiations with Both Competitors,” ibid, vol. 26, no. 8, February 21, 1985. 
313 Ann Taboroff, “Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) has reached an agreement 
with Turkey,” ibid, vol. 26, no. 28, July 11, 1985.  
	   192	  
however, remained cautious, with one executive saying that “there is still a lot to do 
before we finally have all the agreements in place ... The lenders have never been faced 
with a deal like this before.” 314  The financial deliberations inside the Canadian 
government persisted into 1986315 and eventually collapsed after lenders refused to 
finance the project, owing to concerns about the BOT financing arrangement.  
Ozal’s preference centralization continued after his death in 1993. Tansu Ciller, 
for example, continued to implement “Ozal like” reforms, in much the same manner of 
her Prime Ministerial predecessor. However, up until the mid-1990s, the BOT model had 
failed to attract investments in Turkey. It was only after the Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources passed updated BO regulations – outside of Parliament – that more 
foreign companies began to invest more heavily in Turkey’s energy sector. The new 
regulation included a dispute resolution under the UN Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), as well as a 100 percent Treasury guarantee during the 
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contract period for the then state-owned Turkish Electricity Generation and Transmission 
Company (TEAS).316  
Turkey’s Constitutional Court, however, voided these regulations, which forced 
the Turkish parliament to debate the issue; resulting in the passage of updated legislation 
in July 1997. This new law excludes nuclear power plants, which means that the Turkish 
government has yet to provide a Treasury guarantee for the cost of reactor construction. 
This resulted in foreign vendors continuing to forego cooperation with the Turkish state, 
due to continued concerns about the viability of the BOO model for nuclear power plants.  
Every Turkish politician after Ozal pursued this model, including the Islamist 
Necemettin Erbakan and the Kemalist oriented Mesut Yilmaz. Based on this history, the 
data indicates that the worldview – or even economic model – espoused by different 
Turkish leaders did little to affect their approach to nuclear energy issues. Instead, the 
decision was based on the Ozal precedent of using the energy sector to attract FDI. The 
current government, the AKP, has maintained this approach, despite the senior leadership 
equating the development of nuclear power with symbols of political power, particularly 
for Muslim majority countries.  
For example, the current Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has written 
extensively about nuclear issues during his time in academia Davutoglu’s academic work 
has since become the basis for Turkish foreign policy, which the AKP refers to “Strategic 
Depth.” Davutoglu’s approach to foreign policy derives from his belief in the potency of 
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Islam as a source of communal strength and political legitimacy317, as well as his 
adoption of turn-of-the-century theories of geopolitics. Key among the latter include 
Halford John Mackinder’s “Heartland Theory”, Nicholas J Spykman’s “Rimland 
Theory”, and the works of Karl Haushofer, whose theories on geopolitics are in turn 
derived from that of Freidrich Ratzel, who put forward the concept of lebensraum.318 This 
term has negative historical connotations, of course, but Haushofer’s understanding of 
geopolitics is premised on the argument that borders are not static, but are instead 
“dynamic” and “ever changing”319  
These scholars divided the world into zones, known as the “heartland”,320 
comprising much of Central Asia, and the “rimland”,321 which extended from Western 
Europe through the Arabian Peninsula to Asia. During the Cold War, these areas were 
under the influence of either the U.S. or the Soviet Union, thereby preventing the 
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expansion of Turkish influence there. The bipolar order, in turn, was upheld by the 
“balance of terror” and the reliance upon nuclear weapons to keep border’s static. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union was thus perceived by Davutoglu as an important 
opportunity for Turkey to extend its sphere of influence into these vitally important areas 
(many of which had been under the control of the Soviet Union). In Central Asia, the 
newly independent states were predominantly Muslim, had access to vital resources, and 
had historical and cultural links to Turkey. In the rimland, Davutoglu pointed out, eight 
of the world’s sixteen most important waterways were under the control of Muslim-
majority states. In Davutoglu’s view, therefore, Turkey’s connection to these states via 
their shared religion provided Ankara with the opportunity to expand its power and create 
strategic depth.  
Davutoglu then drew upon the work of Haushofer to explain why Turkey has 
natural lebensraum in both of these regions, which he described as the country’s “natural 
hinterland”.322 In this regard, he argued that Turkey was situated at the center of the 
Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, thus providing it with a natural hinterland. In 
turn, Davutoglu postulated, Turkey’s historical links to these areas meant that Ankara 
possessed a unique understanding of the numerous different cultures in its near abroad. 
This understanding, he argued, would allow Turkey to expand into these areas to carve 
out a zone of influence throughout much of the area once controlled by the Ottoman 
Empire. Davutoglu later incorporated this worldview into his foreign policy of “strategic 
depth”, which would come to be known as “zero problems with neighbors”. The policy 
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envisioned a region of borders blurred by increased trade and a common culture and 
history.  
The introduction of nuclear weapons, Davutoglu argued, solidified the Soviet 
position in the heartland, whereas the Western bloc remained riparian powers, focused on 
the rimland states. Based on this understanding of geopolitics, Davutoglu attributed the 
Cuban Missile Crisis to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s assertion that the British Empire’s 
control of the sea – and the United States’ subsequent taking over of that role after World 
War II  – guaranteed Anglo-American hegemony along the rimland. The Soviet Union, 
by contrast, was a land-power in the heartland. Moscow’s meddling in riparian Cuba, 
therefore, required a robust U.S. response and signaled a Russian attempt to gain greater 
control over a key piece of territory in the Caribbean Sea.   
Davutoglu’s point of view differs considerably from the most common 
explanation for Soviet actions during this period of the Cold War; specifically that the 
state of its missile forces were such that it could not guarantee a retaliatory strike against 
the United States, which required the forward deployment of shorter-range missiles 
systems to hold American targets at risk.323Similar to this, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Davutoglu wrote that Muslim World’s strategic position had been strengthened, 
owing to the fact that Muslim majority countries controlled both the heartland and the 
rimland. Kazakhstan, he continued, was an example of this because it “had nuclear 
capacity and power.”324 At the time of Davutoglu’s writing, Kazakhstan had formally 
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territory. The final Soviet weapon was removed in 1995, leaving Kazakhstan with five 
nuclear reactors (one power producing, with four research reactors.)325  
Furthermore, in his book, Strategic Depth, Davutoglu chastised the international 
community for its use of the term Islamic Bomb to describe Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
program, arguing that is akin to efforts to equate Islam with terror; further citing that 
western academics or policymakers don’t use the term “Hindu Bomb” to describe India’s 
nuclear weapons, or “Catholic terror” when discussing the Irish Republican Army’s 
bombings in London.326 This approach is reflective of Davutoglu’s central thesis about 
the post-Cold War order.  
Indeed, he contends that Western political theory is ill-suited to the Muslim world 
because it arrogantly assumes that individual knowledge can compete with that of Allah. 
He also blames the region’s instability on the import of Western political constructs like 
ethnic nationalism,327 arguing that the rulers who have embraced these concepts have lost 
their political legitimacy, having to rely instead on repression to remain in power. This 
repression, he asserts, is supported by the West, which fears that any change to the 
political status quo would undermine its own influence in the Middle East.  
Taken together, these comments on nuclear issues suggest that Davutoglu 
believes that the development of nuclear energy is an asset for Muslim majority states – 
and indeed  symbol of prestige, similar to Abraham’s central argument about 
fetishization. Similarly, deterrence kept in place a global order based on an unsustainable 
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status quo based on the subjugation of ethnic and religious identity. This worldview, 
however, has not resulted in any major changes to Turkey’s post-Cold War embrace of 
nonproliferation. The AKP has remained committed to the BOO model, despite it 
complicating the procurement of nuclear reactions. Had the AKP sought to procure a 
reactor for reasons related to “prestige” in the Muslim world, it could have pursued a 
traditional turn-key vendor model.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that this understanding of nuclear 
technology/nuclear weapons changed Turkey’s reactor procurement policy.  In fact, the 
AKP continued to emphasize the BOO model, despite the model’s financing provisions 
having prevented Ankara from procuring a reactor in the past. In 2008, for example, the 
AKP dominated Parliament passed a complicated nuclear law designed to entice foreign 
vendors without having to do away with the BOO format. Law No. 5710 empowered 
state-owned Turkish Electrical Authority (TETAS) to oversee the bidding process and to 
select the most competitive offer. The vendor would then be required to negotiate a 
bilateral arrangement to sell a certain amount of energy produced at the site for up to 
fifteen years directly to TETAS, which would then distribute it to the country.328 The law 
had been intended to further entice foreign companies to enter Turkey’s nuclear sector, 
but the failure to include a provision for a Treasury guarantee for the still in place BOO 
model limited Turkey’s options. 
This resulted in only one company, Rosatom, submitting a bid for the 2008 AKP 
backed nuclear tender. During the tender process, Turkey quietly let suppliers know that 
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it wanted vendors to take back spent fuel, which further indicates that it had no plans for 
reprocessing or long term spent fuel storage, underscoring Ankara’s emphasis on power 
generation, and not a nuclear weapons program.329 The single bidder resulted in Turkey 
cancelling the tender all-together, in favor of direct bilateral negotiations. The key 
difference between the Turkish and Russian position stemmed from the guaranteed price 
per-kilowatt hour. The Russian side initially proposed 21.16 U.S. cents per kilowatt-hour, 
whereas Ankara countered with a demand for Turkey favored a price around 12 U.S. 
cents.330  
Like during Ozal’s negotiations with AECL, graft may have also played a role. 
According to Western diplomats, “the outcome of separate ongoing negotiations between 
the two countries over future natural gas pipeline projects,” suggesting some element of 
corruption in the final decision-making process.331 Furthermore, the company’s that have 
since been selected to build the non-nuclear infrastructure at the Akkuyu site are known 
to be close to the AKP government; particularly, President Erdogan.332 Nevertheless, the 
two sides reached an agreement in May 2010, for Rosatom to build, operate, and own 	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four VVER-1200 nuclear reactors at the Akkuyu site. The Russian firm agreed to 
establish a local special purpose vehicle (SPV) to finance and manage the construction 
and operation while TETAS agreed to purchase 70 percent of the electricity from the first 
two units for a guaranteed price of 12.35 U.S. cents per-kWh. TETAS also agreed to 
purchase 30 percent of the electricity from the third and fourth unit.333 
Rosatom’s desire to enter the Turkish market is twofold: First, after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has provided numerous subsides to the Russian nuclear 
industry. Rosatom is not run as a for-profit company; instead receives funding directly 
from the Kremlin and its associated sovereign wealth fund.334 Second, Russia has few 
high-technology exports. Moscow is therefore eager to keep its foothold in the global 
nuclear market. In turn, Rosatom has embraced the BOO model, signing contracts with 
Egypt, Jordan, Vietnam, and Bangladesh on the basis of the Turkish agreement.335  
Indeed, Turkey’s subsequent agreement with Japan, which also had a political 
reason to conclude the BOO deal with Ankara, differs slightly from that of Rosatom 
arrangement. In a key departure – and in line with Ozal’s approach with AECL in 1986 – 
then Prime Minister Erdogan indicated that state utility EUAS was prepared to take up to 
a 25 percent stake in the project company.336 To this end, Turkey signed an agreement 
with a consortium of Mitsubishi, Itochu, and GDF Suez in March 2013 for the 	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construction and operation of an Atmea-1.337 The deal has yet to be finalized, but Taner 
Yildiz, Turkey’s energy minister, has said: “[EUAS] may own a maximum 30 percent of 
the shares in the nuclear power plant company to be set up with Japan. We want them not 
to have a share more than 30 percent. We have two models. The plan A is 49 percent of 
the shares. In the plan B, it falls to 25 percent and we share the remaining with private 
sector. The 51 percent share of Japan won’t increase. They are also forming their own 




The AKP’s approach to the issue differed little – if at all – from their 
predecessors. This continuity in Turkish nuclear decision-making suggests that the 
leadership’s world-view did not drive decision-making. If it did, one would expect the 
Islamist Erbakan to have adopted a different approach to that of Mesut Yilmaz, a more 
Kemalist oriented politician. Even in the case of Davutoglu, where there are some 
reasons to suspect that he has equated nuclear energy with Muslim empowerment, the 
government pursued the same policy as Turgut Ozal – the architect of Ankara’s BO 
policy. Taken together, the key driver of individual nuclear decision-making in Turkey 
remains the Ozal era emphasis on BO models of infrastructure development. This 
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suggests that different individuals, regardless of worldview, remain committed to using 
nuclear energy as a vehicle for private investment in the Turkish economy.  
 
The Anomaly: The Iranian Decision to Proliferate 
 
Compare this with the decisions made in the Islamic Republic. As explained in 
previous chapters, the evidence suggest the Iranian leadership made the decision to 
proliferation in 1984/1985; thereafter pursuing all of the infrastructure needed to support 
the development a nuclear warhead for delivery by ballistic missiles. The program was 
kept secret from the Iranian public up until 2002, when the NCRI revealed much of the 
program’s critical infrastructure.  
After the revelations about Tehran’s clandestine nuclear program in 2002, the 
enrichment program became a tool for the Iranian leadership to demonstrate their 
commitment to the tenet of the Islamic Revolution. Thus, western efforts to halt Iran’s 
enrichment program are framed within a commonly held conspiracy theory: The West is 
eager to keep the Muslim world weak to retain control over its dictators and energy 
reserves. The Islamic Republic argues that the 1979 Revolution upended this western 
strategy, resulting in continued efforts to overthrow the Iranian leadership.  
Did Iran’s leadership take a leap in the dark when it made the decision to 
proliferate? Which individuals shaped Iranian nuclear weapons policy? And is there a 
difference between the so-called moderates, perhaps best symbolized by Ayatollah 
Khatami and current Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani and conservatives? Ayatollah 
Khomeini was an archetypal oppositional nationalist and therefore should have wanted 
the bomb, per Hymans’ research. However, his first instinct after assuming office was to 
cancel the program, despite ample evidence that Germany would have continued with 
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construction of the Bushehr reactor. He also appointed Fereydun Sahabi, a non-nuclear 
expert, to run the AEOI because of his father’s loyalty to the revolution.  
Sahabi, a geologist by training, advocated for Iran’s mining of uranium, on the 
grounds that Iran would be able to mine and then export unrefined uranium independent 
of foreign expertise.  In 1979, for example, Sahabi said, “the activities of [the AEOI] 
were directed improperly in the past” yet indicated that Tehran would continue to 
prospect for uranium.339 Three days later, however, Sahabi described the Shah’s nuclear 
program as “a program imposed on the Iranian people.”340 This pronouncement echoed 
that of the new Iranian President Abdulhassan Bani-Sadr, who said, “that the nuclear 
program had ensued on the “basis of colonialist imposed treaties” that had increased 
Tehran’s dependence on the Western powers.”341 He did, however, leave open the 
possibility of mining for uranium, saying that “Uranium is one of the resources we have 
to evaluate ... If we don’t use it ourselves, we can always market it abroad.”342  
These early decisions were consistent with Ayatollah Khomeini’s post-
Revolutionary emphasis on four-core values. These values, according to Karim 
Sadjadpour, include: justice, independence, self-sufficiency, and Islamic piety. With 
regards to the links between these tenets and the nuclear program, Sadjadpour notes:  
A recurring theme in Khamenei’s speeches is the causal relationship linking 
scientific advancement, self-sufficiency, and political independence. His ideal 
vision is of an Iran that is scientifically and technologically advanced enough to 
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be self-sufficient, self-sufficient enough to be economically independent, and 
economically independent enough to be politically independent.343  
 
At its core, Khamenei’s argument is not all that different from Turkish Islamist 
arguments in favor of technological development. Conservative Turkish leaders, for 
example, also allude to a western plot to keep the Muslim world weak, so as to keep the 
region under colonial control.344  
The argument differs in how this widespread belief has been internalized by key 
decision-makers, and how these perceptions shape policy debates/policy making. As 
such, this common trope within the Muslim world about the nature of western policy is 
not the cause of the Iranian decision to proliferate. Nevertheless, much of Iran’s 
leadership now associates the enrichment program with the Revolution’s core values and 
ultimately view western efforts to limit the program as a ruse to keep Iran weak, in order 
to deprive the country of political independence. The Iranian leadership has latched on to 
this argument, even though the country’s research into enrichment had been a closely 
guarded secret before 2002.  
The tenets of the Revolution are reflected in the world view of Iran’s two key 
nuclear actors: The IRGC and a conservative cadre of key people, including Khamenei, 
who have been involved in many of Iran’s nuclear decisions since 1985. The IRGC was 
originally created to counter-balance the regular Iranian military, whose links to the Shah 
– and therefore loyalty to the Islamic Revolution – was a cause for concern for the 
Revolutionary government. Over time, the group has allied itself with Khamenei and is 	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now regarded as the aging leader’s most important bureaucratic supporter.  A 2009 
RAND study on the IRGC notes, “When reformists during the Khatami era appeared to 
be a threat to Khamenei, the IRGC and, particularly, its Basij [popular defense forces] 
force proved to be natural and indispensable allies.”345  
This symbiotic relationship has resulted in these two factions having a mutual 
interest in pursuing self-sufficiency as means to further empower their factions vis-à-vis 
other Iranian political groups through the control of illicit trade and Iranian 
religious/financial institutions, known as Bonyads.346 The IRGC controls construction 
companies, as well as the black-market trade and therefore profits from the illegal import 
and resale of a slew of controlled items, ranging from alcohol to foreign currency.347 
Khamenei, in turn, presides over a patronage network worth hundreds of billions of 
dollars; from which he is able to maintain personal control (and therefore ensure loyalty) 
over much of Iran’s key political and business interests.348  
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Thus, like in the case of previous Turkish and Iranian nuclear decisions, the role 
of graft and personal empowerment cannot be discounted as a key component of policy-
making. In this case, the interests of Khamenei and the IRGC overlap with their natural 
constituency, the Ruhaniyoun (the faction favoring the strict interpretation of the 
Khomeini’s ideology). This, in turn, has created an easy to discern narrative that 
policymakers have adopted to justify Iran’s nuclear secrecy. For these reasons, the more 
conservative elements in Iran have grafted the development of enrichment on to the core 
values of the Revolution. Karim Sadjadpour notes,  “For Khamenei, the nuclear program 
has come to embody the core themes of the revolution: the struggle for independence, the 
injustice of foreign powers, the necessity of self-sufficiency, and Islam’s high esteem for 
the sciences.”349 Based on this, one would also presume that the people he selected to 
assist with the development of the program, including the IRGC factions tasked with the 
weapons related work, share a similar world-view.   
As such, there is a certain amount of fetishization of nuclear technology within 
Iran. This fetishization, however, only took place after the revelation of the program, 
which suggests that this populist narrative was used to justify the expense (both monetary 
and political) of the program, rather than being the cause of Iran’s pre-2002 nuclear 
decision-making. If fetishization of technology had been the cause, one would have 
expected Khomeini to continue the program upon assuming power, ostensibly for reasons 
of prestige stemming from the development of nuclear technology independent of the 
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time of conflict suggests a different set of variables were the reasons for Iran’s 1984 
decision.  
As Hymans notes, when individuals make non-routine decisions, they often rely 
on subjective variables, as part of a process known as the availability of the heuristic.350 
During non-routine decisions, for example, individuals rely on deeply held beliefs and 
other subjective variables to simplify complicated decisions. In the case of Iran, this 
decision was further complicated by the on-going conflict with Iraq, an inherently 
challenging environment for decision-making, owing to the complexities of war, and then 
the need to respond to Iraqi WMD attacks. 
 Naresh Khatri and H. Alvin Ng note that an “unstable environment poses three 
challenges” for decision-makers. They are: 1) Time constraints on collecting data; 2) 
need to collect a large amount of data to deal with environmental instability; and 3) lack 
of reliability about data or information.351 In the absence of time and data, leaders rely on 
“an intuitive synthesis” of data they acquired and their own subjective thoughts on the 
topic. In a stable environment, Khatri and Ng note, “data are more reliable [and] there is 
not much pressure to collect data quickly.”352 Furthermore, as David L. Hamilton and 
Robert K. Gifford describe people’s tendency to rely heavily on illusory correlation when 
making judgments. Illusory correlation “refers to an erroneous inference about the 
relationship between two categories of events.” The study concluded that “distortions in 
judgments can result in the cognitive mechanisms involved in processing information 
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about co-occurring events, at least when the various events co-occur with differential 
frequencies.”353  
The reliance on illusory correlations suggests two things: First, Khomeini’s 
decision to cancel the program was probably a reflection of his association of the 
program with the Shah’s reliance on the West. In this regard, the Islamic Republic’s 
tenets of self-sufficiency and political independence were the two most critical subjective 
variables influencing decision-making. Second, during the Iran-Iraq war, the decision-
making environment was atypical, requiring rapid decision-making about the best way to 
fight and win the war. This resulted in the turn to nuclear weapons. Yet despite the 
decision to proliferate, the need for political and technological independence remained 
important. For example, after Iran concluded its first agreement for the procurement of 
nuclear technology from AQ Khan, it opted to first try and procure and construct the 
related equipment on its own, rather than import complete machines.  
After the war ended, the key decision-makers responsible for the 1984 decision to 
proliferate (Khamenei being the most prominent) remained in place; suggesting a link 
between these individuals’ conceptions of nuclear weapons and Iranian nuclear policy, 
independent of the threat environment. As such, Lavoy’s notion of “nuclear 
mythmaking,” whereby elites convince key decision-makers about the saliency of nuclear 
weapons helps provide greater insight into Iran’s post-Iraq war nuclear program. As of 
1988, Iran had internalized the need for nuclear weapons, resulting in the continuance of 
the nuclear program. The key decision-makers sat atop the bureaucracy, thus wielding 
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tremendous influence over the direction of Iran’s nuclear program. William Samuelson 
and Richard Zackhauser, in the article Status Quo Bias and Decision-Making, found:  
Despite a desire to weigh all options evenhandedly, a decision maker in the real 
world may have a considerable commitment to, or psychological investment in, 
the status quo option. The individual may retain the status quo out of 
convenience, habit or inertia, policy (company or government) or custom, because 
of fear or innate conservatism, or through simple rationalization.354 
 
This description of decision-making helps further elucidate the cause of Iran’s 1988 
decision to continue with its nuclear program, despite the end of the war with Iraq. The 
key leadership remained in place; between 1985-1988 these key officials had internalized 
the need for nuclear weapons; once the decision was made, status quo bias kept the 
program in place.  
The change came only after a major event – the 2002 revelation and subsequent 
concerns about military action – forced a political change. In this regard, the hitherto 
rationalization for the program changed, owing to a different set of inputs influencing 
leadership decision-making. This change empowered so-called moderates more amenable 
to compromise, ostensibly to ensure that Iran’s security was not compromised by the tool 




The role of individuals and the subjective variables inherent in decision-making 
explains the differences between Turkish and Iranian nuclear decisions. The relationship 
between X (input) and Z (policy) is the way in which the key decision-makers respond to 
and then ultimately make nuclear decisions (Y). This means that X (input) does not 	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always lead to Y (nuclear decision) resulting in the same Z (policy). In the cases of Iran 
and Turkey, the decisions correlated with the leaders unique worldview. The Shah, for 
example, judged inputs through the prism of his fear of Arab nationalism, and thereby 
discounted the salience of nuclear weapons, so long as nonproliferation norms could be 
trusted to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In fact, the Iranian monarch “cooked 
the books” so to speak by commissioning biased reports to fit his conception of nuclear 
energy.  
Khomeini’s rejection of the West, in turn, was the key reason for his nuclear 
decisions between 1979 and 1984. The introduction of WMD forced the Iranian leader to 
make a non-routine decision, which psychological research suggests results in leaders 
relying on the availability of the heuristic. In the case of revolutionary Iran, these 
heuristics reflected the leadership’s understanding of the world – and were thereby linked 
to the aforementioned tenets of the Revolution. From this perspective, nuclear weapons 
are seen as a natural tool to gain independence. Yet, in a clear reflection of Iran’s 
emphasis on technological independence, the leadership opted for a rather unorthodox 
path to the bomb; choosing to only purchase a list of components and a few centrifuge 
machines, rather than a turn-key plan from the AQ Khan network. Other known 
proliferators, like Libya, opted for the latter approach.  Iran, by contrast, wanted to 
develop the technologically indigenously from documents purchased from Khan.  
To be clear, Iran’s troubles doing so forced the leadership to return to the Khan 
network in 1994, but it was only after its internal efforts failed did Iran re-evaluate its 
policy. This approach suggests that the prevalence of status quo bias is critical for 
understanding the trajectory of Iran’s program. The leadership’s policy only changed in 
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reaction to Iran’s policy of indigenous development failing, perhaps best evidenced by 
Iranian decision to return to the Khan network in 1994 for more assistance with 
centrifuge development.  
The prevalence of status quo bias also elucidates the key variables influencing 
Turkish decision-making. As of 1977, Turkey’s economic situation and nuclear energy 
plans required substantial vendor financing. For this reason, the pre-Ozal governments 
pushed for a vendor-financing model. Thereafter, in 1983, the economic oriented Ozal 
sought to use the electricity sector to attract foreign investment; thereby viewing nuclear 
energy as an extension of a far broader policy to attract much needed FDI. Subsequent 
Turkish leaders, regardless of their political outlook, adopted the same policy. This 
continuity suggests status quo bias continues to influence key Turkish decision-makers 
and that nuclear energy is still viewed through the prism of the country’s overarching 
efforts to attract FDI through privatization and foreign investment in critical 
infrastructure projects. Indeed, the BOO model is the financing model of choice for every 
major Turkish infrastructure project, ranging from the construction of shopping malls, 
bridges, airports, and the two nuclear power plants.  
Based on this information, this study argues that it is possible to put together a 
new model of proliferation behavior. To properly understand how a state will respond to 
X input, one must first identify the key subjective variables that individual leaders rely 
upon when formulating policy. These variables, in turn, create a natural framework from 
which to draw conclusions about the likely direction of state policy – and thus allows for 
more accurate proliferation forecasting. Thus, in general, economic concerns will frame 
Turkish policy responses to various inputs, whereas Iranian leaders will strive for 
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political/technological independence. These key subjective variables, in turn, help 
elucidate the way in which each country’s leadership views key security challenges, or 
issues related to global nonproliferation norms.   
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Findings: The Dynamics of Decision-Making in Iran and Turkey 
  
Traditional explanations for proliferation decision-making are based on a simple 
assumption: In an anarchic environment, state X will choose to pursue/forego nuclear 
weapons for Y reason. Therefore, when exposed to Y reason, other states will implement 
similar policies. Building upon this assumption, the dominant explanations for 
proliferation and restraint rest on a common set of assumptions: the international system 
is anarchic, states act in their own interests, and that the unit of analysis should be the 
state.  
Neo-realist/realist theorists therefore contend that states will seek out nuclear 
weapons to maximize state power, or as a tool to balance against a nuclear armed/nuclear 
latent rival state. The dominance of realism/neo-realism in the nonproliferation field has 
resulted in the widespread belief of reactive proliferation, whereby the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons in one state will ultimately result in regional proliferation “chains”. Yet 
despite consistent pessimistic assumptions about the inevitably of rapid proliferation, few 
states have actually chosen to develop nuclear weapons.  
To account for this nuclear restraint, constructivist and neo-liberal scholars argue 
that states take norms into account when devising nuclear policy. In turn, the 
internalization of a norm against proliferation and/or the actual use of nuclear weapons 
have rendered the weapon obsolete. As such, all but a few states have turned to 
nonproliferation norms/treaties for security; obfuscating the need for nuclear weapons. 
Solingen, in her seminal work on proliferation, put forward another argument, wherein 
proliferation decision-making is dependent on the regime’s “mode of political survival”. 
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Inward oriented states, Solingen notes, are more likely to proliferate, whereas outward 
oriented states are more likely to accept nonproliferation norms.  
This study found that Turkish and Iranian nuclear decision-makers respond 
differently to similar inputs. As such, the unit of analysis in the aforementioned studies – 
the state – is inadequate to identify the nuances inherit in nuclear weapons/energy 
decision-making. Instead, policy decisions reflect the approach taken by key decision-
makers – and are thus beholden to the inherent biases (the availability of the heuristic) of 
the leaders empowered to make nuclear decisions.  
Hence, when faced with similar inputs, this study found that similar states respond 
differently to these challenges. Thus, this study’s hypothesis is null: Similar inputs do not 
result in similar nuclear decisions.  
Furthermore, the data indicates that that nuclear decision-making is multi-causal 
and therefore cannot be explained using one single nonproliferation theory. The theories 
tested in the previous three chapters do explain certain instances of Turkish and Iranian 
nuclear decision-making. However, they fail to capture the nuance and reasons for each 
nuclear decision – and thus cannot be relied upon to derive a definitive conclusion about 
the causes of nuclear decision-making in both Iran and Turkey. Instead, this study found 
that the tendency to use the state as the unit of analysis is inadequate to capture the 
reasons for/and why Turkey and Iran made different nuclear decisions when faced with a 
similar input. 
As such, the method of analysis Hymans and Lavoy put forward – the individual 
– has more relevance when identifying the reasons for nuclear decision-making in 
different states. Furthermore, this study also found that nuclear decisions reflected the 
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individual conceptions of security and nonproliferation norms; and thus the policies 
adopted were curtailed around an individual’s understanding of the specific inputs. Iran 
and Turkey, for example, viewed regional threats differently. These differences, in turn, 
influenced nuclear policy. Similarly, both Ankara and Tehran thought of nonproliferation 
differently during the 1970s, and since 1985 have pursued opposite policies.  
Moreover, once a decision was made, subsequent leaders followed a similar 
policy regardless of the inputs. Iran’s decision to break with the previous adoption of 
nonproliferation, ostensibly for a combination of security and normative reasons, is a key 
data point that helps shed light on the role of individuals in shaping radical policy 
changes. For example, even though Iran had made the decision to acquire nuclear 
weapons, the leadership’s policy reflected a continued emphasis on technological 
independence; a key tenet of the Islamic Revolution. This decision delayed the 
advancement of the program, but nevertheless was the key subjective variable that 
underpinned the implementation of this policy between 1985 and 2003. Taken together, 
this data suggests that even during times of radical policy changes, individual preferences 
continue to influence policy-making.  
Thus, even though similar states may end up adopting the same policy – signing 
and ratifying the NPT, for example – the reasons for doing so may be completely 
different. This was certainly true for Iran and Turkey. More broadly, the identification of 
the reasons for policy-decision helps to address a key lacuna in nonproliferation 
scholarship; namely the dynamics of proliferation, or the reasons why states adopt 
specific nuclear policies. To discern the reasons for nuclear decisions, this study found 
that one has to account for the subjective variables influencing nuclear decision-making – 
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and how those subjective inputs influence policy makers; and are then reflected in the 
policy-making process.  
These variables, in turn, influence the key decision-makers, and ultimately shape 
policy decisions. Thus, per Hymans’ argument, a leader that has an affinity for nuclear 
weapons is more likely to proliferate, if presented with the justification to do so. That 
justification could stem from security related concerns or be a result of the key decision- 
maker’s deeply ingrained belief in the salience of nuclear energy/weapons for prestige 
reasons. Similarly, leaders who associate nuclear energy with economic development 
and/or energy independence are more willing to accept positive reports about the 
technologies benefits and dedicate state resources to procuring or developing a reactor.  
This study also found that nuclear myths are often used to justify the leader’s pre-
conceived conception about the value of nuclear energy/weapons. Thus, if a leader has a 
positive association of nuclear energy and/or weapons, then he will use widely held 
myths to justify his nuclear decisions. This suggests that, as Lavoy argues, mythmaking 
plays a role in an individual’s understanding of nuclear related issues. However, in the 
cases of Iran and Turkey, the leadership propagated the myth, rather than a powerful 
person in the bureaucracy. This centralized decision-making meant that the programs in 
both countries reflected the priority given to it by the most important decision-makers. 
This study has thus tentatively concluded that policies reflect the point of view of key-
decision-makers. And thus the myths used to justify those polices are likely to have been 
internalized by the leaders who used them in the first place to frame policy decisions.  
The Shah, for example, was apathetic to nuclear energy related issues during the 
1960s. Thus, between 1957 and 1972, Iran’s program was confined to University level 
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research, per the ambitions of its largest supporter: Shah confidante and Tehran 
University chancellor, Manoucher Eqbal. The program’s focus changed after the Shah 
prioritized the development of nuclear energy in the early 1970s. The specific reasons for 
the Shah’s nuclear change of heart are unclear, but the data suggests that the Shah made 
the decision to try and conserve oil for export in 1972. This decision prompted the turn 
towards nuclear as the principle means with which replace fossil fuels for power 
production. To support this proposal, the Iranian monarch relied upon a series of 
industry-drafted reports to justify his ambitious plan. The decision was thus based on 
flawed data and served as a feedback loop, whereby the data served to validate pre-
conceived notions about the value of nuclear energy.   
Similarly, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program also reflected the vision of its 
most important decision-maker, Ayatollah Khomeini. The program was therefore 
cancelled in 1979, and later resuscitated in 1984 to support a dual pronged program 
aimed at developing the front end of the fuel cycle and nuclear weapons development. 
The Islamic Republic’s initial decision-making between 1979 and 1984 suggests that 
prototypical oppositional nationalist leaders, like Ayatollah Khomenei, do not necessarily 
“want the bomb”, as Hymans suggests. This indicates that, indeed, there may be a trigger 
that results in “those more likely to proliferate” making a decision about a weapons 
program. Yet, that “trigger” is also dependent on a key-decision maker’s perception of a 
specific input. In this instance, Iran’s concern about a future Iraqi nuclear weapon did not 
trigger the decision to proliferate, but rather the combination of international isolation, 
western acquiescence to Iraqi chemical weapons attacks, and the WMD attacks 
themselves all appear to have played a role in changing Khomeini’s approach to 
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nonproliferation. Thus, a leader can “learn to love the bomb” if properly predisposed and 
pushed in that direction by a unique set of circumstances.   
The notion of a security threat, for example, is dependent upon the point of view 
of the key decision-maker – and is thus not the only cause of (non)proliferation decision-
making. For Turkey, the Soviet Union was viewed as an existential threat. The Shah, by 
contrast, engaged in a policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Yet, while Turkey largely 
ignored the Middle East, the Shah believed that the threat of Arab nationalism posed the 
greatest risk to Iranian national security. As such, both countries viewed tangential 
security related issues, like the American policy vis-à-vis Cyprus and Pakistan, 
differently. These key divergences resulted in two different nuclear weapons’ policies – 
and, by extension, different potential proliferation triggers. Turkey incorporated nuclear 
weapons into its defense plans and ultimately relied upon them to deter a Soviet invasion. 
Iran, by contrast, turned down an American offer to use nuclear weapons to defend the 
Zagros line, choosing instead to focus on the procurement of advanced conventional 
arms.  
The Turkish policy resulted in Ankara shunning the NPT, whereas the Shah 
signed the document to help prevent proliferation in the Middle East. Ankara viewed the 
NPT as an affront to its own reliance on nuclear weapons for defense and thus resisted 
signature of the document for as long as possible. Turkey eventually reversed course on 
the NPT in 1977, after the formulation of supplier guidelines and Ankara’s nuclear 
energy ambitions required signature.  
Iran’s early adoption of nonproliferation stemmed from the Shah’s concerns about 
proliferation in the Arab Middle East. To ensure Iran’s conventional superiority, the Shah 
	   219	  
ultimately decided on a policy of support for the NPT. This policy stemmed from the 
Shah’s concerns about maintaining Iran’s military superiority over its Arab neighbors, 
rather than the Soviet threat. As such, the NPT was a worthwhile document to prevent 
proliferation. This meant that Iran had few disincentives to sign a treaty that had the 
support of its most important ally, the United States; from which it depended upon for the 
conventional weapons it needed to maintain military superiority in the Gulf. 
The two countries also launched nuclear energy programs in 1973. Iran benefited 
from the dramatic increase in global energy prices. The rapid infusion of petro –dollars 
allowed for the Shah to finance his nuclear program – and most importantly, attract 
foreign vendors to assist with the development of the program. The dramatic increase in 
energy prices triggered an economic crisis in Turkey, which ultimately forced the 
government to diversify its sources of energy. This focus on nuclear energy eventually 
resulted in Turkey changing its approach to the NPT. To attract financing for a planned 
nuclear research center – and to allow for the export of nuclear equipment from NSG 
countries – Turkey signaled its support for the NPT in 1977.  
Yet, despite this willingness to support nonproliferation norms, Ankara’s lack of 
foreign currency prevented the country from attracting the major nuclear energy vendors. 
These dynamics point to a serious divergence in the formulation of nuclear policy in both 
countries: Iran is able to rely on its oil largess to finance its nuclear ambitions, whereas 
Turkey has to rely on creative financing mechanisms to address its economic weaknesses. 
This key divergence explains Turkish decision-making after the 1980 military coup. 
Turgut Ozal formally codified Turkey’s vendor financing model in 1983, which thus 
elevated the importance of economic/financing concerns for civil nuclear decision-
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making. This model has continued to be used by all subsequent Turkish politicians, 
which indicates that economic/financing concerns continues to be the most important 
variable underpinning civil nuclear energy decision-making.  
The Islamic Republic, by contrast, opted to cancel the nuclear program in 1979. 
The Shah’s reliance on western nuclear companies to implement the country’s nuclear 
policy explains the reasons for the program’s cancellation. Khomeini, speaking from 
exile in France just before his return to Tehran, had said in January 1979 that all business 
contracts with American and foreign countries should be reviewed and that those that 
“went against the interest of [the Iranian] people should be cancelled.”355  
Upon returning from exile, Khomenei appointed a political loyalist to lead the 
AEOI and ultimately decided to cancel much of the Shah’s ambitious nuclear program 
(which had run into financing issues related to global energy prices in 1978.) This 
decision – which coincided with the start of the Iran-Iraq war – suggests two things: First, 
Iran’s bombing of Iraq’s nuclear facilities during the opening days of the war indicates 
that there was concern about the development of nuclear weapons in Iraq. Nevertheless, 
Iran took no initial step to proliferate. Second, Khomeini was a prototypical oppositional-
nationalist, and per Hymans’ argument, should have wanted the bomb. Khomenei’s 
decisions, however, suggest that the key drivers of early nuclear decision-making 
stemmed from the subjective association of the nuclear program with the Shah, and the 
Iranian monarch’s reliance upon the West for critical nuclear technology.    
The decision to proliferate stemmed from two interrelated events: First, the Iraqi 
use of chemical weapons prompted the Iranian leadership to consider nuclear weapons. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 Paul Lewis, “Khomeini Demands Review of Iran’s Foreign Deals: Ayatollah Will 
Visit Cemetery,” New York Times, January 22, 1979, p. A11. 
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Second, this decision was based in part on the failure of the nonproliferation regime – and 
the international community as a whole – to condemn and/or stop the Iraqi chemical 
attacks. These concurrent issues prompted the Iranian leadership to conclude that the 
nonproliferation regime was subservient to the geopolitical ambitions of the world’s great 
powers; most of which were hostile to the Islamic Republic. Thus, while Turkey had 
begun to embrace nonproliferation norms, Iran was moving in the opposite direction 
(albeit after having settled on nonproliferation between 1979 and 1984). 
However, in an indication of how Iran’s emphasis on technological independence 
guides state decision-making, Iran sought to maintain its independence whilst developing 
enrichment technologies. Rather than pursue the turn-key approach to the front end of the 
nuclear fuel cycle like Libya, Iran chose to purchase the list of the AQ Khan network’s 
European suppliers for centrifuge components. This decision resulted in a slow 
development process and eventually forced Iranian decision-makers to procure 500 
complete centrifuges directly from the Khan network in the mid-1990s.   
The data suggests that whereas Turkey has elevated financing concerns when 
making nuclear decisions, the Islamic Republic is determined to gain technological 
independence from the West - even if this policy slows down the realization of specific 
policy goals. The Iranian leadership has subsequently used this ex-post facto 
rationalization to describe its clandestine nuclear activities. Iran’s focus on independence 
also framed the internal Iranian debate about nuclear policy after the 2002 revelation of 
its once clandestine nuclear program.  
During the intra-government policy debates, a schism emerged: Iranian moderates 
advocated for greater transparency, whereas more conservative elements advocated for a 
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more hardline position vis-à-vis cooperation with the West. Despite this disagreement, 
both sides advocated for Iran retaining the right to enrichment. The direction of Iran’s 
post-2002 policy included input from numerous decision-makers. The final decision was 
left to Ayatollah Khamenei. Faced with this intra-governmental disagreement, Iran’s 
Supreme Leader decided on a diplomatic compromise, wherein elements of the weapons 
program remained in place. The Iranian Foreign Ministry was given some leeway to 
reach a comprehensive agreement with the West. The enrichment issue remained a 
redline, and ultimately was used as means with which to propagate the tenets of the 
Revolution.  
These two cases indicate that nuclear decision-making is multi-causal and 
ultimately based on an individual’s conception of key external inputs. In both Iran and 
Turkey, nuclear policy reflected the conception of similar inputs; and thus resulted in 
different policies to address similar challenges. These divergences further suggest that the 
dynamics of proliferation/nonproliferation are country specific, rather than based on a 
universal model. Related to this, this study also found that there is not a universal 
trigger/restrain that explains proliferation decision-making.  
Thus, to build a more accurate proliferation model, this study found that scholars 
must first identify key decision-makers and then determine which variables influence 
policy-making. Such a determination allows for the identification of these drivers of 
decision-making – an indeed what a potential nuclear trigger may be. These decisions 
help inform the likely courses of action individuals will take when presented with 
different inputs. This study, for example, found that Turkish leaders weigh economic 
considerations when making security related decisions – and are thus more likely to adopt 
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policies that do not undermine its economic interests. The Iranian leadership has 
consistently shown that economic considerations are secondary to the perceived benefits 
of resistance to the West and other nebulous tenets of the revolution. This study 
tentatively concluded that this approach to policy-making stems, at least in part, from the 
two countries’ different economic models. Iran, as a rentier state, simply had more cash 
on hand than Turkey, and thus has the luxury of making decisions without taking into 
account how the policies would upset the economy.  
These key divergences help explain why these two similar states responded 
differently to similar inputs. Key decision-makers have a different understanding and 
solutions to similar events. These key differences result in different policies and thus call 
into question whether there is an all encompassing model – or universal trigger – for 
proliferation decision-making. Certainly, in the cases of two similar states, Iran and 




Year Nuclear Decision Nuclear 
Energy/Nuclear 
Weapons 
Reason for Decision 
Turkey (Aggregate)   
1954 After Atoms for Peace announced, Turkey first 
approached US about nuclear energy  
Nuclear Energy Economic 
1955 Conclude nuclear agreement with US Nuclear Energy Economic  
1956 Inquire about nuclear weapons Nuclear Weapons Security 
1957 Support NATO communiqué Nuclear Weapons Security/Alliance 
Management 
1957 First dual capable delivery system - the Honest 
John - is deployed in Turkey. The US begins to 
train Turkey to use the system 
Nuclear Weapons Security 
1959 Sign Nuclear weapons agreement Nuclear Weapons Security 
1959 Turkey first articulates its nuclear weapons 
policy 
Nuclear Weapons Security 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Resist US policy of 
trading Jupiters in Turkey for Soviet nuclear 
weapons in Cuba 
Nuclear Weapons Security 
	   224	  
1963 Submarine port visit to Izmir Nuclear Weapons Security/Alliance 
Management 
1964 TAEC formulates its first plan for nuclear 
energy 
Nuclear Energy Economic 
1967 Turkey resists signing the NPT over concerns 
about pre-delegation and NATO nuclear 





1967 Atomic Demolition Munition War Plan Nuclear Weapons Security/Alliance 
Management 





1972 TAEC revisits its 1964 plan to develop nuclear 
energy 
Nuclear Energy Economic 
1976 Negotiations with Sweden begin Nuclear Energy Economic 










1979 Turkey expresses support for introduction of 
Pershing missiles in Europe 
Nuclear Weapons Security/Alliance 
Management 
1980 Sweden cancels nuclear talks with Turkey Nuclear Energy Economic 







1982 Reissue Akkuyu tender Nuclear Energy Economic 
1983 Tender terms finalized, but then reissued in 
line with new legislations 
Nuclear Energy Economic 
1983 Signs three letters of intent: AECL, KWU 
(Akkuyu); General Electric (Sinop) 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
1984 General Electric withdraws, citing turkey's 
financing legislation 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
1984 Final negotiations with KWU for Akkuyu Nuclear Energy Economic 
1985 Negotiations with AECL begin, after KWU 
balked at Turkey's financing requirements 
Nuclear Energy Economic 
1986 Turkey alters BOT law Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
1986 Ankara expresses an interest in acquiring fuel 
fabrication technology; explores mining for 
uranium 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
1988 Negotiations with Argentina begin Nuclear Energy Economic 
1990 Argentina and Turkey announced their 
intention to form a joint company to oversee 
the development of a larger 25 MW Carem 
LWR 
Nuclear Energy Economic 
1991 NATO decides to decrease the total number of 
tactical nuclear weapon, leaving some 700 
gravity bombs in Europe  
Nuclear Weapons Security/Alliance 
Management 
1991 Nuclear artillery shells are removed from 
Turkish territory  
Nuclear Weapons Security/Alliance 
Management 
	   225	  
1992 Nuclear weapons removed from Eskisehir air 
base, leaving nuclear weapons in three Turkish 
airbases: Akinci/Murted, Balikesir, and Incirlik 
Nuclear Weapons Security/Alliance 
Management 
1994 BOT legislation updated  Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
1994 Tansu Ciller issues a decree creating the 
pathway to BOO 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
1995 US nuclear weapons consolidated at one air 
base: Incirlik.  
Nuclear Weapons Security/Alliance 
Management 
1995 Turkey decertifies its DCAs Nuclear Weapons Economic/ Alliance 
Management 
1996 Ciller's decree is overturned Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
1996 MUNSS Teams leave Akinci and Balikesir Nuclear Weapons Security/Alliance 
Management 
1997 Turkey re-launches nuclear tender Nuclear Energy Economic 
1998 Turkey delays a decision on the 1997 tender, 
owing to upcoming elections, and supplier 
disinterest 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
1999 Turkey announces that it will select a winner 
for the 1997 tender in October 2000, despite a 
recent earthquake 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
1999 Turkey signs and ratifies the Comprehensive 






2000 Turkey defers on making a decision in its latest 
nuclear tender 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2000 Turkey signs the Additional Protocol, ratifies it 







2001 Turkey cancels the 1997 tender Nuclear Energy Economic 
2005 Ankara turns down a US offer to permanently 
station US DCAs in Turkey 
Nuclear Weapons Security/Alliance 
Management 
2006 Turkey begins informal discussions with 
AECL for Akkuyu 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2008 Turkey updates BOO law Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2008 Turkey makes clear that it prefers a take back 
provison; also expresses interest in developing 
thorium fuel cycle 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2008 Ankara expresses an interest in becoming a 
regional fuel fabrication center, but rules out 
enrichment 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related/Nonproliferation 
2008 Turkey objects to US backed NSG proposal to 
black certain nuclear exports 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related/Nonproliferation
/Treaty Interpertation 
2008 Despite lack of interest and political 
instasbility, Turkey announces that it will 
proceeed with nuclear tender 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2008 Turkey begins to review Russia proposal Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2009 Turkey expresses its displeasure with Russia's 
bid and cost per-kWh 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
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2009 Turkey cancels the tender negotiations with 
Russia 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2010 Turkey chooses to forego tender process, in 
favor of direct bilateral negotiations 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2010 turkey and Russia reach a preliminary 
agreement for the Akkuyu site 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2010 Turkey agrees to NSG clean text; thus 
overcoming its intial reluctance on US backed 
language to 'black box' certain nuclear exports 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related/Nonproliferation
/Treaty Interpertation 
2010 Turkey signs an MOU with South Korea for 
nuclear cooperation; begin discussions about 
Sinop 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2010 Negotiations with South Korea's KEPCO 
collapse; Ankara begins talks with Japan's 
Toshiba 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2011 Ankara's freezes its talks with Toshiba; signs 
an MOU with SNC-Lavalin 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2012 Turkey signs an MOU with China Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2013 Mitsubishi and Itochu begin negotiations with 
Ankara 
Nuclear Energy Economic/Supplier 
Related 
2013 Mitsubishi-Itochu-Areva consoritum selected 
to begin exclusive bilateral negotiations 











Iran (Aggregate)   
1955 The Majlis approved $132,000 for the nuclear research 
laboratory at the University of Tehran 
Nuclear Research Nuclear 
Research 





1956 Manoucher Eqbal travels to the United States, meets with 
NGOs and asks for funding for University of Tehran nuclear 
research center 
Nuclear Research Nuclear 
Research 
1956 The Iranian ambassador to Washington, Ali Amini, was 
authorized to send a formal letter to Secretary of State Dulles 
indicating a desire to begin negotiations on a nuclear 
cooperation agreement. 
Nuclear Energy Nuclear 
Research 
1956 Iran and the U.S. agree to delay the signing of the Atoms for 
Peace Agreement after the Shah expressed an interest in 













1957 Iran sent scientists to Baghdad for training at British run 
nuclear research center 
Nuclear Research Nuclear 
Research 
1958 Iran agrees to host CENTO nuclear research center after 
overthrow of King Faisal 
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nt 
1959 The Majlis ratified the Atoms for Peace agreement after 









1959 US and Iran discuss the use of nuclear weapons to defend 
























1972 The Shah directed the Ministry of Water and Power to 
develop a feasibility study for the development of a nuclear 
energy program. 
Nuclear Energy Nuclear 
Energy/Eco
nomic 
1974 Shah gives his Norouz address outlining the country's 
nuclear energy plan 
Nuclear Energy Economic/
Political 
1974 The Shah creates the AEOI Nuclear Energy Economic/
Political 
1974 Iran concluded a "super turn key" agreement with Germany 
for the sale of two reactors at Bushehr 















1974 Iran begins nuclear cooperation negotiations with the United 
States 









1974 Iran allocates $300 million to construct a nuclear research 








1975 Work began at Bushehr, despite the fact that the two sides 
had yet to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement 





1975 Iran begins to explore laser enrichment after being 
approached by Jeff Eerkens 




1975 Iran signed an agreement with EURODIF Nuclear Energy Nuclear 
Energy/Sup
plier 
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Relations 
1976 France and Iran reached an agreement for the supply of two 
nuclear reactors to be built at Darkhovin near the city of 
Ahwaz on the Karun River 




1976 Iran and Germany signed a nuclear cooperation agreement, 
after overcoming American led issues about reprocessing 




1977 The Majlis ratified the nuclear cooperation agreement with 
Germany 




1977 Iran and Germany signed a declaration of intent for the 
construction of four air-cooled reactors at a site in the 
Isfahan area near the town of Saveh 




1978 Iran changed the financing terms with France and reached an 
agreement to pay for the reactors with oil.  




1979 Announced that the $6.3 billion contract for the construction 
of two reactors at the Darkhovin site and the ENTEC 






1979 The new leadership in Tehran appointed Fereydun Sahabi as 
undersecretary of the ministry of energy and head of the 





1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran peremptorily abolished the 
nuclear development program 
Nuclear Energy Economic/
Political 
1980 Iran cancels work at Bushehr, but indicates it will continue 






1980 Iranian jets target Iraq's nuclear reactor Security Concerns  Counter 
proliferatio
n 
1981 The AEOI begins  experiment with uranium conversion and 
reduction. 




1981 The AEOI reaches an agreement with France for the supply 
of conversion equipment 





1982 The Islamic Republic revisits its nuclear program and 
expresses an interest in continuing work at Bushehr 
Nuclear Energy Political 
1982 Parliament Speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani led a 
parliamentary delegation (including today’s president 










1983 the Islamic Republic approached Argentina for help with 
procuring conversion equipment and fuel fabrication for use 









1985 Iran signs a secret nuclear cooperation agreement with China Nuclear Nuclear 







1985 Iran begins centrifuge R&D Dual Use Political/S
ecurity 
1985 Iran reaches out to numerous EU suppliers for a lathe 









1986 a high level Iranian delegation, comprising President 
Khamenei, Foreign Minister Velayati, and Construction 
Jihad Minister Bijan Zangenh, met with Pakistani President 
Zia al-Haq to inquire about purchasing fuel cycle equipment 





Iranian officials meet with AQ Khan representative; 
acquiring technical schematics and centrifuge equipment for 
a centrifuge facility as well as a list of illicit suppliers in 
Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, for which Tehran 
reportedly paid $3 million 
Dual Use Dual 
Use/Politi
cal  
1987 Iran and Pakistan sign a nuclear cooperation agreement, 

















1988 Iran's Sharif University tries to purchase a mass spectrometer 









1989 Lavizan Shian is opened. The site is managed by an entity 









1990 Sharif University sent three identical telexes to Thyssen, 
Bakker Madava, and Magnet Applications for magnets 









1990 Sharif university sent two more telexes to Air Products, a 
British supplier of fluorine gas, 10 kilograms of “mega-
grade” sulfur hexafluoride. The gas is sometimes used as a 









1991 The AEOI begins laser enrichment work - a program that 







	   230	  










1992 Iran and Russia reach an agreement to complete the Bushehr 
reactor 





1993  Bukhari Sayed Abu Tahir, a businessman in Dubai 
representing the Khan network, approached a private 
company in Iran with an offer to sell centrifuge technology 













1994 Iran recieves  a duplicate set of drawings for the IR-1 
centrifuge, along with components for 500 centrifuges. Iran 









1995 Russia and Iran conclude a secret addendum to the nuclear 
cooperation agreement that included a commitment to assist 
Tehran with its uranium mining efforts and to provide it with 








1995 After American intervention, Russia voids the secret 
addendum and its decision to provide a centrifuge facility. 
Russia agrees to supply Bushehr with nuclear fuel 





1995 Russia's Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power 
Technology (NIKIET) and the D. Mendeleyev University of 









1995 AEOI centrifuge research is moved from the AEOI to the 








1995 Vyacheslav Danilenko, a member of the gas dynamics 
research group at Chelyabinsk-70, a Russian nuclear 
weapons laboratory, approached the Iranian embassy in 
Ukraine with the offer to assist Tehran with the production 
of ultra-dispersed diamonds (UDD or nanodiamonds). 
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Supplier 
Dynamics 






1997  Aghazadeh made the decision to begin the construction a 40 









1998 The AEOI asks Amir Kabir, an Iranian University, to 




























1999 Iran's alleged weaponization work is consolidated; dubbed 
AMAD plan and placed under the leadership of Mohsen 
Fakhrizadeh (Mahabadi) 







1999 Iran begins work at Gchine - a uranium mine separate from 









1999 Kimia Maadan, which allegedly acted as a front for both the 










2002 AEOI sends P2 design to a private Iranian company for mass 
production 
Dual Use Dual Use 
2002/2
003 
Work on Project 111 - the purported effort to design the 
triconic warhead variant’s payload chamber to accommodate 





2002 AMAD plan reportedly tests the R265 shock generator 
system - a multipoint unlensed system that uses a castable 
explosive mixture of TNT and RDX to generate a uniform 
shock wave to compress the fissile core 
Nuclear Weapons Nuclear 
Weapons 
2003 Iran razes the Lavizan Shian site Nuclear Weapons Detection/
Security 
Related 
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2003 Rouhani consolidates the nuclear “file”; the weapons 
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Conclusion 
 
As more information becomes available and scholars gain access to new tools to 
analyze nuclear programs, nonproliferation and Middle East experts will be in a better 
position to determine the dynamics of proliferation. In doing so, future research can add 
to the two case studies discussed in this dissertation and, perhaps, improve upon its initial 
findings. This study suggested that nuclear decision-making is multi-causal, owing to the 
key decision-makers’ differing interpretation of inputs. As such, states respond 
differently to similar inputs, and therefore the dominant theories on nuclear decision-
making fail to capture the dynamics of proliferation in different countries. 
However, confidence in this assertion can only come with more research. The 
most important course of action is to document nuclear decision-making in states that did 
not proliferate, compared to states that have explored developing nuclear weapons. The 
fact remains that most leaders don’t pursue nuclear weapons. What explains their 
restraint? And how does that compare to leaders who did choose to proliferate?  
This study also suggests that leaders are not necessarily pre-disposed to “want the 
bomb,” and instead may “learn to love the bomb” when exposed to a certain trigger. 
However, this trigger is dependent on the perception of key-decision makers. This finding 
raises interesting questions: Why do some leaders “learn to love the bomb?” Similarly, 
why do some leaders “love the bomb,” only to determine at a later date to discontinue a 
long established nuclear weapons program?  
Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, for example, all pursued nuclear 
weapons, only to abandon the program after making progress. Syria and Israel, neighbors 
in the Middle East, also launched nuclear weapons program; with Jerusalem successfully 
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developing and deploying a nuclear weapon in as early as 1967. By contrast, two other 
regional states, Oman and Jordan, have never pursued nuclear weapons, with Muscat 
adopting a non-interventionist foreign policy premised on non-alliance and mediation. 
Omani foreign policy in general differs considerably from that Saudi Arabia, which has 
long been suspected of keeping its nuclear options open owing to concerns about Iran. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia also helped to fund two other nuclear programs in Iraq and 
Pakistan, further suggesting that not all proliferators are created equal and threat 
perceptions are individualistic.  
These differences in decision-making warrant more scrutiny to determine the 
drivers of nuclear decision-making in different countries. Why, for example, do certain 
states proliferate and/or pursue nuclear weapons, whereas others have embraced 
nonproliferation? To address these questions, scholars benefit from more rigorous 
analyses detailing the reasons why similar states, in different regions through out the 
world, have made different nuclear decisions. The focus on these dynamics will, in total, 
help scholars to develop a more rigorous theoretical framework designed to measure how 
states respond to similar inputs. This data, in turn, can then be used to make a 
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